Socialisation into European professional and political communities

An ethnographic study of seconded national experts deployed by EASO and Frontex to the Lesvos migration hotspot

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Preface

The Post-Crisis Legitimacy of the European Union (PLATO) (2017-2020) was an Innovative Training Network (ITN) funded by the EU's Horizon 2020 programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions. 15 PhD researchers have studied the legitimacy of the EU's crisis responses in a number of different areas together with senior researchers in a consortium of nine university partners and eleven training partners, coordinated by ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo.

By investigating the legitimacy of the EU's responses to the financial crisis, PLATO has generated new understanding of where crises can also be legitimacy crises for the EU. It has used the example of the financial crisis to build and test theory of what would amount to a legitimacy crisis in the case of a multi-state, non-state political system such as the EU.

This report is part of a project series which publishes the doctoral theses written by PLATO's 15 Early Stage Researchers. The report is a fascinating micro-study of one of the most 'macro' questions of European integration: namely, how, if at all, is political community built at the European level through processes of individual socialisation? Disillusioned with answers to that question based on demographics, Gil Thompson sought to investigate the problem through an ethnographic study of beliefs. The search for answers took him to a migration hotspot on the island of Lesvos where he interviewed and observed seconded national experts (SNEs) deployed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) in support of Greek authorities. So, here you might say, were people whose allegiances were thoroughly mixed up. Yet, the thesis finds that beliefs about legitimate authority formed in professional communities that are neither purely national nor purely European matter a great deal to the performance of tasks. Professional identities can contribute to political identities.

Chris Lord

PLATO Scientific Coordinator

Abstract

The European Union (EU), though a treaty between states, is different from previous international organisations in the depth and breadth of its aims. Termed a supranational organisation, it seeks not only to work in the common interest of its 27 member states, but in the general interest of the Union. Scholars of EU studies have long debated the construction of this emergent political community, asking whether it would come to exist the manner needed to legitimise these newfound powers.

A subset of these researchers has been particularly interested in European socialisation, a field that studies how time spent working in European institutions leads to effective cooperation and the creation of a common, imagined collective. Reviewing literature dating back to the 1970s, this report finds consistent results showing that inductees' ages and countries of origin seem to matter consistently for their likelihood of undergoing European socialisation; however, few other results appear consistently and across studies

The theoretical contribution of this work is to argue that beliefs, rather than demographics should be studied. By looking at how novel organisational roles and norms cohere to those learned over time in national communities, the socialisation process can be better understood.

Setting the study at the Lesvos migration hotspot, this study uses ethnographic research methods to understand the microprocesses of the socialisation process among Seconded National Experts (SNEs) deployed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) in support of Greek authorities.

On the basis of intensive fieldwork, including formal interviews with 24 SNEs and participant observations, this research finds that beliefs regarding legitimate authority and what constitutes high-quality work, formed during their tenures in national professional communities, help explain the efficaciousness of the socialisation process on Lesvos. Moreover, the work finds that the European professional community built on the Greek island undergirds the formation of an inchoate political one. These results contribute to those early questions asked by scholars of European integration and contain practical lessons for mangers and trainers overseeing diverse European workforces, as well as for policymakers and civil society looking to instil best practices.

Acknowledgments

I owe thanks to far more people than I could list here. I will therefore mention only some by name but would like all those who supported me to know how much I appreciate their help.

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my principal advisors – Prof. Dr. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Dr. Geoffrey Edwards – for their guidance and insight.

I am also grateful for the generous financial support I received from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Marie Skłodowska Programme through the Innovative Training Network entitled *The Post-Crisis Legitimacy of the European Union (PLATO)*.[1] In particular, I would like to thank the network's core team, Prof. Chris Lord and Marit Eldholm (both University of Oslo). I would also like to thank all of my fellow Early Stage Researchers across Europe and in particular Julien Bois (Hertie School), Jose Piquer (University of Cambridge) and Ivana Skazlic (University of Vienna) for their endless patience and assistance.

I am also privileged to have been a part of the Cluster of Excellence *Contestations of the Liberal Script* (SCRIPTS)[2] and would like to thank Prof. Dr. Tanja Börzel (Freie Universität Berlin), Prof. Dr. Thomas Risse (Freie Universität Berlin) and Prof. Dr. Michael Zürn (Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung).

As a member of the Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre, I've had the fortune to meet Policy Fellow Lucas Rasche, who shared his insights on migration governance, and Visiting Fellow Prof. Jonathan White (London School of Economics and Political Science), whose advice on analysing diachronic social phenomena was crucial for my work.

I gained invaluable insight into fundamental rights issues while seconded to the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), for which I am grateful in particular to Prof. Dr. Sergio Carrera, Marco Stefan, PhD and Lina

Table of contents

List of figures

List of acronyms and shorthand terms

BAMF	Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, German Ministry for Migration and Refugees
CEAS	Common European asylum system
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
Commission	European Commission
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives in the European Union, from the French 'Comité des Représentants Permanents'
CWG	Council Working Group
DG	Directorate General
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EBCG	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (2005-2016); European Border and Coast Guard Agency (2016-present)
GAS	Greek Asylum Service
IA	Inaudible or hard to understand interview segment
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IF	Ideational Framework
JAP	Joint Action Plan
Member state	Member state of the European Union
SNE	Seconded National Expert
TFEU	Treaty on the Function of the European Union

Terminological notes

The report uses the term 'applicants' or 'applicants for asylum' to refer to the people who have crossed from Turkey to Lesvos in search of international protection. However, participants will often also use the terms 'refugees' and 'migrants' interchangeably with 'applicants.'

The subjects of the interview are mostly referred to interchangeably as 'SNEs,' 'guest officers,' 'officials,' 'officers' or 'participants.' The exception is the few times EASO interpreters are mentions. Not being SNEs, they are only referred to as 'participants.'

Participants in this study are pseudonymised, referred to with 'they/them' pronouns and given pseudonyms from Greek mythology.

[Home Country], when used in a quotation, refers to the participant's home country, not the applicant's.

The report is divided into chapters, sections and subsection, respectively.

After the lay public had been turned out into the street, the atmosphere of sanctity downstairs at the entrance gradually gave way to a flaming row in Italian. The clerics seemed to have undergone a transformation. Onno could not follow what all those grumbling old voices were saying, but regarded the fact that this had happened as a confirmation of his theory of the Golden Wall: behind the Church's wall things were just like everywhere else — and in a certain sense that was right and proper, because in this way those impassioned old men in their black dresses proved that they were religious professionals and not pious amateurs.

– Harry Mulisch, *The Discovery of Heaven*

Chapter 1

Introduction

When the European Community was first constructed, scholars and practitioners had many concerns about how this new, growing bureaucracy could be managed. The European Council was conceptually fairly straightforward: representatives of the various member states would meet together and negotiate agreements in their mutual interest. There was plenty of precedent for such a forum, including the United Nations and the International Trade Organisation. There was less consensus, however, about how the supranational European Commission might work. Commissioners, as well as the civil servants working under them, were not supposed to act in the interests of the countries they were from; rather, they were instructed to act for the benefit of the whole of the Community.

Would officials, upon induction to the Commission, really work for the benefit of the inchoate construction of Europe rather than for that of their home countries, in which they were taught and trained? Some thinkers saw this as a question of socialisation. When a new member is inducted into an organisation, they are introduced to novel roles and norms, which they are expected to perform and adhere to without the need for regular incentives or sanctions. The scholarly literature has looked at organisations ranging from multinational firms to rebel armies, asking how new beliefs and behaviours are instilled in inductees. A subfield of this work focuses on European socialisation, which is interested in how

working at European institutions leads to the adoption of new roles and norms, especially those which are relevant to the project of European integration.

These studies span the gamut from a focus on effective negotiation at the intergovernmental Council to questions about whether working at the supranational Commission might lead to a transfer of loyalty from one's member state to Europe. Researchers tended to study these questions with surveys and interviews, looking to understand whether and how novel roles and norms are internalised, being performed and adhered to without the need for regular incentives or sanctions, what is known as type I socialisation. Others go further, asking whether these roles and norms might become taken for granted, being performed and adhered to beyond a given, locally occasioned context, in what is referred to as type II socialisation. Taken together, these works are difficult to neatly compare due to the use of a broad variety of operationalisations and conceptualisations. However, the literature generally finds small effects, best predicted by the age of the inductee and their nationality. Moreover, it is challenged by the effects of self-selection because people who join a given organisation are more likely to be predisposed to accepting the roles and norms it espouses.

The limits of previous research into European socialisation can be distilled into three categories. By focusing on clearly measurable inductee characteristics, such as age and nationality, reliability is achieved at the cost of validity. These characteristics do not affect socialisation directly, but only insofar as they are indicative of less-tangible beliefs or behaviours that make inductees more or less likely to be socialised (see section 3.2). Second, although previous work has been laudable in contrasting the differential effects of various organisational characteristics – notably whether they are supranational or intergovernmental – the focus has been mostly on inductees based in Brussels, with only few exceptions. As a result, it is difficult to know how much of what the field knows about the socialising effects of European institutions applies outside this bubble (see section 3.4). Finally, surveys and interviews are very useful for aggregation and big-picture analyses, but elude a deeper understanding of the complex microprocesses of socialisation (see section 3.1).

This work is inherently explorative, as it tries to address all three lacunae at once. On the basis of six months of ethnographic fieldwork, it looks to illustrate how pre-existing beliefs affect socialisation. The theoretical frameworks does not see socialisation as a binary outcome, but as a complex process in which inductees interpret, modify and parse prospective roles and norms they encounter. Inductees' web of pre-existing beliefs, dubbed the 'ideational framework,' helps understand findings in previous works about the socialising effects of age and nationality.

Finally, context is thought of as capable of facilitating or hindering the socialisation process. By setting the study in Lesvos, the report shows how the affective setting of Europe's infamous camp Moria combines with the social setting of a beautiful Greek island to facilitate or hinder the socialisation of national officials – known as Seconded National Experts (SNEs) – who are deployed by the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO)[3] in support of Greek authorities' migration management efforts. On the basis of interviews with and participant observation of dozens of officials, the work generates a corpus of transcribed materials which shows who these people are and how they act upon and react to the novel socialisation claims they encounter during their deployments.

The principal finding of this report is that novel socialisation claims (roles and norms) need to cohere to particular pre-existing beliefs. Type I socialisation, in which inductees perform and adhere to roles and norms without regular incentives or sanctions, requires coherence to beliefs regarding legitimate authority. Type II socialisation – by which inductees come to take novel roles and norms for granted, performing and adhering to them beyond the locally occasioned context of their deployment – requires these claims cohere to beliefs internalised as a result of membership in national professional communities. As a result, almost all work-related roles and norms are accepted by participants in the manner of type I socialisation. Even if participants in the study disagree with them, these SNEs accept the legitimate authority of the organisations under which they operate and so adhere to the norms and perform the roles as

[3] In 2021 EASO has been rechristened as the EU Agency for Asylum (EUAA).

required, without the need for regular incentives or sanctions. However, they must see these roles and norms as consistent with their nationally formed beliefs about how work ought to be done in order to take them for granted, perhaps continuing to adhere to and perform them once their deployments have ended.

As for more political socialisation claims regarding European solidarity and identity, this report shows how the European professional community on Lesvos can undergird the construction of a European political community. Encountering what most participants see as a general failure to manage borders and asylum, SNEs lay blame at the feet of politicians and higher-ups, whether in Brussels or national capitals. They compare their street-level perspective and practical cooperation to a politics that is far away from immediate problems and dedicated more to scoring points than addressing social ills. As a result, many officers come to see solidarity as a norm needed for the EU to function. Some go further yet and begin to see themselves as Europeans or strengthen their existing European self-conceptions.

Due to the design of this research, it is incapable of saying precisely what characteristics of which inductees lead to what outcome. Nevertheless, it shows the roles of pre-existing beliefs in socialisation, demonstrating that if European institutions wish to increase the effectiveness of socialisation outcomes, they ought to deeply understand who the experts they deploy are and what they believe. Moreover, this report hopes to set the stage for future rigorous, large-scale studies that seek to go beyond demographic categories and truly heed Geoffrey Checkel's (2003) call to take qualitative factors of socialisation seriously.

Chapter 2

Literature Review: European Socialisation

European Studies has been interested in socialisation since the early years of European integration. The EU's unusual construction – more than an intergovernmental treaty but less than a federal system – has led scholars to wonder about the people who manage it, whether in the Commission, Council, Parliament, Court of Justice or one of its many agencies. Would they effectively work together and adhere to a shared system of roles and norms? Would these people become committed Europeans, interested in the welfare of the Union as a whole, or would they remain nationals, seeking to advantage their home countries at every turn? To answer these questions, many scholars have looked to socialisation, the process by which organisations induct newcomers into roles and norms.

This literature review begins by discussing socialisation generally, explaining that studies in this area seek to understand how and why inductees internalise roles and norms. Some studies seek to learn whether inductees internalise these new roles and norms in the form of type I socialisation, performing and adhering to them without the need for regular incentives or sanctions (Checkel, 2005b, p. 804-5). Others go further, asking whether these inductees go on to adopt "new interests or possibly identities" in what is known as type II socialisation (Zürn and Checkel, 2005, p. 1065-6).

The review chronicles work on European socialisation since the 1970s. It shows that the field has undergone an important change at the start of the millennium, shifting from thinking of socialisation as primarily a function of time in an organisation, to a more nuanced view, which incorporates myriad qualitative factors. This chapter aggregates these factors and distinguishes them from one another, considering the effects of characteristics of inductees, of their particular experiences and of their different organisations.

Afterward, an overview of empirical findings is provided, showing that age upon induction and country of origin affect socialisation consistently across studies. These findings form the basis for the theoretical framework of this report presented in chapter 3. The chapter ends with a discussion of lacunae in the literature on European socialisation and a forward-looking consideration of how this report can address them.

2.1. Socialisation, an Overview

Given its prominence in European Studies, this work uses Jeffrey Checkel's (2005a, p. 804) definition of socialisation:

> [Socialisation] is defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.

This definition introduces a series of important terms, which are discussed in turn.

In the context of socialisation, norms usually refer specifically to social norms, contra moral or legal ones, which are "the informal rules that govern behavior in groups and societies" (Bicchieri and Sontuoso, 2018, sec. int.). These have been central to theories of socialisation going back to Parsons (1951). Although subject to change (Mackie, 1996), norms are

relatively static. Roles[4] refer to contextually dependent identities, according to which agents are expected act on the basis of norms (adapted from Bicchieri and Sontuoso, 2018, sec. 2). They "are deeply embedded in institutions that structure the range of roles available and structure how particular roles are to be played" (Searing, 1991, p. 1245).

Socialisation in this work is defined as the process by which members are inducted into and internalise roles and norms. Internalisation means that inductees have incorporated these into their pre-existing beliefs.[5] Behaviourally, socialisation presents itself as sustained compliance without the need for regular incentives or sanctions. This sustained compliance ought to be based on a logic of appropriateness, rather than one of consequence, meaning that it "is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions" (Checkel 2005a, p. 804). Logics, as used in this sense, refer to "modes of action" (Schulz, 2018, p. 914), the system of reasoning by which individuals come to form beliefs and take actions. The contraposition of logics of consequence and appropriateness "characterize the difference between deliberate and habitual action" (*Ibid.*).[6] The key feature of the logic of consequence is "the presence of calculated choice between alternatives" (*Ibid.*). The logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, has to do with the "matching of rules to situations" (*Ibid.*, p. 915). In a decision-making process governed a logic of consequence, the agent chooses a course of action based on regular incentives or sanctions; in one governed by a logic of appropriateness, the agent chooses a course of action based on analysis of which internalised roles and norms apply to a given situation.

The shift from a logic of consequence to one of appropriateness is an important modifier to the notion of compliance as the outcome of socialisation because it demonstrates internalisation. This shift does not mean that agents following the logic of appropriateness are no longer

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[4] Checkel refers to norms and rules. This work is less interested in formal rules, but instead follows in including roles, which are common in more sociological analyses of organizational socialization (see Trondal, 2007).

[5] Chapter 3 introduces the term 'ideational framework,' which formalises this concept.

[6] For an earlier formulation, see March and Olsen (1989), which is critiqued by Goldman (2007).

rational or self-interested, nor that consequences are no longer guiding their actions. Rather, they do not consider their self interest in every action. Instead, they generally do what they are supposed to do out of habit, perhaps with a general notion that compliance is in their self-interest. This shift in logic is a limited claim, intending to offer a way out of the prisoner's dilemma which constrains cooperation by introducing the expectation of mutual adherence to roles and norms in repeating games (Scharpf, 1997).

Because shifts in logics are difficult to demonstrate empirically, the crucial component of Checkel's definition is compliance in the absence of incentives or sanctions. Such compliance is straightforwardly operationalizable and due to the structure of the definition of socialisation, can be taken to imply that a shift in logics has occurred. As a result, this work does not seek to demonstrate a shift in logics *per se*, focusing instead on changes to behaviours or beliefs, which definitionally imply a change of underlying logics. Further methodological details are discussed in chapter 4.

Scholars go beyond simply looking at whether or not socialisation occurred, often subdividing socialisation into types I and II (Checkel, 2005; Hooghe, 2005; Lewis, 2005). Type I refers to internalised roles and norms followed on the basis of a logic of appropriateness but does not go so far as to question whether they are taken for granted. Checkel (2005a, p. 804) explains:

[Inductees] behave appropriately by learning a role – acquiring the knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations – irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it. The key is the agents knowing what is socially accepted in a given setting or community. Following a logic of appropriateness, then, means simply that conscious instrumental calculation has been replaced by conscious role playing.

This definition of type I socialisation implies that appropriate identities are performed only within the context of the socialisation organisation. A fundamental shift in belief structures is not expected, nor would one expect any deeper impact on an inductee's basic worldview or identity.

Type II socialisation, on the other hand, is concerned precisely with whether internalised roles and norms become taken for granted. In this type of socialisation,

> appropriateness may go beyond role playing and imply that agents accept community or organizational norms as "the right thing to do" … *It implies that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part.* Conscious instrumental calculation has now been replaced by "taken-for-grantedness" (*Ibid.*, emphasis added).

Type II socialisation goes beyond investigating whether a person can seamlessly play roles and adhere to norms as expected by an organisation. It asks whether the person has somehow changed.

Dividing socialisation into types I and II can cause empirical difficulties because the distinction is not clearly observable. Researchers use surveys and interviews to glean insight, but the lack of a definitionally behavioural component sets limitation for the ability to extrapolate from observation. Critiquing findings of type I socialisation, one could well ask whether it is possible that roles and norms can be internalised, performed and adhered to over long periods with no deeper effect. Likewise, even in cases in which type II socialisation is reported, one ought to question whether these roles and norms would continue to be performed and held once an institutional structure no longer enforced them.

Although there are some practical difficulties with the distinction, it remains important, not only because type II is in certain a sense a stronger, or deeper version of type I, but because the two types have traditionally been used to answer different questions. Type I is practical for answering questions about how rational consideration of repeating games leads to the internalisation of roles that make long-term cooperation possible. This is notable in Scharpf's (1997, p. 34) work on cooperation, which sees actors as rational and strategic, but takes seriously "the enabling, constraining shaping effects of… institutional structures and institutionalized norms." Specifically, in the EU institutional context, type I socialisation is useful for explaining how a diverse political structure full of competing interests and veto points socialises inductees into roles and norms that allow it to function effectively (Moravcsik, 1991; Scharpf, 1988; Spence, 1995).

Type II socialisation, on the other hand, has been used primarily in EU Studies to answer questions deriving from debates about neofunctionalism, which posits that supranational institutions – among other forms of cooperation – facilitate European socialisation among elites (Stone Sweet and Sandholz, 1997). The notion, roughly stated, is that European socialisation might lead elites to identify self-consciously as Europeans, or with values underpinning an inchoate European community (Haas, 1964; Risse, 2005; Schmitter, 2005).

One may think of type I socialisation as the buttressing of the Gesellschaft and of type II as the undergirding of the Gemeinschaft (Weber, 2019; Tönnies, 1957). However, it should be emphasised that although Checkel sees identity as a possible outcoming of type II socialisation, identity change is not necessary for it to be present. The notion of socialisation as a process with this most ambitious, perhaps teleological end can obscure what is more useful about socialisation for EU Studies: it offers a perspective for understanding a social mechanism through which repeating games lead to sustained behavioural change (type I) and possibly changed interests and even identities (type II) (Zürn and Checkel, 2005, p. 1065).

Prior to socialisation becoming a mainstay of political science research, it was much more central to psychology. Studies of European socialisation regularly engage with the psychological literature, most notably earlier works by Searing and Tajfel (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; 1982; Searing, Schwartz, and Lind, 1973; Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz, 1976)[7]. The interdisciplinary translation has led to some insights getting lost and concepts getting stretched (Sartori, 1970). In psychology, socialisation focuses on mutable parts of an individual's psyche, looking to understand what can or does change in people as a function of time and life experience. This is where type II socialisation comes in, but the general theme of resistance to socialisation is also relevant for understanding challenges to type I.

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[7] Citing authors include Beyers (2010, p. 910-1), Checkel (2017, p. 595), Flockhart (2004, p. 379), Gheciu (2005, p. 992), Hooghe (1999, p. 439) and Trondal (2007, p. 1114), among others.

Psychology has long seen fundamental personality characteristics as mostly immutable after childhood:

> On perhaps no other major issue do widely variant psychological theories lead to such congruent predictions. Whether one is an extreme hereditarian, an environmentalist, a constitutionalist, or an orthodox psychoanalyst, he is not likely to anticipate major changes in personality after the first few years of life (Kelly, 1955, p. 659).

Put another way, competing socialising influences act upon mostly static personalities (Searing *et al.*, 1976).

Personality's relative immunity to change undergirds resistance to socialisation, which increases as a function of time and experience throughout adulthood. That is why the field of EU Studies considers primacy[8] to be the foremost factor affecting the likelihood of socialisation. In the psychological literature, however, primacy contains three assumptions, explained here in the case of political orientations:

> The first is that political orientations are learned during childhood. The second is that this childhood learning further shapes any subsequent modifications of them. The third is that the scale of any such subsequent modifications is small: fundamental political orientations tend to endure through life
>
> (Searing et al., 1976, p. 83).

Political orientation, however, is naturally a more complicated and problematised concept for the political scientist than for the psychologist.

In Searing's work, political orientation is almost tautologically covariant with personality, including metrics such as authoritarianism. When political orientation becomes definitionally untethered from personality, the relationship becomes weaker. For example, a more contemporary

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[8] Hooghe (2005, p. 889) uses primacy to refer to inductees to the European Commission, which are at least in their 20s. Searing *et al.* (1976, p. 113), whom she cites, pushes back against the foregrounding of aging effects in explaining orientation changes, finding the Zeitgeist effect considerably more important.

meta-analysis of related literature looking at political conservatism finds that personalities are only weakly covariant with political orientation because "the relationship between personality and political orientation fundamentally depends on the social context" (Sibley *et al.*, 2012, p. 675).

Taken together, these findings imply that there is some basic personality that is mostly fixed during childhood and that insofar as personality characteristics imply a political orientation, that is also relatively fixed. However, political orientation in the sense of conservatism, liberalism or other ideological frameworks is a product of personality conditioned by social context. Given that European Studies tends to be interested in political views regarding Europe or the EU, these can be thought of as a step or two farther removed from personality than more fundamental political ideologies. As a result, the psychological literature leads one to expect personality to retain an influence, but that life experience has strong effects.

These complexities are why Checkel (2003, p. 225) describes socialisation as a middle-range theory full of exceptions, conditions and limitations that is unimpressed with grand-theoretical analyses. Instead, studies of socialisation consider how, in certain contexts, organisations can influence beliefs and behaviours, notwithstanding resistance from the primacy of relatively fixed personalities.

It is clear why socialisation became an important concept in European Studies. With the creation of European institutions, scholars wanted to know how they would affect the people in them and how these diverse people might work together. These questions have led to a fruitful research agenda, which has its limitations, but answers crucial questions about how European organisations manage their diverse national workforce and how these inductees are changed by the experience.

2.2. Early Research into European Socialisation

As described above, the literature on European socialisation can be understood from the perspective of types I and II socialisation as having twin goals. One, relating to the former, is to explain how, through exposure to institutions and one another, bureaucrats speaking dozens of languages, representing 27 member states and trained to take into

consideration sundry ideological, parochial and other interests, manage to work together at all. This observation is followed by questions regarding how they manage to do so in practice.

The next, even more ambitious hypothesis, relating to type II socialisation, is that perhaps the habitual performance of these roles and adherence to these norms might lead to their being taken for granted. That is, officials in European institutions are not only performing roles and adhering to norms because they are supposed to, but because their underlying beliefs have changed. Taken even further, scholars ask whether this conversion could form or buttress something resembling a European identity (Lewis, 2005, p. 967).

One can see these two questions entangle in Scheinman and Feld's work (1972, p. 133), which understands socialisation as successful once bureaucrats "considered themselves part of an 'insider group' in terms of transnational economic and political goals." Their hypothesis is explicitly derived from Haas' (1964) neofunctionalism: "Both secondment and bureaucratic interpenetration presumably contribute to political socialization processes enhancing the integrative potential of central institutions" (Scheinman and Feld, 1972, p. 121). In effect, the authors suggest that spending time in a European bureaucracy may lead officials not only to become socialised in the sense implied by type I, but to see themselves – in the manner of type II socialisation – as part of a group working for Europe, rather than just their member states.

Scheinman and Feld's (*Ibid.*, p. 134) interviews with 23 Dutch national administrators who had participated in the European Economic Community process find that socialisation "appears to progress only haltingly." They explain that socialisation is thwarted because "basic identity, bureaucratic motivation, and the defense of functional interests serve to balance the potential socializing effects of interpenetration"[9] (*Ibid.*, p. 135). Their study is emblematic of social scientific scholarship on Europe at the time, with its small sample size and ambitious hypothesis relying on grand theory. More importantly though, it uncovers the basic dynamic that will animate later work: bureaucrats experience tensions

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[9] Interpenetration may be equated here with the term 'contact' used in later works.

between the pre-existing beliefs they have as member state nationals and new ones they encounter during their induction into European institutions. In the fifty years since this study, even though methodologies and conceptualisations have changed and improved, the basic finding suggesting only small effects in terms of type II socialisation has continued to hold.

Scheinman and Feld's focus on socialisation in European bureaucracies is a pioneering application of the concept. Scholars at the time tended to show more interest in socialisation as it pertained to mass publics and questions regarding intergenerational value transmission, often in dialogue with Ronald Inglehart's (1967; 1970; 1971) psychology-informed work on public opinion. The dialogue turned into a backlash as the 1970s ended and it became apparent that there was "lack of clear evidence of elite-led or socialization-pushed movement either in support for European unification or for the Community" (Handley, 1981, p. 359). Nevertheless, there was an understanding that what Bach (1992, p. 28) called *transnationale Fusionbürokratie* relied on a process in which "die europäische Integration in erster Linie auf Prozessen der [institutionell] Differenzierung und Rationalisierung beruht."

European socialisation, especially as a result of time spent in EU bureaucracies, fell out of fashion and would not re-emerge until the 1990s (Niemi and Hepburn, 1995). Organisational socialisation, however, especially in management studies and psychology, remained a productive area of inquiry (Feldman, 1981; van Maanen and Schein, 1977; Morrison, 1993; Ostroff and Kozlowski, 1992; Reichers, 1987); however, this did not translate to European Studies, which was more focused on refining the concept of European identity and understanding public perspectives on the emergent European Union.

The interest among scholars of Europe in questions of identity, however, would come to be important for better understanding European socialisation. Perhaps most important was the move away from positing a competition between European and national identities. Instead, scholars conceptualised a European identity that could be seen a thinner version of national identity, resting on common interest and relying on output-oriented legitimacy, as opposed to the thicker national identity, which rests on a Gemeinsamkeitsglaube and relies on input-oriented legitimacy

(Scharpf, 1999, p. 7–13). Not all scholars agreed, with Cerutti (1992, p. 152-8) positing European identity as a type of supranational identity in contradistinction to national identity, resting on interdependence, shared normative commitments, common challenges, and institutionalisation (Cerutti, 1992, p. 152–8). However, the balance was in favour of conciliatory analyses, such as Risse's (2004b, p. 251) marble cake model, which characterised subnational, national and transnational identities as mutually constitutive, arguing that "the various components of an individual's identity cannot be neatly separated on different levels from each other."

This "complexification of identities" (Risse and Maier, 2010, p. 74) blended with questions about the myriad ways European and member state institutions fuse into (Bach, 1992; Rometsch and Wessels, 1996) and affect one another (Mény *et al.*, 1996; Olsen, 1996; Trondal, 2001), leading eventually to a reinvigorated interest in the socialising potential of time spent in European institutions. Scholars described an emergent Eurocrat culture (Abélès *et al.*, 1993; Shore and Black, 1992) and asked questions about how European bureaucrats "might come to discern other, more individual aspects of their partners, which could be independent from their nationality" (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998, p. 308). Put another way, scholars hypothesised "that, in general, national profiles tend to become modified and watered down as length of [European] service increases" (Egeberg, 1996, p. 726).

The 1990s saw a surge in interest in European socialisation, much of it the work of Egeberg (1996) and Hooghe (1999). One of the most-cited articles in what may be called the new literature on European socialisation was published by Jeffrey Checkel in 2003, a decade after the Maastricht Treaty instituting European citizenship was signed. In it, he asks whether administrators 'go native' in European institutions; that is, whether and to what degree they are inducted into European roles and norms in the manner of type II socialisation. He (2003, p. 210) argues that there is a need for a micro-level analysis because "much of the literature downplays or brackets such dynamics and, instead, offers macro-historical or macro-sociological arguments on the preference-shaping influence of European institutions." To rectify this shortcoming, he studied micro-level "patterns of social interaction within two of the Council's committees—the

Committee of Experts on Nationality and the Committee of Experts on National Minorities" in order to produce a mezzo-level theory focusing on "the central roles of persuasion and argumentation in preference change" (*Ibid.*, p. 212).

This new approach can be seen as a final break with older works that were grounded in attempts to contribute to grand theoretical debates begun by Mitrany (1948), Deutsch (1957; 1961), Haas (1964; 1968) and Hoffmann (1966) and continued by Moravcsik (1993), Hooghe and Marks (2009) and Bickerton *et al.* (2015a; 2015b). A couple of years following Checkel's seminal article, the fall of 2005 saw publication of a special issue of *International Organization* dedicated to *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe*.[10] The issue effectively laid out the parameters of the debate, which persist to the present. Checkel (2005a, p. 803) reiterated that the principal theoretical contribution of research into socialisation is to offer middle range theories that focus on developing scope conditions that help to "explore the mechanisms of state/agent socialization."

He goes on to share the authors' mutual definition of socialisation, which sees it as both a process and an end state, defining the former "as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" and the latter as "sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms" (Checkel, 2005a, p. 804). It also offers a helpful distinction between socialisation types I and II, explaining that type II requires that "agents accept community or organisational norms as 'the right thing to do" and "implies that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are a part" (*Ibid.*). Checkel's role in the special issue and related thematic network has had a corralling effect, getting other major scholars to cohere to a conceptualisation of

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[10] Built upon the Commission-funded thematic network Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses, the intellectual link between scholarship on identity and socialisation is evident. Beyond the array of well-known authors, one should also note the acknowledgments (Checkel, 2005b) given to Morton Egeberg who, along with Jarle Trondal, restarted interest in the subject several years prior (Egeberg, 1996; Egeberg, 1999a; Egeberg, 1999b; Schaefer et al., 2000; Egeberg et al., 2003) and to Risse, associate editor of the journal at the time and a central figure in developing the marble cake model of European identity, (Risse-Kappen, 1996; Risse, 2004a).

socialisation and its subtypes, which was not a prior consensus (e.g. Herrman and Brewer, 2004).

2.3. Contemporary Scholarship

2003 is a useful starting point for demarcating the start of contemporary scholarship because work after that point tends to use pretty consistent definitions, making studies easier to compare. Instead of taking authors or articles in turn, classes of findings are considered. First, this section looks at findings related to characteristics of inductees that have bearing on the socialisation process. It then goes on to look at the socialising organisations, considering which types best facilitate socialisation. Third, despite increasing consensus on the concept of socialisation, there is still significant diversity regarding particulars, which are considered in turn.

There is strong evidence that inductee characteristics affect the likelihood of their socialisation. Juncos and Pomorska (2006, p. 14), for example, find that "personal characteristics" affect socialisation in Council Working Groups. The most consistently predictive indicators across studies of European socialisation, however, are age and national background (Beyers, 2005, p. 934; Hooghe, 2005, 2012; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p. 14; Murdoch et al., 2018, p. 14–7; Risse 2005, p. 304-5; Wonka, 2008, p. 1159). In her highly cited contribution to the special issue mentioned above, for example, Hooghe (2005) offers compelling evidence of socialisation in Commission officials under the age of 30, a finding is confirmed by Murdoch *et al.* (2018, p. 14–7).

Country of origin is already expected to be important in contemporaneous criticism of Scheinman and Held's 1972 paper, which critiques their extrapolation from conclusions gleaned from an exclusively Dutch sample to nationals from all EU member states (Smith, 1973, p. 564). This insight is corroborated by Hooghe (2012), who finds that national backgrounds affect socialisation more than particular job roles. Wonka's (2008, p. 1159) work on high-level Commission officials likewise sees a central role for national background. Research on Council Working Groups (CWG) similarly finds that "Domestic factors matter considerably and, indeed, in some cases they positively affect the adoption of supranational role conceptions" (Beyers, 2005, p. 934) and that "national administrative cultures" make an important difference" (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p.

14). Likewise, Risse (2005, p. 304-5) argues that coming from a federal state, rather than a unitary or centralised one, facilitates European identification. Studies of states, rather than individuals, lend further credence the notion that national backgrounds matter for the effectiveness of socialisation (Gheciu, 2005; Schimmelfennig, 2005).

Gender is clearly important to socialisation in the broader field of political science (Bennett and Bennett, 1989; Dassonneville and McAllister, 2018; Mayer and Schmidt, 2004; Trevor, 1999) and European studies in particular (Kantola, 2010; Nelsen and Guth, 2000; Spierings and Zaslove, 2015). However, studies of the socialising effects of European institutions generally do not find convincing gender effects, notwithstanding suggestions that "women are less supranational and more state-centric" (Hooghe, 2012, p. 101). An important exception comes from Murdoch *et al.* (2018, p. 17), who find that gender is relevant when interacted with organisational changes, an effect they ascribe to "the notion… that women's higher socio-evaluative concerns increase their openness to positive and negative socializing influences within IGOs (intergovernmental organisations)." Overall, however, the literature does not provide much ground for expecting reliably strong gender effects in and of themselves.

People, however, are more than their demographic characteristics. Wodak (2004, p. 99) reminds researchers that, "although a person may be potentially classifiable by gender, ethnicity, class or age, or as a doctor, mother, sister and so on, these particular identities are not automatically relevant in every interaction she or he engages in… identities are locally occasioned, interactively constructed, and are resources 'used in talk.'" Identities should be taken seriously in analysing European socialisation, but given that they are locally occasioned, the assumption of their consistent relevance cannot be taken for granted.

Beyond immutable characteristics of inductees, their previous experiences in both home-country organisations and their current ones in European institutions both appear to be relevant. For example, Murdoch and Geys (2012, p. 1365) note the effect of home-country ministries of foreign affairs and previous "participation in other multilateral fora" as well as "formal and informal briefings" on "the automaticity of relevant role enactment." Likewise, Horii's (2012, p. 160) study of Frontex training of member state

police officers finds that it "has promoted the socialization and professionalization of border guards at the European level."

Although the significant amount of work previously done on factors driving European socialisation has been productive, research has been limited by the effects of self-selection and selective recruitment (Hooghe, 2005 p. 869-70). Moreover, Suvarierol (2011, p. 195) posits self-selected individuals may not only be easier to socialise, but could also be more effective at socialising their peers. She argues convincingly for conceptualising a "double effect of socialization … in terms of organizational socialization through continuous daily exposure to the multinational environment of the Commission" (Suvarierol, 2011, p. 195).

Notwithstanding its limitations, contemporary research into European socialisation finds that characteristics of inductees affect their socialisation. As far as readily categorizable demographics are concerned, there is strong evidence for effects of age and country of origin, but not for gender. It also seems clear that previous professional experience matters. Both identity and professional backgrounds are after all affected by the collection of beliefs and experiences that make up the person and their socialisation-subjected worldview. However, identities and individual characteristics more broadly should be treated with care because they are locally occasioned and socially constructed. Moreover, selection issues limit the confidence researchers might be able to have in more granular findings and the double effect of socialisation suggests complex interactions between inductees that may complicate empirical analysis even further.

Beyond individual inductee characteristics, the organisations into which they are inducted are also relevant. The most agnostic view on organisation effects comes from the contact thesis, which suggests that socialisation is principally a function of time spent in an organisation, rather than its peculiarities. The effect has some credence in the literature, with Juncos and Pomorska (2006, p. 14) finding that "the length of time he/she has been a member of the group" is an important determinant of socialisation. Likewise, Egeberg (1996, p. 726) finds that "in general, national profiles tend to become modified and watered down as length of service increases." Nevertheless, studies are by no means universal in their support for the contact thesis. For instance, on the one hand, Trondal

et al. (2008, p. 260) find that "short SNE [Seconded National Expert] contracts make profound resocialization less likely;" on the other, Hooghe (2005, p. 876) sees no significant effects of the length of time spent in the Commission.

Organisational seniority is distinct from, but related to, both length of contact and age. Trondal (2007, p. 1128), for example, finds "that seniority among SNEs is significantly associated with the emergence of supranational roles." Similarly, Wonka (2008, p. 1159) argues that high-level officials undergo a rather different socialisation process in comparison to lower- and mid-level bureaucrats.

The distinction between effects of seniority, tenure and age reveals the complexity inherent in studying socialisation and the consequent importance of Checkel's (2003) invocation to centre quality of contact: the interaction between qualitative factors of both the inductees and the organisation into which they are inducted ought to be considered. Which qualities of contact matter, however, is strongly contested. For example, Beyers (2005, p. 933) finds that "Scope conditions that refer to European experiences – such as intensity, duration, and density of contact – showed no systematic relationship with" socialisation. In fact, Beyers' (*Ibid.*, p. 929) factor analysis finds stronger supranational socialisation among part-timers or those who have spent less time at European institutions; that is, those who have been less exposed to European socialisation.

Despite the paucity of consensus as to findings regarding particular characteristics of time spent in institutions, more general aspects of the institution do appear to matter. For example, leadership change in Directorates General (DG) seems to undermine socialisation, suggesting "that socialization into internationalist attitudes is particularly likely to be disrupted under unexpected changes" (Murdoch *et al.*, 2018, p. 14). In a similar vein, formal job responsibilities seem to be important (Wonka, 2008, p. 1159).

More generally yet, scholars have suggested that it is important whether an institution is supranational or intergovernmental. Supranationalism refers to an international institutional arrangement that lies somewhere between loose associations such as the United Nations and tightly knit federal systems (Mitrany, 1948, p. 351). Such a functional arrangement is

intended to be not so much "a matter of surrendering sovereignty, but merely pooling as much of it as may be needed for the joint performance of the particular task" (*Ibid.*, p. 358). Neofunctionalists see supranationalism as "a political conception of how cooperation was possible on the basis of competing and colluding sub-national, non-state interests" (Schmitter, 2005, p. 256). Importantly, supranationalism posits – contrary to intergovernmentalism – that there exist relevant supranational interests which are distinct from, and may conflict with, member state interests.

Intergovernmentalism sees less common cause between member states, suggesting "a kind of race" between the "logic of integration" (see Haas, 1968) and the "logic of diversity" (Hoffmann, 1966, p. 881). Likening sovereignty to an artichoke whose heart is shrunk with every leaf chewed by supranational regulation, Hoffman (*Ibid.*, p. 886) was pessimistic about the prospects for integration in areas of "high politics," relegating functionalist explanations to "relatively painless areas." This is not to ascribe to Hoffman a particular view of socialisation, but to suggest that intergovernmental organisations may have less socialising potential than supranational ones because they make weaker socialisation claims.

In general usage, the European Council is usually described as intergovernmentalist while the European Commission and its institutions are considered supranational. These labels are problematised by Wonka (2008, p. 1159), who uses leaks to the *Financial Times* and *Frankfuter Allgemeine Zeitung* to reject the notion that "the Commission is … a cohesive unitary actor driven by a 'supranational' self-interest for further integration to increase its own competences." Moreover, organisations such as COREPER blur the lines between intergovernmental and supranational" institutions (Lewis, 2005, p. 967). Nevertheless, the distinction is conceptually valuable as a reminder that different European institutions ascribe to different roles and norms and ergo may produce different socialisation outcomes.

Somewhere between the intergovernmental and supranational models lie Seconded National Experts (SNE). They are in one sense intergovernmental because they are paid by their home country (along with an EU-financed supplement) and their prior professional socialisation comes from their member state; on the other hand, they are

expected to work in European interests during their secondments. Murdoch and Geys (2012, p. 1365) argue that SNEs' institutional status can "weaken the automaticity of relevant role enactment and allow for the simultaneous influence of instrumental calculation". Referencing their work (*Ibid.*), Sundström (2016, p. 132) similarly argues that SNEs "are less strongly embedded into the Commission apparatus than permanent officials working in the Commission," making them an interesting object of study. Like experts seconded to EASO or Frontex, those sent to the Commission do not have the same authority and know they will soon enough return to their home countries.

Taking the contemporary literature on European socialisation as whole, a fairly clear consensus can be seen to have emerged as to how socialisation ought to be defined and even operationalised. Nevertheless, the field remains broad. Some scholars are focused on type II socialisation, whether in terms an emergent identity or an outlook that may be considered alternately cosmopolitan (Suvarierol, 2011), supranational (Beyers, 2005; Hooghe, 2012; Trondal, 2007), internationalist (Murdoch *et al.*, 2018) or some other term that suggests a common 'we-ness' and sense of purpose beyond the nation state. They also offer a variety of focuses regarding how national and European identities interact, considering blurring or blending of identities (Lewis, 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005), loyalty transfer (Trondal *et al.*, 2008) or the interplay of allegiances (Lewis, 2005).

A paradigmatic research question regarding type II socialisation comes from Beyers (2005, p. 901), who asks whether,

> as a result of prolonged and intensive exposure to EU affairs, individuals adopt role conceptions that promote a sense of "we-ness," and that fit into a view of the EU as an autonomous level primarily designed for finding policy solutions in the interest of a common, European, good.

Using different language, Suvarierol (2011) similarly looks at 'everyday cosmopolitans,' finding "evidence of Urry's (2000) operationalization of

cosmopolitanism" [11] (Suvarierol, 2011, p. 195) and Murdoch *et al.* (2018) study 'internationalist attitudes'.

Some studies of type II socialisation are focused on how identities interact. Lewis (2005, p. 967), for instance, finds no "clear-cut evidence of ranked 'primary' and 'secondary' allegiances;" rather, he sees a "a pattern of symbiosis between national and collective identities" compatible with Risse's (2004a, p. 251–2) marble cake model of multiple identities. In a similar vein, Hooghe (2012, p. 91) finds that a strong minority of Commission officials hold views she labels "institutional pragmatism," meaning that they "identify shared needs and propose European solutions, but they [are also] sensitive to national diversity." Likewise, Sundström (2016, p. 143) sees a mixed allegiance to the Commission and the home country, which "does not contradict the conclusion drawn by Trondal, van den Berg, and Suvarierol (2008, p. 270)." These conclusions of Trondal *et al.* are perhaps the strongest in terms of findings of type II socialisation. The authors (2008, p. 270) conclude:

> This observation clearly reflects conditional processes of socialization of SNEs within the Commission more than rationalist mechanisms of expected utility and anticipated returns. Upon return in the member states, however, former SNEs shift loyalties toward the national level and their primary institutional affiliations. Any long-lasting effect of socialization within the Commission is largely absent.

Taking these different studies of type II socialisation into account, one can see meaningful but limited findings. Something clearly does happen to a significant number of inductees into European institutions, whether they are SNEs or permanent officials; however, their pasts are clearly not erased. They appear to build upon the socialisation of their home

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[11] Cosmopolitanism as an object of study is distinct from European socialization, but as the mention of Cerutti above demonstrates, the two are deeply interlinked, making Suvarierol's work applicable to studies of European socialization. As with the previous note, much of the distinction has to do with her coming from a different scholarly tradition.

countries, incorporating new roles and norms into pre-existing self-conceptions.

The more definitionally behavioural character of type I socialisation allows for more clear-cut findings, especially as they relate to deal-making, bargaining and generally succeeding professionally in the EU context. For example, in their analysis of Council Working Groups dealing with Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters, Juncos and Pomorska (2006, p. 13) explain: "the code of conduct has been applied as a part of a strategic calculus, in which legitimacy and credibility (of their own and of their countries), as well as the long-term perspective of the negotiations, played a crucial role." Looking at states, rather than individuals, however, Schimmelfennig (2005, p. 838) does not find strong evidence of socialisation, noting the need for regular incentives or sanctions: "In norm-violating CEECs (Central and Eastern European countries), only intergovernmental reinforcement offering the reward of EU and NATO membership can generate sustained compliance with liberal-democratic norms."

2.4. Conclusion

Socialisation, the process by which organisations induct new members into novel roles and norms, has a long history in European Studies. Its focus can be on type I socialisation, seeking to understand how diverse Europeans manage to work together for a common purpose, or on type II socialisation, seeking to explain how working for Europe creates a sense-of we-ness among members of the organisation. By looking for adherence to norms and performance of roles in the absence of incentives, scholars can demonstrate internalisation and therefore socialisation.

Following a hiatus in the 1980s, the 1990s saw a new wave of research into the subject, which was rationalised and systematised in the early 2000s, creating common definitions and a new focus on qualitative aspects of inductees' experiences in their organisations. This contemporary research shows consistently that age and country or origin are important, suggesting that both older works' interest in quantity of contact and newer ones' interest in quality of contact are important. Additionally, the

distinction between intergovernmental and supranational institutions demonstrates that the socialising organisation matters, making SNEs, with their unusual status, an interesting population for analysis.

Insofar as the literature suggests lacunae, three are noteworthy. Regarding inductee characteristics, previous work has looked at concrete characteristics, but less so at the specific beliefs that they hold regarding the roles and norms into which they are inducted. Chapter 3 offers a theoretical framework which considers inductees' professional communities and suggests approaches to understanding how pre-existing beliefs affect socialisation into novel ones. As for organisational characteristics, EU agencies and their operations outside Brussels remain understudied, notwithstanding important work by Horii (2012; 2015), Juncos and Pomorska (2006) and Maurer and Raik (2014). This work seeks to expand the literature by focusing on EASO and Frontex based in the Lesvos migration hotspot in Greece.

Finally, going back to Scheinman and Held (1972), the literature has had a strong emphasis on surveys, which are useful for aggregation and big-picture analyses. Despite being often complemented by interviews, however, they remain focused on straightforwardly categorizable inductee characteristics, such as age, gender, country of origin and the like. Although useful as proxies, these studies to not engage directly with the underlying beliefs that are contested during the European socialisation process. This work remedies this shortcoming by employing an ethnographic approach, a narrower, but deeper method that has been underused in the field, notwithstanding the important contribution of Suvarierol (2007).

Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework: Belief and Community

As the previous chapter explains, findings in research into European socialisation can be limited, but the effects of age and country of origin have consistent support across multiple studies (Beyers, 2005, p. 934; Hooghe, 2005, 2012; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p. 14; Murdoch et al., 2018, p. 14–7; Risse 2005, p. 304-5; Wonka, 2008, p. 1159). Other aspects, from supranationalism of the organisation to particular job types, clearly matter as well, but they are not supported by multiple, comparable studies. Due to issues of selection, whether self-selection or organisational selection, even very large surveys have not paved the way for very clear predictions about what kinds of inductees are most likely to be socialised into what types organisations.

This study seeks to go beyond readily categorizable characteristics of inductees, focusing instead on the beliefs implied by those characteristics. Socialisation into novel roles and norms requires an interaction with pre-existing beliefs. Therefore, understanding how beliefs are constructed and changed helps to provide a perspective on socialisation that delves into the microprocesses.

The chapter begins with describing how beliefs are constructed intersubjectively and introduces the notion of an ideational framework to describe the system of discursively constructed pre-existing beliefs upon

which the socialisation process acts. Novel roles and norms, which are types of beliefs, require coherence with this ideational framework in order to be internalised. This theoretical framework, in which novel roles and norms cohere to a discursively constructed, pre-existing ideational framework, forms the basis for how the report approaches socialisation.

Next, the chapter considers professionals more generally, looking at how their ideational frameworks are formed. Employing insights from the sociology of professions, the notion of communities of knowledge is introduced. When Seconded National Experts, for instance, are seconded from their national professional community to a European one, there is the possibility of a clash between their pre-existing beliefs and the novel roles and norms into which they are inducted by EU organisations.

The chapter ends by returning to the qualities of contact, which the previous chapter showed are central to contemporary research into European socialisation. Studies have previously focused on work in Brussels, notwithstanding noteworthy exceptions (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006; Maurer and Raik, 2014), and therefore much of what might be known about European socialisation may be less generalisable beyond that bubble than the literature implies. By looking at extreme, affective and social contexts, this chapter sets up the empirical chapters, demonstrating the importance to studying socialisation in different environments.

3.1. Ideation Frameworks and the Origin of Beliefs

Inductees perform and adhere to roles and norms because they believe they ought to do so. Therefore, in order to understand how novel roles and norms come to be internalized, studies of socialisation need to have a theoretical understanding of what beliefs are and where they come from. This research looks to work in epistemology, which argues that beliefs are formed intersubjectively and are in some sense inherently social. It also considers insight from the sociology of professions to suggest that professionals form communities of knowledge, which socialise inductees into beliefs.

The epistemological framework of this study takes it as a given that beliefs are formed intersubjectively (Husserl, 1977, p. 128–31), meaning that they

are constructed socially. The communication that intersubjectivity allows for (Duranti, 2010, p. 9) can also be described as discourse and discursive construction forms beliefs. Seeing beliefs as discursively constructed means that they are always facts based in the social environment. Moreover, it means that beliefs can be collective (Searle, 1995, 2000; Tuomela, 2002).

The building blocks of the discourse constructing beliefs are speech acts (Green, 2017, sec. 2) and their conversational implicature (Grice, 1989, p. 31–40). These speech acts, jointly making up the discourse, do the work (Austin, 1962, p. 144-6) of constructing beliefs. Employing the lens of discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008) to socialisation, inductees' beliefs regarding the appropriateness of given roles and norms can be described as discursively constructed and the result of responses to speech acts (Krzyżanowski, 2020, p. 439–41).[12]

The speech acts that drive socialisation are representative claims (Saward, 2006, p. 302) which tell an individual that the community into which are inducted shares a given belief. This is of course "a two-way street" (Saward, 2006, p. 301), in which claims are "shapeshifting" (Saward, 2014) and subject to "the judgment of the constituency, which will have either responded to, not responded to, or rejected a claim" (Disch, 2015, p. 488). That is, despite the importance of the structure (the inducting organisation),[13] however, the agent is not a passive object of this process, but can transcend it (Unger, 2004). This insight is noted by scholars of socialisation in their oft-cited admonishment against positing "structural dopes" (Beyers, 2010, p. 917).

Taken all together, the epistemological framework in this study sees socialisation as a process by which inductees encounter representative claims, a kind of speech act, which explain that members of the inducting organisation share certain beliefs and that, in order to become a member, the inductee ought to as well. The two-way process by which inductees

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[12] Relatedly, see Wodak *et al*. (2009, chap. 2) on the discursive construction of political identities.

[13] For a famously strong case for the centrality of the socialising structure, see Bourdieu, 1986.

respond to these claims produces a discourse which constructs beliefs regarding an organisation's roles and norms.

Explanations for the drivers of socialisation have traditionally focused on clearly categorizable attributes of inductees (e.g. age and country of origin), the socialising organisations (e.g. whether intergovernmental or supranational) and the contact thereof (e.g. density and intensity of contact). These categorizable attributes are proxies, which aggregate a panoply of prior experiences, beliefs and extant conditions. They are helpful for understanding general trends and aggregating results; however, the centring of discursive construction – of claim-making and claim-accepting – is a reminder that these attributes are not meaningful in and of themselves, but because they reflect underlying beliefs. That is, age of inductee may be a proxy for quantity of previous experience, the supranational nature of an organisation might mean that it makes strong claims regarding Europeanness and the density of contact could suggest that claims are made repeatedly.

The study of socialisation is, at its heart, the study of how beliefs are changed as a result of induction into an organisation. In political science, the microprocesses of socialisation are derived principally from works by Tajfel (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel, 1982) and Searing (Searing *et al.*, 1973; Searing *et al.*, 1976; Searing, 1991). For the researcher, analysing and categorising these beliefs is difficult, especially in comparison to figuring out someone's age or country of origin. Analysis at the unit level, trying to definitely categorise an individual's, rather than cohort's beliefs, is especially difficult (Beyers, 2010, p. 913–4). However, focusing only on readily categorizable attributes does not avoid the complexity of the underling psychological processes; rather, it confines them to an analytical black box.

Coherentism (Audi, 2002; Putnam, 1981) provides a useful perspective on the intersubjective, discursively constructed nature of belief. Instead of understanding beliefs as grounded in a real, external world, it sees them (such as those regarding roles and norms) as being true insofar as they cohere to one another. Put another way, "the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions" (Young, 2018, sec. 1), rather than necessitating a foundational root in an external metaphysical world. Coherence provides a mechanism for how novel claims can be accepted

and incorporated into inductees' system of pre-existing beliefs. Insofar as a novel socialisation claim can be made to cohere to an inductee's pre-existing beliefs, it can be accepted. The need for coherence shows why pre-existing beliefs are so important to socialisation: they create limits for which new beliefs inductees might be able (or willing) to accept.

This work describes the coherent web of an individual's beliefs as an ideational framework. This intertwined set of "cognitive priors" (Checkel, 2017, p. 597) is built up over time, becoming increasingly complex and, resultantly, less plastic. As a result, very basic traits, such as personality (Kelly, 1955; Searing *et al.*, 1976) or personal culture (Kiley and Vaisey, 2020), are formed early and remain static, while more specific ones, such as particular political views (Hooghe, 2005), are imbued later and are more amenable to change. This dynamic is why Lisbeth Hooghe (2005, p. 868-70), for instance, finds that primacy is the most predictive independent variable for explaining socialisation in the European Commission.

Beliefs occupy different parts of the ideational framework. Some beliefs are central anchors, holding together the framework, whereas others are more incidental. The differing comparative crucialness of pre-existing beliefs is helpful for explaining the distinction between types I and II socialisation. Some socialisation claims may be too difficult to cohere to the ideational framework for them to be taken for granted in the manner of type II socialisation, but they may cohere well to pre-existing ideas about the legitimacy of the organisation to demand adherence in the manner of type I socialisation. As a result, different pre-existing beliefs may not only condition acceptance different claims, but also different types of acceptance of the same claim.

3.2 Professional Communities

The previous chapter has been primarily concerned with describing the literature on socialisation generally and on the socialisation of professionals inducted into European institutions in particular. In order to construct an applicable theoretical framework, it is worthwhile to consider what professionals precisely are and how these descriptors should affect expectations of socialisation.

Hall (1968, p. 95) describes professions as having the following attitudinal characteristics: (1) the use of the professional organisation as a major reference, (2) a belief in service to the public, (3) belief in self-regulation, (4) a sense of calling to the field and (5) autonomy (*Ibid.*, p. 93). Most important for purposes of this work is the first, which "involves both the formal organization and informal colleague groupings as the major source of ideas and judgements for the professional in his work" (*Ibid.*, p. 93).

Goode (1957, p. 194) describes professions as communities, which involve, "a sense of identity…[shared] values…role definitions *vis-à-vis* both members and non-members…[and] a common language, which is understood only partially by outsiders." Members of professional communities identify as members with certain normative values and roles. Socialisation describes the process of induction into these roles and norms and therefor into the community. A common language binds and bounds the community, creating a clear distinction between who is a member and who is not. The assumption implicit in this language is that those who have learned the language have also internalised the roles and norms of the profession. As Wilensky (1964, p. 138) puts it, "The professional man adheres to professional norms."

The second of Hall's (1963, p. 93) attributes is also important, as it "includes the idea of indispensability of the profession and the view that the work performed benefits both the public and the practitioner" (Hall, 1963, p. 93). Members of a professional community believe that their work is important, for both the broader society and the particular people they serve (sociologists often use the term 'clients'). This sense of importance allows for a certain esteem or pride in the profession. This sense of professional self-regard dovetails into Hall's (*Ibid.*) fifth attribute, which "involves the feeling that the practitioner ought to be able to make his own decisions without external pressures from clients, those who are not members of his profession, or from his employing organization." Professionals are not only members of a community that performs an important function: they are also experts with a complex set of belief regarding what constitutes high-quality work and that this work matters.

Taken all together, professionals can be said to represent a community of knowledge. Its members display a certain solidarity (Hughes, 1963, p. 657) and a shared "esoteric knowledge" (*Ibid.*, p. 655). Wilensky (1964, p. 138)

describes this esoteric knowledge as technical, meaning that it is "based on systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired only through long prescribed training" and that "there is no notion that it can all be learned on the job". As with the particular communal language, the esoteric knowledge is not quite accessible to the broader public.

When studying the socialisation of inductees into European institutions, therefore, one is studying professional socialisation—the induction of novices into a community of knowledge. Inductees have ideational frameworks consisting of sundry beliefs which may clash or cohere with the beliefs of the professional community they are joining. Usually, inductees have little of the esoteric, technical knowledge of the community or its language. These take time and effort to learn and to cohere to pre-existing beliefs. Some roles and norms of the community might be broader in scope and be more difficult to cohere to pre-existing ones. The work of both the organisation and the individual is to find ways to create coherence out of the conflict.

One approach, as discussed by Wonka (2008), is to cohere roles and norms locally. Although an inductee may reject a given role or norm of the organisation, they can usually learn to accept that it nonetheless ought to be performed or adhered to in the context of work. This is the distinction between types I and II socialisation. Inductees understand that they cannot be quite the same person at work and in private and so this pre-existing belief allows them to coherently adopt a role or norm in their professional capacity that conflicts with those of their private lives.

Seconded National Experts, the subject of this report, add a further complexity to the concept of professional communities of knowledge. They are different from the usual inductees because upon joining EASO or Frontex they are definitionally already experts. As a result, SNEs tend to have a fairly complex ideational framework developed through their experience as professionals in their home countries. SNEs, all parts of their home countries' professional communities, are inducted into the European community of professionals during their deployments. Invariably, they are confronted with novel roles and norms that are distinct from those they perform and adhere to in their home countries. Their ability to be socialised into the European professional community, and the manner of socialisation that they might undergo, depends on how

the socialisation claims SNEs encounter during their deployments cohere to the pre-existing beliefs that make up their ideational framework of beliefs constructed as national professionals.

The study of SNEs is further complicated due to self-selection. EASO and Frontex officials in particular are well familiar with these organisations prior to joining and may have had interactions with them previously. Even though controls are usually put in place for country of origin, age and other variables that the scientific literature suggests may account for socialisation, self-selection itself cannot be easily controlled for. Regardless of precisely why an individual decides to undergo an experience, this choice is liable to represent an underlying characteristic that makes them different from their peers, to whom the social scientist would like to generalise findings. For example, an individual may self-select into an organisation on the basis of a pre-existing positive inclination toward it or perhaps due a certain openness to (self-altering) experience. Such motivations for self-selecting into the organisation have direct implications for the inductee's socialisation potential, distinguishing them from peers who did not make the same choice.

The implications for socialisation of the choice to be inducted into an organisation show the importance of both agency and structure (that is, structuration (Giddens, 1984)). Agency is clearly less important to studies of involuntary induction, such as military conscription; however, this work contributes to a literature which studies cases of voluntary induction. Moreover, being selected for service in European institutions is difficult, which makes the role of self-selection even more important. Nevertheless, organisations also make entreaties to potential inductees, trying to get them to join and do not accept all interested applicants (Frontex, 2020).

Beyond the choice to join an organisation, individuals make choices upon having joined as well. These choices alter the course of interactions within the socialisation process, affecting the socialisation outcome. Individuals decide to what degree to apply themselves, to get involved, to learn and to consider adopting new roles and norms. Moreover, the inductee can always quit, as continuing to work in European institutions is a choice too. Officials who do not agree with a European institution's roles and norms can always exit the organisation or not renew a temporary contract;

however, they can also voice their discontent, getting the organisation to change its behaviour. As a result, self-selection is of crucial importance, but so are peculiarities of the organisation (Hirschman, 1970). For example, people who are conscripted or motivated primarily by financial or career considerations may manage their socialisation process very differently from participants in this study who seem primarily motivated by an open-to-experience personality type and professionalism.

3.3 Political Community

This report uses the term political community to describe the self-aware *demos* or polity, which provides legitimacy to political authority. The term is adopted to highlight the similarities between political communities and the professional ones discussed in the previous section. As with professional communities, political ones are marked by their exclusivity: they tend to have a peculiar language, as well as a body of knowledge that separates members from non-members. Even in states that have multiple spoken languages, the process of national creation undergone since the 18th or 19th century has usually led to supremacy of a single, national one that is spoken by all citizens, even if they maintain vernaculars in their local communities (Anderson, 1991; Weber, 1976, ch. 6). Likewise, national myths have been constructed in an attempt to buttress political legitimacy (Judson, 2016, ch. 6).

Notwithstanding efforts such as Linklater's (1998, ch. 6) or Delanty's (2005) to imagine a more cosmopolitan, post-Westphalian polity, contemporary states – especially in Europe – are usually composed of dominant nations whose populations speak a common language (Anderson, 1991). In democratic theory, the state's authority to coerce is citizens is derived from its legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002). As the EU has grown more important to its citizens' lives, scholarship has become ever more interested in understanding whether the Union is "als Legitim angesehen" (Weber, 1958, 493) by an emergent political community of Europeans. The notion is that for the EU to become a legitimate authority, it must be seen as such by a self-aware and consenting *demos*.

Scholars have long debated whether Europe's disparate nationals can see themselves as part of a coherent 'we' that might endow the European institutions with the legitimacy they need to exercise their power. This

report posits that the same microprocesses that construct a professional community may lead to the construction of a political one. This intuition about the construction of community is tested in chapter 7, which looks at the role of solidarity on Lesvos and the emergence of a sense of political community.

3.4. Facilitating and Hindering Impacts of Context

Older work on European socialisation (see section 2.2) leans heavily on the contact thesis, which sees socialisation as primarily a diachronic function of stays at European institutions (Checkel, 2003, p. 210). The scholarship was never quite so simple, but Checkel's observation that "it is arguably the quality of the contact—whether hectoring, deliberation, or hardheaded bargaining—and not simply its length that plays the central role in promoting change," nevertheless pushed the scholarship in the right direction, adding complexity to later analyses (*Ibid.*).

Context can be thought of as applying heat or cold to an ongoing reaction, accelerating or slowing it down. As Beyers (2010, p. 917) explains, "socialization processes are highly contingent and potentially shaped by exogenous and sudden events." Scholarship, described below, suggests three types of context – extreme, affective, and social – might be particularly important. This understanding of context completes the theoretical framework of the report, which understands socialisation as a discursively constructed process in which novel beliefs are cohered to ideational frameworks.

Extreme contexts describe situations that involve the potential of physical or mental harms or their imposition on others. Work on European socialisation in EU bureaucracies is inherently limited in its relevance for such contexts. Secondments to Brussels are office jobs and do not present any unusual dangers so different from working in a member state bureaucracy. Although the content of officials' work may well be important for the world at large, they do not work under extreme conditions. As a result, the literature on European socialisation does not offer much practical guidance on this specific context.

Instead, insights into extreme contexts can be gleaned from work on socialisation in the midst of war or violence, such as that of Fujii

(2009;2017), later Checkel (2017), Cohen (2013) and Manekin (Grossman *et al.*, 2015; Manekin, 2017), who explore situations of mortal danger, violence and deep ethical dilemmas. Soldiers, gangsters and genocidaires have markedly more extreme experiences from those of civil servants at the European institutions and the authors listed effectively demonstrate how these extreme contexts translate to facilitating or hindering effects on the socialisation process.

The participants studied in this report deploy to a context that is more extreme than that of the typical secondments spent in Brussels, but less extreme than those described above (see 5.3 for detail). As a result, insights into the socialisation impact of extreme contexts ought to be considered, while keeping in mind the limitations of the comparison. For instance Fujii explains in her analysis of the decision of genocidaires, swept up in the tumult, to participate in the killings:

> A war was waging. Soldiers were shooting. People were fleeing. Some were getting shot and raped. Authorities were calling on residents to protect their community. Then the awful news: the RPF-Inkotanyi shoot the president's plane down from the sky — testimony to the rebel army's power and its ultimate goal of taking the country by force. Given these circumstances, even those who participated willingly did so under powerful external pressures.

> (Fujii, 2009, p. 156)

These effects of "powerful external pressures" facilitate novel socialisation claims. Whereas killing may have once been viewed as prohibited, the extreme context could cohere an otherwise unacceptable idea to a person's ideational framework.

The manner in which extreme contexts facilitate or hider the internalisation of socialisation can also be shown in Käthe Kollwitz's conversion to pacifism following her son's death (Moorjani, 1986). She clearly was never a warmonger or supporter of violence, but German patriotism was communicated effectively enough by her society and in a context in which it seemed appropriate enough, that she supported her son's enlistment. Once he fell and the war became a quagmire, this patriotic norm of sending one's children to possible death for their

homeland no longer seemed appropriate: the extreme context facilitated her realisation that her mostly non-violent ideational framework was incompatible with supporting war.

An array of studies bolsters the case for the importance of an extreme context to the socialisation process. Checkel's (2017, p. 596) study of violent gangs shows how it can facilitate the production of violence by civilians. In a similar vein, Cohen (2013, p. 387) studies why "gang rape occurs with more frequency during conflict than during peacetime," revealing how abducted fighters are incentivised to commit atrocities. Taken together, these examples show that extreme contexts can be important facilitators of or hindrances to socialisation. Although working in Lesvos is by no means as extreme as the cases described in this section, it is a much more extreme context than previous studies of European socialisation have had to consider. Section 5.3 discusses this and the following two types of contexts as they apply to EASO and Frontex personnel in further detail.

Affective contexts describe settings which are emotionally fraught for inductees. Although these contexts may be extreme as well, they do not require any personal danger or the need to inflict harm on others. Rather, the focus is on settings that produce strong emotions, a good example of which is working in a refugee camp, as many of the participants in this study do. Such a context can be affective as a result of exposure to human suffering, but may not involve any personal danger or the need to endanger others. Although affective and extreme contexts should be conceptually distinguished, they likely interact with one another and the effects of each may not necessarily be conveniently disaggregated.

Witnessing suffering, as many participants in this study do, has long been a subject of interest to psychologists, who have produced a comprehensive literature on the traumas experienced by humanitarian aid workers (Cardozo *et al.*, 2005; Connorton *et al.*, 2012; McCormack and Joseph, 2011). The effect of affective contexts on socialisation can be inferred from of the principal role emotions play in the formation of identity (David and Bar-Tal, 2009, p. 360–1; Mead, 2013) and political views (Sears, 2002), the communication of norms (Roeser, 2012) and the realisation of self-understanding vis-à-vis the world (Fredrickson, 2000, p. 589). Given the ability of emotions to so clearly do work adjacent to

socialisation, it is reasonable to expect that they facilitate or hinder it to some degree.

Affective contexts overlap and interact with social ones in important ways. Emotions can be social and play a role in group cohesion, both as the result of shared emotions (Rhee, 2005, p. 16) and the act sharing of those emotions (Rimé *et al.*, 1991, p. 463). Nevertheless, as with extreme contexts, social ones should also be conceptually distinguished. Social context refers to relationships an inductee has and which affect the socialisation process. These can be with colleagues, supervisors or others who are part of the organisation into which they are inducted, or they can be with friends, family and others from outside the organisation. Regarding the former, the organisational embeddedness of social networks has long been clear (Granovetter, 1985; Perrow, 1986): for example, in a context of low morale, colleagues may make socialisation claims contrary to those of an organisation's management, hindering the socialisation process.

Such a process can be intuited from Murdoch *et al.*'s (2018, p. 11–4) findings that unexpected leadership changes undermine the socialisation process. Likewise, section 7.1 of this work shows how officers' views of their mission's success are affected by one another. These findings suggest that organisational morale is a facilitator of socialisation and that the lack thereof may hinder the process, supporting Morrison's (2002, p. 1156) finding that "expected, structural characteristics of newcomers' informational and friendship networks related in systematic ways to discrete socialization outcomes."

Social networks outside of an organisation are likewise important, as inductees' friends and families also make socialisation claims. The strength of these bonds is likely quite important, whether the socialisation claims are complementary or contrary to those made by the organisation in question. Therefore, the closeness between agents and these pre-existing social networks is liable to be relevant for the effectiveness of the socialisation process. This is particularly relevant to this study, in which guest officers work on a distant island, in which they are surrounded with a new social network and comparatively removed from their pre-existing ones.

3.5. Conclusion

Of the two lacunae described at the end of chapter 2, this chapter addresses the focus on beliefs and the importance of context. Participants in this study are described as having ideational frameworks, or a networked system of interrelated beliefs, in which the "the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions." This approach means that novel beliefs, such as those regarding organisational roles and norms, need to cohere to pre-existing beliefs in order to be accepted. When studying socialisation, this approach implies that researchers should try and understand inductees' belief structures in order to understand what roles and norms they are liable to internalise.

As national experts, SNEs' pre-existing beliefs are largely constructed in their national professional communities. The notion of such a community, with its esoteric expertise and language, is described in order to frame the rest of the report. Rather than neatly categorizable demographics or neophytes, SNEs are members of one professional community who are inducted into another and then return to the former. The question the empirical chapters ask is how national socialisation affects European socialisation and what roles and norms might continue to be performed and adhered to once the officer returns to their national professional community.

The process of this induction into an EU organisation is bound to be affected particularities of context, as much of the contemporary literature discussed in section 2.2 suggests. By looking to studies of socialisation far away from Brussels, the theoretical framework builds an expectation that extreme, affective and social contexts may be particularly important for socialisation. Section 5.3 takes these theoretical insights and applies them to participants in the study in order to understand how socialisation might be different on Lesvos, addressing the lacuna of research into European socialisation beyond Brussels.

Chapter 4

Methodology and Research Design: An Illustrative Case Study

Stated formally, this study addresses the following research question:

> *How are Seconded National Experts (SNEs) deployed to the Lesvos migration hotspots socialised into European professional and political communities?*

The general hypothesis as to the 'how' part of the question is that when roles and norms cohere to participants' ideational frameworks constructed in their national professional communities, inductees might demonstrate type II socialisation, which means that they perform and adhere to them beyond the locally occasioned context of their deployment. However, where there is a conflict, officials only show type I socialisation, which means that although they perform and adhere to these roles and norms without the need for regular incentives or sanctions in the context of their deployments to Lesvos, they do so in only a locally occasioned context and do not continue to do so once their deployments have ended. The process is hypothesised to effectively drive the formation of a professional community on the island, which in turn undergirds the creation of an inchoate political community. The hypothesis is tested using ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the fall of 2018 and the summer of 2019 on Lesvos, Greece, including in-depth interviews, participant observation and informal conversations with around three dozen of these deployed officials.

Previous research into European socialisation has demonstrated consistently that inductees' ages and countries of origin correlate with socialisation potential (Beyers, 2005, p. 934; Hooghe, 2005, 2012; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p. 14; Murdoch et al., 2018, p. 14–7; Risse 2005, p. 304-5; Wonka, 2008, p. 1159). More specific predictors, however, have not been confirmed as consistently across studies. Surely other aspects, such as training (Horii's 2012, p. 160), formal and informal briefings (Murdoch and Geys 2012, p. 1365) and seniority (Trondal, 2007, p. 1128; Wonka 2008, p. 1159), are important too. However, finding clear results across studies and contexts is made difficult by these characteristics not being drivers of socialisation in and of themselves, as section 3.1 explains. Rather, such categorizable inductee characteristics are proxies for participants' pre-existing beliefs, which make up the ideational frameworks to which novel socialisation claims need to cohere. Once selection effects and the diverse conceptualisations and operationalisations of socialisation are considered as well, it becomes even less likely that a given inductee characteristic can be highly reliable.

Given all the empirical difficulties involved in studying European socialisation, this research seeks to study matters as directly as possible. That is, it focuses directly on the beliefs that make up inductees' ideational frameworks. Likewise, instead of choosing roles and norms of interest deductively, this study is based on fieldwork that seeks to uncover inductively which roles and norms that are most relevant for inductees. Having foregrounded inductees' ideational frameworks and the particular socialisation claims to which they are exposed, the study seeks to describe how one affects the other.

Inductees' ideational frameworks can be difficult to understand through surveys, even if complemented by interviews. These webs of interrelated beliefs, forged by time and place, require reflection and interpretation on the part of participants in the study and so demand an in-depth approach. This study does so by using ethnography. Spending months with inductees, conducting long interviews and socialising with them, both at work and afterwards, gives a holistic picture of what their worldviews are. Likewise, although behavioural adherence to given roles and norms may well be ascertainable through surveys, the details of internalisation can be hard to know. Whether a claim is accepted only locally or is

genuinely taken for granted can be better understood using methods that allow participants to reflect and explain. This is especially so for claims that do not have clear expected behavioural manifestations once inductees return to their home-country organisations. The empirical chapters of this report consider individual roles and norms one-by-one, using the ethnographic method to understand how and in what ways they are internalised.

This chapter begins by discussing case selection. The literature on European socialisation is mostly interested in policy professionals in Brussels. This report looks at a very different population. These are street-level bureaucrats at the edges of Europe who spend usually only one to three months deployed in a highly intense environment. The reason for the shift in context is that this is an illustrative case selection. By looking for an explanation that covers existing cases as well as very different ones, it becomes more valid to make claims about socialisation in European institutions *per se*, rather than only in Brussels or among certain types of inductees. Moreover, the highly social and affective nature of these deployments should allow for more rapid socialisation than usually observed, making an approach that focuses on in-depth exploration appropriate.

The theoretical focus on ideational frameworks calls for such a micro-level approach. Therefore, the following section discusses ethnography at some length, including its strengths and weaknesses. Trading some degree of reliability for validity, this work traces the individual beliefs of inductees and how these interact with specific novel roles and norms. Such a question requires of the participants reflection and interpretation, which is difficult to elicit using survey studies, even if complemented by structured formal interviews.

Having described the case selection and ethnography, the chapter delves into the context. The hotspots, organisation, inductees and even physical space are described. As appropriate to single-case ethnographies, the reader is given the detail needed to understand the context of the conversations with participants in this study and these participants' experiences.

Next, the data on which the study is based are described, including the manner in which they were collected, allowing for as much transparency as possible. This includes both details of the collection process and of the text corpus produced as a result. Once the details of the data available have been described, the manner in which it has been manipulated, coded and analysed are discussed. Then, conceptualisation and operationalisation are discussed, including what counts as evidence of socialisation, what distinguishes evidence for type I from type II socialisation and so on. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what results mean, including their validity and reliability as well as what relevance they may have for researchers and policy makers.

4.1. Case Selection, Concept Operationalisation and Ethnographic Methods

This study is a plausibility probe, making it important to choose an illustrative case. Illustrative, however, does not have to mean a case that is similar to previous ones studied by other scholars. In this work, the illustrative nature of the case lies in its ability to demonstrate socialisation. In one sense, this means a hard case. Seconded National Experts have been used in the past for this purpose because unlike permanent officials who may have begun their career with a traineeship right after their studies, SNEs have been through the socialisation process in their home countries. As a result, they have a better-formed ideational framework, which affects the types of novel roles and norms they are liable to accept.

EASO and Frontex deployments offer an especially hard case because of how short they are. When policy professionals are sent to Brussels, they usually remain there for about four years. However, EASO and Frontex officials usually deploy for between four and twelve weeks, with the exception of Frontex Cultural Mediators, who often remain longer. It is common for these SNEs to partake in multiple deployments, as a third of the sample in this study has, but more than two or three deployments are uncommon, and they usually spend significant time with their home country's professional community in between deployments. Considering the contact thesis discussed in previous chapters, the shorter time spent by SNEs in Lesvos compared to Brussels makes this a comparatively hard case.

Although a hard case on its face, there are many aspects of SNE deployments to Lesvos that suggest an easier case. The literature on quality of contact, also discussed in previous chapters, urges scholars of socialisation to look beyond the length of time spent at an organisation and consider qualitative aspects of the time spent by inductees in an organisation. Lesvos, with its notorious Moria refugee camp (discussed in the following section), is a very different context from Brussels. In the language of the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter, it is highly affective, social and somewhat extreme. SNEs live together, apart from their families and home-country colleagues, constructing new social networks, which function as communities of knowledge. They also witness affective scenes of recent arrivals landing, living in the camp or recounting in interviews the events which led them to seek asylum.

The case of Lesvos is therefore a laboratory for studying an unusually fast-moving socialisation process. Inductees are strongly pre-socialised by national organisations and leave the island quickly, but their deployment experience is very intense and conducive to socialisation. As a result, Lesvos is ideal for an in-depth but time-limited study of how novel roles and norms are cohered to pre-existing ideational frameworks, making it a highly illustrative case.

Furthermore, this study is a plausibility probe in that its aim is not only to answer the research question in order to better understand the socialisation of EASO and Frontex SNEs. This approach, of using in-depth research methods to look at how specific roles and norms interact with specific pre-existing beliefs could lay the ground for further research, applying this approach to other contexts and different types of inductees into European institutions.

To understand the effects of ideational frameworks on socialisation, all relevant concepts have to be operationalised. Socialisation is operationalised using Checkel's (2005, p. 804) description of adherence to an organisation's roles and norms without the need for regular incentives or sanctions. In order to learn whether they are adhered to, therefore, the specific roles and norms participants in the study encounter on Lesvos (that is, socialisation claims) need to be elucidated.

Socialisation claims pertaining to the construction of professional and political communities are of particular interest. The former is studied through work-related roles and norms, which have to do with how work ought to be done. As members of national professional communities, the SNEs have been inducted into certain ways of doing work, which might contradict how European agencies do their work. This study seeks to understand the microprocesses by which these novel roles and norms are or are not cohered to participants' ideational frameworks. These roles and norms are more concrete than broader ideas relating to Europe and so performance and adherence are easier to observe.

Once the hypothesis introduced above has been tested on work-related roles and norms, demonstrating the role of the ideational framework in fostering type I or II socialisation, the approach is, at least partially, validated and can be more confidently applied to the less-concrete constellation of ideas about Europe. During deployments, SNEs encounter the socialisation claim that the European professional community into which they are being inducted is also a political community. They are challenged by the notion that they themselves might be Europeans in some meaningful sense. The success of these socialisation claims is hypothesised to relate to whether they can be made to cohere to pre-existing beliefs.

Having isolated a number of roles and norms, the empirical chapters will assess whether or not participants adhere to them without the need for regular incentives or sanctions. Insofar as work-related socialisation claims are concerned, establishing such adherence is fairly straightforward. Participants openly divulge whether they follow EASO or Frontex roles and norms, both in formal recorded interviews and informal conversations. The trust built up over months and guarantees of anonymity make participants comfortable sharing their views. Moreover, the fact that about a third have previously deployed allows for hindsight, addressing questions about the 'stickiness' of socialisation by enabling participants to say whether, upon returning to their home organisations, they have continued to adhere to the roles and norms they encountered during those deployments.

Socialisation into roles and norms regarding Europe are more difficult. Whether a participant sees themself as part of a European political

community is harder to establish. This is made even more difficult if the question is whether such adherence is 'taken for granted' in the manner of type II socialisation. These complexities are mitigated, however, by the ethnographic method and open interview style. Although not an exact science, context and informal conversations help with analysing whether or not socialisation has occurred.

This work is a single-case study consisting of 24 major participants and several further minor ones selected through organisational chain referral (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). Instead of focusing on breadth and applicability to a broad class of cases, it goes in depth, studying its subjects in minute detail. The fieldwork includes interviews, casual conversations and participant observation, all conducted with an ethnographic eye (Harper, 1989) or lens (Crewe, 2006; Lawlor, 2003).

Jorgensen (1989, p. 12) describes the value of participant observations, which holds for ethnographic research more generally:

> The methodology of participant observation is exceptional for studying processes, relationships among people and events, the organization of people and events, continuities over time, and patterns, as well as the immediate sociocultural Contexts (*sic.*) in which human existence unfolds.

Specifically, Ethnography relies on being in the field and observing from an intimate distance in order to observe detail and elicit topics that a survey or other methodology intended for large-N research designs might miss:

> Corporeal presence provides opportunities for people to experience problems together in tangible and, therefore, memorable ways. In this increasingly digital world, the power of physical presence is sometimes minimized; however, the ability to co-experience sensations, smells, sounds, and sights with participants enriches interview questions and provides

> researchers-not-at-home with opportunities for overcoming many traditional barriers to outsider research.
>
> (Wiederhold, 2015, p. 12–3)

Corporeal presence is particularly valuable for somewhat secretive organisations such as EASO and Frontex, whose inner workings can be difficult to interpret from the outside.[14]

Ethnography is appropriate for this study because professional communities can be fairly inscrutable from the outside (Goode, 1957, p. 194) and due to the complexity of ideational frameworks, which undergird identity: "although a person may be potentially classifiable by gender, ethnicity, class or age, or as a doctor, mother, sister and so on, these particular identities are not automatically relevant in every interaction she or he engages in" (Muntigl *et al.*, 2000, p. 99). Identities are based on beliefs, which form the ideational framework and as such are discursively constructed. By using ethnographic analysis, the research tries to understand these beliefs and how they condition the internalisation of new ones.

Even though many studies discussed in the literature review include interviews, they do not generally partake in the same level of analysis as ethnographic work.[15] This work mostly presents quotes from recorded interviews, but their selection is heavily conditioned by field notes written during and following informal conversations, interactions and observations, offering contextualisation and occasional unguarded comments. For example, following a conversation with Eurybia,[16] the following note was made:

> [They] didn't say anything on tape then once I stopped recording, [they] really opened up. [They] talked about fake migrants and how people who've lived 15 years in Turkey are coming and so on.

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[14] For a longer discussion of ethnography in secretive organization, see discussion by Monahan and Fisher (2015).

[15] An important exception being Suvarierol's (2011) work, which involves participant observation in the European Commission.

[16] Eurybia is a pseudonym for a Frontex officer. See section 4.3 below for further detail.

> People are so shy of saying this on tape. It's amazing there's such a consensus and yet nobody will talk.
>
> (Field Notes 1400, Pos. 4)

Interviews are helpful in filling gaps in surveys, but an ethnographic methodology goes deeper, understanding the views of participants beyond what they might mention in the formal context of a recorded conversation with an outsider.

A central challenge of ethnographic fieldwork is the manner in which the researcher influences the outcome of their research. Crapanzano (2010, p. 58) explains: "There is in all fieldwork a struggle at both manifest and latent levels between openness to the new, to the exotic, to otherness and to our reductive loyalty to our orientations and prejudices". That is, the ideational framework of the researcher and their agency have an important influence on their research findings.

Ethnographers seek to attenuate the effects of particularities of the researcher with what they term reflexivity, which is distinct from the reflection they prod in participants:

> reflexivity is the self-appraisal in research. It means turning of the researcher lens back onto oneself to recognize and take responsibility for one's own situatedness within the research and the effect that it may have on the setting and people being studied, questions being asked, data being collected and its interpretation.
>
> (Berger, 2015, p. 220).

There are many different approaches to reflexivity and the appropriate one depends on the research question: "It is the task of each researcher, based on their research aims, values and the logic of the methodology involved, to decide how best to exploit the reflexive potential of their research" (Finlay, 2002, p. 227).

In this work, reflexivity is introduced through transparency. This chapter offers a detailed account of how data was collected and a clear description of how it is analysed. Additionally, appendices include the original codebook used for transcript analysis, a researcher positionality statement

to consider potential biases and copies of materials given to research participants and the researcher. Finally, although not available to the broader public for contractual and ethical reasons, reviewers of the report have access to the full database of coded transcripts and field notes. Introducing as much transparency as legal and ethical commitments allow does not eliminate bias, but allows readers and reviewers to better understand any bias that may be present and take it into account when evaluating the research product as a whole.

4.2 Contextual Description

The case of national officials deployed to Lesvos is contextually different from previous studies of SNEs, which mostly focus on officials seconded to Brussels. The political, institutional and geographic circumstances all affect the socialisation claims that inductees might encounter. Moreover, SNEs' motivations to deploy to a migration hotspot for a few weeks or months are likely different from those to deploy to Brussels for a few years. These particularities of Lesvos are delineated using thick description (Ponterotto, 2006). The question of how thick a thick description ought to be is inherently difficult to answer and there is always a danger of going too far down a rabbit hole (Geertz, 1973, p. 28-30). This work tries to offer enough of a description so that the reader has a sense of who the participants in this study are and how they differ the from the subjects of studies described in the literature review.

Since the so-called refugee crisis[17] of 2015-16, the European Union has struck or strengthened agreements with international partners to stem the irregular border crossings of asylum seekers. The EU's capacities and competences in the area of Integrated Border Management (IBM) have expanded and some reforms to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) have been made. The EU-Turkey deal may be the most high-profile of these initiatives and refers to a tripartite diplomatic understanding regarding EU-Greek-Turkish cooperation regarding irregular crossings of the Greek-Turkish maritime border by asylum seekers. It is composed of the 15 October 2015 EU-Turkey Joint Action

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[17] For a comment on terminology, see Sigona (2018).

Plan (JAP) (European Commission, 2015) and the 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Statement (Council of the EU, 2016).

Despite its being known in the press and referred to by its executors as a deal,[18] its legal status is uncertain. The JAP is a memo from the Commission and the Statement is a press release from the Council: the deal is not an international agreement in the traditional sense, falling "outside the EU Treaties and [constituting] policy tools which stand far away from the ordinary shapes of, and checks and balances applicable to, international agreements in the EU legal system" (Carrera *et al.*, 2019, p. 11). The Court of Justice of the EU has found that it is not an international agreement in the sense of Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Art. 218; however, legal scholars debate whether or not this 'soft arrangement' is an international agreement and what its legal implications are (Wessel, 2020, p. 8–9).

The Joint Action Plan calls for "Turkey's opening of its labour market to Syrians under temporary protection, the introduction of new visa requirements for Syrians and other nationalities, stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police and enhanced information sharing." In return, the EU had "begun disbursing the 3 billion euro of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey for concrete projects and work has advanced on visa liberalisation and in the accession talks, including the opening of Chapter 17 (on economic and monetary policy)" (European Commission, 2015). Following the Statement, "Turkey furthermore agreed to accept the rapid return of all migrants not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey into Greece and to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters" (Council of the EU, 2016).

In return, the EU committed that "For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey

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[18] For example, in March of 2020, Council President Michel said that High Representative Borrell would work with Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu, "to be certain that we are on the same page that we have the same interpretation about what we do, in Turkey and at the level of the European Union, in order to implement the deal" (Euractiv and AFP, 2020).

to the EU" (Council of the EU, 2016). Despite this agreement "The pace of returns to Turkey from the Greek islands under the Statement remains slow, especially concerning Syrians, with only 2,735 migrants returned since March 2016" (European Commission, 2020, p. 3). Adding to the difficulties, the visa liberalisation and reopening of Chapter 17 were, however, frozen following Erdogan's reaction to the attempted coup d'état of July 2016: "Most observers see little room for progress on this front, especially with regard to the revision of Turkey's terrorism legislation" (Kirchner and Flanagan, 2020, p. 160).

Most importantly for this work, however, the deal governs the five island hotspots of Chios, Kos, Leros, Lesvos and Samos. According to the so-called EU-Turkey deal, applicants ought to be returned rapidly to Turkey and continue their application for asylum from there. However, this has largely not been the case, with the camps, along with EU presence in the hotspots, growing over time.

Originally the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, Frontex's principal activities have involved risk analysis, coordinated returns and support for joint operations Triton, Poseidon and others (Benedicto, 2019). Founded in 2004 (Council Regulation No. 2007/2004), Frontex (the shorthand remained in use after the organisation changed its name) became the European Border and Coast Guard as a result of an eponymous Regulation in 2016 (EU Regulation No. 2016/1624). A response to the 2015 refugee crisis, the EBCG Regulation builds on previous regulations (Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 and EU Regulation No. 656/2014) under the TFEU Art. 7 mandate to introduce "measures necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders." The EBCG Regulation was followed by a reform, adopted by the Council in summer 2019, which intends to place 10,000 border guards under the command of Frontex by 2027 (EU Regulation, No. 2019/1896, Art 5). Commission President Von der Leyen (2019, p. 15) has said she wants this process completed by the end of her presidency in 2024 instead of 2027.

Likewise an outcome of the Schengen agreement, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was created to manage the movement of asylum seekers between member states, create common standards of member state responsibility for applicants and to facilitate communication among

member state asylum authorities. The CEAS has been panned as ineffective, most notably due to Hungarian resistance to refugee quota implementation and a larger reluctance by member states to give up control of a core state power (Lavenex, 2018, p. 1196-7; Thompson, 2021b p. 4; Trauner, 2016). Previous European Parliaments and Commissions have tried to reform the system, but proposals have been unable to pass through the European Council (Servent, 2019, p. 297).

Notwithstanding hurdles to agreement on fundamental reform, one area of progress has been the creation of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO),[19] which is principally tasked with material and informational support to member states, as well as providing training regarding common standards and best practices (EU Regulation No. 439/2010). Material support to member states benefits primarily arrival countries, notably the Office's support of the development of the Greek Asylum Service (GAS).[20] Training and promulgation of best practices are priorities for destination countries,[21] which see "diverging asylum standards as important pull factors leading to an unequal distribution of asylum seekers across Europe" (Schneider and Nieswandt, 2018, p. 16).

EASO and Frontex deploy Seconded National Experts (SNEs) to five Aegean migration hotspots and hire local, temporary staff. The deployment of SNEs builds on a long tradition of the EU seconding national officials to support its work, on the claim that this solidarity both improves EU governance and provides useful experience for national officials. Aside from the Aegean, there are also hotspots in Italy, which

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[19] Despite agreement to the creation of EASO, upgrading the Office to a European agency has faced significant challenges and only been agreed to in 2021 (Thompson, 2021a). The distinction between the two categories, however, is often overstated (Tsourdi, 2016, p. 1001) and this work refers to EASO as an agency.

[20] The GAS was created following an EU infringement notice in November 2009 and a second notice in June 2010, which led to the Greek Government to present in August 2010 an "Action Plan on Migration Management" and the establishment of the Asylum Service (McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012, p. 73).

[21] Despite the importance of asylum standard harmonization to support of destination countries for the creation of EASO, at Greek and Italian hotspots, deployed EASO officers are viewed as primarily a support function for national authorities, "who hold ultimate responsibility for their activities" (Carrera *et al.*, 2018, p. 246).

operate under a separate legal framework. Moreover, many EASO and Frontex activities in both Italy and Greece take place outside the designated hotspots.

The largest of the hotspots is Lesvos, a large Greek island in the Eastern Aegean 5.5 kilometres off the coast of Turkey and a destination for refugees since mythological times (Carstensen, 2015). In recent history, it was a major destination for refugees during the 1913-22 period of ethnic cleansing, genocide and population transfers in the region (Carstensen, 2015; Shirinian, 2017). This history made the island comparably hospitable to irregular arrivals in 2015, but as it became clear to locals that the arrangement was not temporary, their attitudes soured towards both the refugees and the politicians they held responsible for their indefinite predicament (Rontos *et al.*, 2019).

The main city on the island is the port of Mytilene, situated near the main airport. It is where most of the socialising among officers takes place. Some SNEs stay there in hotels, although many live a bit outside of town, commonly in the beachfront hotels on the way to the airport. Others are in private accommodations. There are also a mix of public and private beaches in the area, where guest officers interact casually with local Greeks and applicants for asylum. Frontex also has sea patrol officers stationed in the more picturesque port of Molyvos on the northern end of the island. Molyvos is quieter and feels very remote, although it is not much more than an hour's drive from Mytilene.

Fieldwork was conducted both in officers' workplaces, including the Moria refugee camp and the Pagani EASO site, and offsite. The camp, named after a nearby town, housed at the time of the fieldwork between 5.000 and 10.000 refugees. It is an open camp, meaning that residents are allowed to leave at their leisure; however, entrance is restricted by security guards and limited to residents and people working in the camp. On the camp's outskirt lies the so-called jungle, an informal settlement of improvised shelters that accommodate the camp's overcapacity. It burned down in September, 2020 but was reconstructed (Hadoulis, 2020). A nearby camp, Kara Tepe, helps with the overflow, housing vulnerable refugees in particular.

Entering Moria, on the righthand side are the Frontex offices, in which applicants are screened, fingerprinted and given initial documents. Further into the camp, to the left, is the EASO area, nicknamed 'the cage' due to its double fencing and barbed wire. Where there is no roof, it is covered by wire netting. At the rear is a drawbridge over a dry riverbed to facilitate escape of the staff. These protective measures were taken following a 2016 riot during which the area was pelted by stones and set on fire (BBC News, 2016). The roof was still charred from that riot during the fieldwork. The camp is formally secured by Greek police, but in practice mostly by G4S, a private security contractor.

The second major worksite is Pagani. Part of a Greek military base of the same name, it was given over to EASO to conduct in-depth asylum interviews as a safer alternative to working in Moria. Applicants are bused in daily from the camps for these interviews. As a result of these interviews, applicants will either be found vulnerable (see subsection 6.3.1), or an EASO officer will write an opinion regarding their eligibility for asylum and forward their case to the Greek Asylum Service. Whereas in other hotspots caseworkers often share containers as working spaces, conducting multiple interviews at a time. In Pagani, interviews are conducted one-on-one, in small offices with doors that close.

Taking the institutional, personal and geographic together concretises the differences between time spent in Brussels and Lesvos. The hotspot is a European effort to manage a temporary problem, whether real or perceived. It involves a large refugee camp that has occasional violent riots. An island at the edge of Europe, rather the city at the Union's heart, it's part of a comparatively recent attempt to integrate the block's border and asylum systems. Moreover, the hotspot involves police and asylum officers, who are public servants, but better fit the notion of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980)[22] than those seconded to Brussels. Finally, secondments are short, lasting only a few or several weeks rather than years. Nevertheless, there are similarities too. As in Brussels, Lesvos hosts diverse Europeans work together for a common purpose, even though member states might have conflicting views on how borders and asylum

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[22] See Borrelli (2019) and Triculescu (2020) for a practical application of the street-level bureaucrats concept to migration issues.

should be addressed. There are conflicts inherent between the pre-existing ideational framework formed in national professional communities and the novel roles and norms encountered during induction into a European one.

4.3. Data: Description, Collection and Analysis

The principal participants[23] studied in this work are SNEs seconded to EASO or Frontex and deployed by these agencies in the fall of 2018 and summer of 2019 to the Lesvos migration hotspot within the framework of the EU-Turkey deal.[24] The data produced from 13 weeks of fieldwork in Lesvos[25] were used to create a corpus of transcribed interviews and fieldnotes. Of the interviews, 24 were audio-recorded[26] and five were recorded in written notes, either taken during or shortly after the conversation. These interviews are complemented by field notes composed on average once per day and which describe interactions and informal conversations with participants.

Audio-recorded interviews feature participants from Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK. The most common of these is Germany. Participants cited in field notes, but not in the audio recordings come from some of the previously listed countries, as well as Bulgaria and Italy. Recordings range from 33 to 71 minutes and were done in one sitting, with the exception of two that were conducted in two parts. Most interviews last between 50 and 60 minutes.

The 24 audio-recorded interviews are evenly split between EASO and Frontex officials. EASO officers in the dataset have the following titles:

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[23] The term 'participants' is used in this work in the same sense that 'informants' is used in anthropology. The choice is aesthetic and not intended to imply a theoretical or practical distinction.

[24] A few EASO interpreters – who are contract workers rather than SNEs – are discussed in field notes, but are not formally interviewed, making them minor participants.

[25] Six additional weeks were also spent in Samos and three more in Catania, Italy, but materials from those periods are not used in this report.

[26] About five additional interviews were audio recorded, but were later lost.

caseworker, flow manager, team leader and vulnerability expert. The most common is caseworker. Frontex officers have the following titles: cultural mediator, diver, escort officer, field press coordinator, finger printer, screener, shore patrol officer and surveillance officer. The most common is finger printer.

Field notes reflect participant observation and social interaction with participants, including both group and one-on-one interactions. These interactions took place in a variety of locations, including bars and tavernas around Mytilene, the Moria refugee camp, a church plaza, officers' private lodgings and elsewhere.

Frontex officers mostly work what is known as a 'two plus two' schedule, in which they work two days, spend the third on standby in case they are needed and do not work on the fourth. They are usually separated into two teams for each job function, alternating their work. Frontex cultural mediators, however, usually work six days per week. EASO officers work Monday through Friday in Pagani and Moria and alternate Saturday shifts in Moria but do not work on Saturdays in Pagani.

Half of the 24 participants in audio-recorded interviews had previously been deployed to hotspots. Some had participated in joint Frontex operations distinct from the hotspots. Some were part of EU missions in the former Yugoslavia. Some have military backgrounds. Others had worked abroad in other capacities. Cultural mediators have usually been in the hotspots far longer than other SNEs, some nearly constantly since the camps were opened in 2016.

All EASO participants have completed a degree beyond undergraduate. Most Frontex participants had professional education to become police officers, but some completed all or part of bachelor's degrees. Two were in continuing education.

The audio-recorded interviews feature 9 women and 19 men whose ages range from their 20s to 60s, most being in their 30s. A few were foreign-born and arrived in their home countries as children. Two arrived as teenagers. Some have one or more foreign parent. About one third of participants are parents themselves. These numbers appeared to be roughly proportional to those of guest officers more generally, although

detailed figures are not publicly available. EASO officials are generally younger and more of them are women, although both organisations featured a broad distribution of ages and included both men and women.

SNEs operate within a close-nit social context. I spent time with four loose social groups. The first group was composed mostly of Frontex officers working in Moria as screeners, fingerprinters and returns officers.[27] The second was composed of EASO flow managers and interpreters working in Moria. The third was principally EASO officers working in Pagani. The fourth was Frontex cultural mediators working mostly in Moria. There was, however, some overlap between these groups, especially between the two Frontex and two EASO groups.

The interviews – whether or not they were audio-recorded – were very loosely structured in an attempt to allow topics of import to participants to take precedence and limit the introduction of bias by the researcher.[28] They begin with concrete questions about participants' career paths and work in their home countries. They then transition to questions about their work during the deployment. Third, participants are asked open ended questions, such as, "And how do you think you see things differently as a result of this deployment?" (Aides, 110). If the topic of Europe has by that point not arisen, participants are asked more direct questions, such as "Have you – and you really don't have to answer yes to this question, I just want to see if it's important to you – have you, as a result of being in hotspots, had a change in how you thought about Europe, the EU, anything like that?" (Kaliope, 45). The most direct way such a question would be posed would be along the lines of, "do you personally feel more connected to other Europeans, to Europe, the EU as a result of your deployment?" (Thaumas, 82).

Participants were also observed during social activities and several personal friendships were formed, which lasted beyond the period in

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[27] Due to the low volume of returns, returns officers also work as fingerprinters, which is why they were part of the Moria-based Frontex social group.

[28] The approach is described by Spradley (1979, p. 58) as, "a series of friendly conversations into which the researcher slowly introduces new elements to assist [participants] in responding as [participants]."

which the study was conducted. Resultant observations, along with observations of the field and researcher reflections were recorded in a mix of hand-written and typed notes.

EASO interviews were conducted in the fall of 2018 in both Pagani and Moria. To organize interviews in Pagani, EASO staff were given preferences regarding characteristics of officers (usually countries of origin) to be interviewed and the staff would find willing participants. Occasionally this was done less formally, asking SNE team leaders if they had someone they could spare. Oftentimes, one official would be unexpectedly busy and so a replacement would be found *ad hoc*. This organisational selection method helped increase the representation of different member states. Interviews in Pagani were generally conducted in an unused staff office, in an interview cubicle or at an outdoor space used by staff to take breaks.

Interviews in Moria were arranged less formally because of the smaller size of the team. Flow managers were interviewed in the space behind their containers adjacent to the toilets, where staff and interpreters would smoke cigarettes, eat lunch and socialise. One audio-recorded interview was conducted in a coffee shop rather than on site. Participant observation was also conducted at the gate, during which detailed notes were taken on how officials interacted with asylum applicants, Greek staff and interpreters. This observation also included contextual questions recorded in field notes. One day was spent in its entirety shadowing a single flow manager and taking careful notes on all of their activities and contextual explanations of their work.

Frontex interviews took place in both the fall of 2018 and the summer of 2019. They mostly took place off-site, usually in either coffee shops or a church plaza. During the fall, interviews were organized by the press officer sending a mass email with documents generally describing the research and the researcher. Officers would then send an email if they wanted to be interviewed either while they were on standby or on a day off.

During the summer, a new field press coordinator was deployed and so the process for arranging interviews changed. The coordinator would find officers and sit in on the interviews. The press officer said very little

during the interviews and did not balk at any questions or answers. It appeared that the press officer was trying to facilitate a successful interview, while making sure sensitive information was not disclosed. The only material interjection came at a moment in which a participant argued camps should be closed instead of open and the coordinator said that context is important in such cases.

The press officer was very helpful and worked hard to facilitate interviews and did not actively censor participants. Nonetheless, those interviews included less criticism of Frontex or European migration management generally than interviews conducted the previous autumn; however, they did include discussions of emotional reactions to asylum applicants and the Moria refugee camp. This disparity may have been due either to implicit censorship by the presence of the coordinator or it could have been the result of the coordinator's selection of participants. Although Frontex generally appeared to have high morale, at least compared to EASO, these participants were particularly positive. Nevertheless, on issues of socialisation into professional or political communities, the answers did not defer from those of the previous autumn with any regularity.

All audio-recordings and hand-written notes that had not been lost have been transcribed and – along with typed materials – entered into the MaxQDA software programme. Some irrelevant portions of these materials have been omitted or paraphrased. This is most often the case with introductory remarks during which the researcher and participant were getting to know one another.

Of the materials entered, interviews are titled by the pseudonym of the participant. In cases when interviews took place over two sessions, the two are combined into a single transcript. Field notes usually refer to multiple participants and so they are referred to by the date and time they were written. Within documents, each paragraph is numbered automatically by the software. As a result, when citing a quote from participants, the generated paragraph number is written. Occasionally, MaxQDA does not automatically

Figure 1: Example of naming conventions for interviews and field notes in MaxQDA

generate these and then the minute number from the transcript is used instead. The MaxQDA file is provided to reviewers to ensure transparency but not to the public due to contractual agreements with participants and agencies, as well as to protect the identities of participants.

Once entered into the programme, passages are coded according to topic and mood and then categorised (colour coded) according to overarching categories, following recommendations from Saldaña (2014, p. 8-14). The code categories are as follows: emotions (red), views regarding Greeks/Greek authorities (cyan), deployment effects (lavender), affective responses (green), views on Europe/EU (blue) and specific/technical issues (yellow). When coding, statements are taken at face value: for example, if a participant described an explicit belief in Greek sovereignty, then an eponymous tag was used. By not reading too much between

Figure 2: Example of codes and categories used in MaxQDA

the lines and avoiding making implicit statements about participant beliefs or intentions, researcher bias is somewhat reduced. However, this approach limits the analysis to what participants say they believe, rather than what they may actually believe. The complete codebook is available in Appendix F and it should be noted that theoretical changes have been made since the original coding scheme and so not every code lines up with a particular area of inquiry within the report.

Instead of pure anonymity, participants are given pseudonyms, which are listed in Appendix A. Pseudonymisation is more transparent than anonymisation, but requires further steps to prevent depseudonymisation, which is easier than deanonymisation. For instance, all participants are referred to in the epicene, singular 'they' regardless of gender. Additionally, sensitive parts of passages, including names, dates and more are redacted and replaced with descriptions where and to the extent possible. This tradeoff is intended to offer the most transparency possible while preserving the privacy of participants in the study.

4.4. Validity, Reliability and Relevance

This explorative plausibility probe is an illustrative case asking, "How are SNEs deployed to the Lesvos migration hotspots socialised into European professional and political communities?" More specifically, it confirms the hypothesis that when roles and norms cohere to participants' ideational frameworks constructed in their national professional communities, they might demonstrate type II socialisation; however, where there is a conflict, officials only show type I socialisation.

This research employs an ethnographic approach to exploring study participants' ideational frameworks and how particular roles and norms cohere to specific pre-existing beliefs. Participants' internalisation is further described as either type I or type II socialisation by assessing whether the performance of or adherence to these roles and norms is limited to the context of their deployments or becomes 'taken for granted' and continues once they return to their home countries' professional communities. Comparisons are then made between the pre-existing beliefs needed for type I and type II socialisation. Demonstrating how socialisation works in the particular context of Lesvos, this study goes beyond "mere description" (Gerring, 2012) and illustrates microprocesses that may be applicable to similar cases.

Given the in-depth analysis, the internal validity of the findings is fairly clear. The fieldwork reached saturation, meaning that "the investigation ceases to reveal further new constructs" (LeCompte and Goetz 1982, p. 47). Saturation becomes apparent as a result of coding and analysis (see previous section and Appendix F), which shows plenty of examples for all the principal code categories, significantly decreasing the marginal value of further interviews. Such saturation is often described as an appropriate endpoint for ethnographic research and a marker of internal validity, or at least of a turning point in the research focus (Ybema et al. 2009, p. 67-9).

Internal validity, however, should not be taken to imply external validity. The research design is not sufficient to prove causation; rather, its focus is on microprocesses. Similarly to process tracing, it is particularly useful for affirming a hypothesis without confirming it via a hoop test (Collier, 2011, p. 826–7). That is, a necessary criterion for belief has been established, but

not a sufficient one. Therefore, in order to establish clear causation, further research remains necessary.

The study's reliability is limited by the fact that SNEs are not interviewed once they've returned from their missions. The lack of a time series creates an inherent challenge to describing any diachronic process, including socialisation. This shortcoming is mitigated, however, by the fact that many participants have deployed more than once and can reflect on past post-deployment periods. Ideally, participants could be observed directly doing their work once they have returned to their home countries; however, as with time-series panel data, this approach is beyond the scope of the report.

Caution should be taken when applying findings from an illustrative case study research design. Insofar as the case study effectively uses its theoretical framework and methodology to explain the socialisation of EASO and Frontex SNEs on Lesvos, there is cause to analyse similar cases using this approach. Although there is no guarantee that particular answers to the research questions will apply to every spaciotemporal context or disparate population, this work's illustration of microprocesses of socialisation provide sufficient grounds for applying this study's central hypothesis to like cases.

The discussion of like cases begs the question of which other cases this study might be illustrative of. At its broadest interpretation, this is a study of how professionals from one professional community of knowledge are resocialised when transferred to a new one. However, this study is informed by the literature on European socialisation, whether in the sense of socialisation of inductees into European institutions or in that of socialisation into roles and norms relating to Europe. As a result, one ought to expect the theoretical framework to be less reliable if used outside of the study of European socialisation. Therefore, this study would more concretely apply to SNEs in the European institutions.

Even so, Lesvos is an unusually affective and social environment, with some extreme characteristics. As a result, this study would be more illustrative of European socialisation on adventurous missions directed by the EU, especially peacekeeping or capacity building in the former

Yugoslavia[29] and the European neighbourhood. Most immediately, however, this study should be illustrative of deployments to different hotspots and at different time periods.

Beyond being meaningful in the social scientific sense both within the case and beyond, this research holds social relevance, with its implications for public policy. Street-level bureaucrats have certain discretion in carrying out their work, with implications for policy outcomes (Lipsky, 1980). This could be an EASO caseworker deciding whether an applicant for asylum's story is credible or a Frontex screener deciding whether a recent arrival to the camp came to Europe for economic reasons or not. Their expertise, created in their national professional community and then adapted when inducted into the European professional community, means that the question of socialisation in one and then another community of knowledge has important effects on policy outcomes.

Organisations should therefore try to understand their inductees' ideational frameworks in order to have a better idea of what socialisation claims are best suited for internalisation. By considering socialisation types I and II, and how they cohere to different beliefs, trainers can shape their messages more effectively and improve the organisational induction process. Likewise, the affective, extreme or social characteristics of the contextual environment should be taken seriously, with hypotheses about how these might hinder or facilitate the socialisation process. Such recommendations are already intuited by managers and trainers, but could benefit from formalisation.

More specifically, this work could be helpful for Frontex in trying to implement roles and norms pertaining to fundamental rights, a highly salient and challenging subject for the organisation. Findings in chapter 6 demonstrates how belief in the legitimate authority of host countries drives deployed personnel to adhere to roles and norms with which they disagree and are contrary to the standards of their home countries' professional communities. This reticence to disobey should lead to concern about underreporting of or even participation in fundamental

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[29] Yugoslavia is noted in particular because many Frontex officers have deployed there and discuss the similarities and differences.

rights violations. Trainers should teach the limits of legitimate authority of forces Frontex supports and instil a clear understanding of when red lines have been crossed and the process that SNEs should follow in such cases.

4.5. Conclusion

Contributing to the literature on European socialisation, this study offers a theoretical framework rooted in the sociology of professions and coherentist epistemology. Rather than focusing on easily categorizable demographic characteristics, it looks in depth to see how pre-existing beliefs cohere to novel roles and norms so that they can be internalised and incorporated into ideational frameworks. Using SNEs deployed to Lesvos as an illustrative case, the work demonstrates the efficacy of this approach. It hypothesises that types I and II socialisation require coherence to different parts of the framework: whereas type I requires only coherence to pre-existing beliefs regarding legitimate authority, type II requires coherence to beliefs developed as part of a national professional community of knowledge regarding what constitutes high-quality work. Furthermore, it expects that the resultant professional community will support the construction of a European political community.

The case selected is in some ways a hard and in others an easy case, making it an ideal laboratory for studying particularly fast-moving socialisation. SNEs have strong presocialisation gleaned from their memberships in national professional communities and do not remain on the island for long. However, the highly affective and social context, which is also somewhat extreme, suggests that a surprising degree of socialisation is likely to occur on the island.

The research is based on audio-recorded interviews, participant observation and informal conversations, which allow a thick description of participants' beliefs and the manner in which particular socialisation claims are cohered to specific pre-existing beliefs. Turning all of the notes and transcripts into a large text corpus allows for theoretically informed coding which reveals these patterns and shows consistency across participants.

Having reached saturation (Ybema *et al.*, 2009, p. 67–8), the work is demonstrably internally valid. However, as an illustrative case, it is externally valid only as a plausibility probe. Causal mechanisms cannot be proven due to the lack of a diachronic design; however, the microprocesses uncovered are plausible and merit application to similar cases. The most similar cases are SNEs at different hotspots in different times, but there are arguments for application to adventurous deployments more generally, SNEs in Brussels and even inductees transferred from one professional community to another more generally.

It is hoped that beyond sparking further academic research into European socialisation that focuses on belief coherence, this work will have practical application. Most immediately, this work could be applied to designing new trainings for SNEs, especially in the highly salient area of fundamental rights enforcement. More broadly, this work should encourage managers and trainers charged with inducting professionals into organisations to take their pre-existing beliefs seriously instead of seeing them as a bundle of demographic characteristics. By designing trainings to cohere novel roles and norms to pre-existing beliefs, it is hoped that the organisational induction process can be facilitated.

The following three chapters take this research design and apply it to empirical cases. Chapter 5 looks at the microprocesses of socialisation on the island, demonstrating the posited role of coherence and ideational framework. Chapter 6 considers a series of work-related roles and norms, showing how type I socialisation requires that novel socialisation claims cohere to pre-existing beliefs regarding legitimate authority while type II requires coherence to beliefs acquired as part of national professional communities. Chapter 7 looks at how a European professional community can undergird a political one.

Chapter 5

The Microprocesses of Socialisation: Internalisation of roles and norms Lesvos

This report, as discussed in the previous chapter, is an illustrative case study. Finding lacunae in the existing literature, it seeks to study a different type of European official in a context far away from Brussels and using a more in-depth methodology that centres beliefs rather than demographics. This chapter demonstrates the value of that approach by showing how it can be used to describe the microprocesses of socialisation, tracing the complexity of how particular roles and norms are internalised.

By going through transcripts and field notes, the motivations of inductees for deploying in the first place are considered. This analysis leads to the finding that a certain openness to (self-altering) experience, as well as what is termed 'professional motivation' both play important roles. Additionally, it finds that financial and career motivations are not generally central to guest officers' reasons for deploying. Evidence for this is furnished by participants' complaints that their home organisations don't appreciate the value of the deployments, seeing them instead as well-paid beach holidays (Sangarius, 80; Phorcys, 317). Instead of careerist motivations, officials' reasons for deploying include the mundane nature of work at home (Sangarius, 80; Ares, 30; Eumenides, 41), curiosity about the hotspots (Polyhymnia, 11; Eumenides, 41), attractiveness of living on a Greek island (Polyhymnia, 11; Thalassa, 33), meeting new people (Ares,

30; Aides, 68), career mobility (Terpsichore 14, 88; Nereus, 24; Thalassa, 1), improving English language skills (Brizo, 41) and wanting to help (Erinyes, 18; Nerites, 28).

Having explained who these participants are that select into the research sample, the chapter goes on show the variety of responses to socialisation claims that are possible. Instead of a simple acceptance/rejection binary, the chapter shows that participants can also modify or avoid various roles and norms, or even consider them in parts. Coherence to pre-existing beliefs, theorised in chapter 3, is shown to be the condition required for accepting roles and norms and openness to experience and bureaucratic motivation are shown to facilitate their coherence by motivating participants in the study to modify and partition claims.

The chapter's last section considers how contextual factors facilitate or hinder the socialisation process in the particular setting of Lesvos. Extreme contexts are found to be somewhat important, most notably SNEs' concerns for their personal security; however, these do not appear to be of overwhelming importance. The affectiveness of the context, however, is very significant. Especially when discussing conditions of asylum seekers in the camp, participants are very clear that they are deeply affected. Likewise, the social context is important to officers, who discuss it often and with enthusiasm. Taken altogether, the context of Lesvos is clearly important, especially its affective and social dimensions, suggesting that it plays a major role in facilitating or hindering the socialisation process.

Taken altogether, the chapter shows how coherence functions in the socialisation process on Lesvos. It shows who deploys and why, clarifying that this is a population that is unusually open to experience and professionally motivated, suggesting a proclivity toward socialisation. The chapter also explicates the complexity of the socialisation process, showing how claims are modified and made to cohere to pre-existing beliefs. Finally, it shows why the context of Lesvos is important, noting deployments' affective and social dimensions in particular. The two chapters that follow this one will apply these insights to the analysis to various roles and norms in order to show how a European professional and political community, respectively, is constructed on the island.

5.1. Self-Selection and Participants' Pre-Existing Beliefs

National officials deployed by EASO and Frontex to Lesvos are not conscripted: they have to volunteer for their postings. Moreover, they often have to expend organisational capital convincing their supervisors and other management to allow them to go on what many bosses view as a beach holiday. Such reasons behind their self-selection into the organisation offer a window into guest officers' pre-existing belief structure. They are not random members of their national professional community, but rather ones who want to deploy enough to do the work needed to secure a deployment.

Conversations with participants suggest that they are more curious and open to experience than their colleagues who did not deploy, at least in these participants' telling. When asked why they chose to deploy, most speak of wanting to have new experiences, demonstrating a personality characteristic known to psychologists as 'openness to experience' (Costa and McCrae, 1976; Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974). This type of curiosity and openness is likely conducive for socialisation, suggesting that deployed officials are comparatively interested in hearing new ideas and taking them seriously. This inclination suggests a comparative openness to a variety of socialisation claims.

A secondary reason for volunteering for deployment has to do with wanting to have an impact through their work. This may be a wish to protect borders, to help refugees through the asylum process or other reasons. This characteristic is not as prominent, but still common and can be thought of as professional motivation—that is, many SNEs are motivated to exercise their professional abilities in an impactful manner. Such motivation may be ascribed to a strong belief in the value of their profession, meaning that they have been well-socialised into their home-countries' professional communities. This motivation suggests that pre-existing beliefs in what constitutes high-quality work may be stronger among deployed personnel than ones who have not been deployed.

Finally, other costs and benefits of deployments are considered. For a minority of SNEs, career prospects are improved by deployment, although most see deployments as unimportant or even hinderances to their careers. Financial benefits and language learning are also considered

in some detail and found to be significant, though not primary motivations. Deployments also include significant costs, most notably the distance from family and strain on romantic relationships.

5.1.1. Openness to (Self-Altering) Experience

Many of the explanations that officials offer for their choice to deploy to Lesvos imply a personality trait known as "openness to experience" (Costa and McCrae, 1976) or "openness to absorbing and self-altering experience" (Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974).[30] The former term is more widely used, and so will be here too, but the second offers important contextualisation regarding the connection between openness to experience and socialisation. Self-selection into contexts in which inductees may encounter novel claims implies a certain propensity to consider novel claims and cohere them to one's ideational framework. Openness to experience can be reasonably understood, almost tautologically, to imply openness to socialisation claims. Moreover, the notion of 'self-altering' suggests a possibility of internalising new roles and norms and performing and adhering to them beyond a locally occasioned context (i.e., type II socialisation).

Participants do not invoke the psychological term of art; instead, their personality characteristics are imputed from their self-descriptions. Most directly, this can be seen in their descriptions of curiosity, which is a central tenant of openness to experience (Silvia and Christensen, 2020, p. 15-7). The softer versions of curiosity are evident in statements, such as Sangarius' (Pos. 80) laconic, "I go out [on deployments] because it's [redacted] years same job. These Frontex missions help me clean my mind. I like it." In such statements there appears to be an implication of curiosity as a motivator of deployment, although that is not so clear as to be beyond contestation.

Other participants are clearer about the role of curiosity in their decisions to deploy:

> Yes, for sure. Like, we heard that the Germans might be, had the opportunity to go to, to all the, like to Ethiopia, to Libya, not to

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[30] The two terms denote similar underlying traits (McCrae and John, 1992, p. 186).

> Libya, to Lebanon, to a lot of interesting places. And that sounds really interesting. Because working as a caseworker in the [redacted] in [Home Country] is not the most popular job.

> (Nereus, 2018)

Uses of terms like 'interesting' imply a certain openness to, and even enthusiasm for, new experiences. Other officials denote similar sentiments with the use of terms like "exotic" (Thalassa, Pos. 53) or with discussions of the attraction of being on a "Greek island" (Polyhymnia, Pos. 11).

Participants might describe curiosity in general terms. For example, some officers invoke novelty: "I wanna do something different, you know? Meeting people. And every day is a challenge, and you learn a bit more. Every day is a surprise" (Ares, Pos. 30). Other participants are more specific in the subjects of their curiosity, saying they want to learn about "refugee issues" (Eumenides, Pos. 41) or understand the "political dimension" (Aides, Pos. 140) of their work. Eumenides (Pos. 45) makes explicit the link between curiosity and changes to one's ideational framework: "You grow as a person and your understanding. It's different cases and situations and you can relate to the things happening in the past [after the deployment], think about it."

Participants see themselves as having stronger traits that imply openness to experience in comparison to their colleagues who choose not to deploy. Aides (Pos. 140) specifically offers the terms 'open' and 'liberal' to describe the difference between officers on Lesvos and those who do not deploy:

> You have to, you have to be open, you have to kind of have an open mind… because you have to be kind of open to do the deployment in the first place. So I usually, I get along with most of my colleagues here on the island, because we kind of have similar, like, I would say that we are maybe more liberal than most of the colleagues that stay at home.

This intuitively sensible contradistinction between officers who deploy and their colleagues who do not is broadly held by participants and comes up frequently in casual conversation. Nearly all participants describe curiosity and other characteristics that imply openness to experience as a

major motivating factor for deploying. They are nearly unanimous in seeing these characteristics as more common among deployed officials than among their colleagues back home. This saturation of responses (Ybema *et al.*, 2009, p. 67–8) allows for the empirical claim that officers deployed to Lesvos generally see themselves as having character attributes constitutive of the openness to experience character trait at higher levels than their colleagues who have not deployed.

5.1.2. Professional Motivation

Another common reason for deployment described by participants is professional pride and desire to do the work which ought to be done. Most participants expressed a belief in the value of their work or at least in the potential value of their professional abilities. Professional communities, as described in section 3.2, are communities of knowledge which see themselves not only as having esoteric expertise, but "a sense of calling to the field" (Hall 1968, p. 95). The motivation to use one's professional abilities to ameliorate problems out of a sense of calling is described as professional motivation and should not be confused with motivations to succeed in one's career.

The motivating effect of professional pride is described succinctly by Erinyes (Pos. 18), who explains: "Somehow all the colleagues – here, I mean [on Lesvos] – we apply for these jobs because we are all interested in migration and somehow want to help people on one level, not to take sides but to bring more justice." The notion of not taking sides is a common technocratic conceit that the work done is above political contestation (Lord and Magnette, 2004, p. 186), also termed the 'technocratic illusion' (Easterly, 2014). Pro- and anti-refugee politicians and publics may argue, but bureaucrats – even street-level ones, as in this case – see their role as solving practical problems using expertise, a goal described in this instance as "to bring more justice."

As suggested by Erinyes' use of the term 'justice,' professional motivation should not be confused with a lack of authentic, emotional commitment. Rather, this sort of motivation is only intended to describe the notion of working toward a solution using one's expertise as opposed to engagement with the popular political debate. In Nerites' (Pos. 78) words:

"We feel like, what are we doing here? We are contributing to the well-being of my, of your own country."

This sense of professional motivation among deployed officials is complemented by a belief that they are generally more competent than their colleagues back home, perhaps as a reflection of their conviction about the import of their work:

> I think all the experts here are on a really high level that I've met so far. In their home countries, they are really good caseworkers, and I've never seen anybody here who was too lazy to do things or to, you know, like, not good enough to understand things or comprehend things.

(Phorcys, Pos. 317)

This sense of overall quality of SNEs is less common among Frontex officials working in the camp, including fingerprinters, screeners and the like, which is reflective of their lower thresholds for qualification than for EASO or other Frontex personnel (see requirements listed in Frontex, 2020). However, even among them, there is a general sentiment that deployed personnel at least ought to be better at their work than colleagues who do not deploy:

> Also, I think whoever is deployed here they should choose people back home who want to be deployed and who are able to deal with the migrants and can take this stress here, you know. Some of them they just they come here, they wanna do something and they get stressed and they start whining.

(Ares, Pos. 112)

In general, there is a sense among officials that the best officials deploy, not only out of a sense of curiosity, but out of a sense of duty and ability defined here as professional motivation. They tend to see themselves as the best of their peers and as more committed to helping solve the problems on Lesvos. They also see a contrast with publics and politicians back home who are more interested in political bickering than solutions. This is a classic self-conception of professional communities of technocrats who conceive of themselves as called to the objective pursuit of solutions.

5.1.3. Costs and Benefits of Deployment

EASO and Frontex officers are paid well from EU funds for their deployments and the impact of this financial benefit on their decision to deploy should be considered. Monetary motivation is also not generally seen as virtuous, which may suggest it is underreported, whereas curiosity and technocratic motivations are seen as virtuous and so may be overreported to the researcher. Likewise, career benefits could hypothetically confound the impact of other motivations. However, these impacts appear to not be too strong, especially when considering other difficulties posed by deployments, such as distance from spouses and children.

The financial benefits depend on the country of origin, but are significant, especially when compounded with the fact that some countries allow SNEs to keep unspent money for expenses (Nike in Field Notes 2107, Pos. 33). Officials are fairly open about the additional pay, but do not describe it as a motivation for deploying, even though some Frontex officials working in the camp describe other Frontex SNEs in the camp as being primarily motivated by money (Euterpe in Field Notes 1401, Pos. 4).

Moreover, the additional pay during deployments can also instil a sense of obligation. For example, Phorcys (Pos. 257) generally feels that EASO in Lesvos is ineffective and has mixed feelings about the public costs:

> I'd say it's a bit of a waste of money, to be honest... For me, personally, it's a great experience to be here, to be on an international level and to see how the border procedure works, how EASO works, and so on. But like in general, or like, like a taxpayer, let's put it this way, I would say yeah, we actually receive quite a lot of money here and yeah, for what?

Erinyes (Pos. 21) describes a similar sentiment: "I kind of feel and felt quite guilty about the money that I'm earning from this. I think this is really, really awful that I do these things that lead to almost no results, that lead to no results, and earn money by that."

Considering career prospects, Sangarius (Pos. 79-80) describes the negative reaction to her deployment from colleagues in her home country.

When asked "what would you tell colleagues back home they'd learn from being here?" they explain:

> They don't give me this question. They only give me, 'oh you don't do nothing there. You stay on the beach.'
> I say, 'no that's not true.'
> [They reply,] 'They told me you make the big money.'
> I say, 'no it's nothing special, no.' …
> Sometimes, you know, I feel like they are jealous I go out [on deployment].

Similarly, Phorcys (Pos. 317) complains that,

> Most of my colleagues think that this is some kind of vacation. It's true. They always think, 'Come on, you're, you have nice weather, you have the beach and you have your good, you are paid really well and you have a car' ... So for them, of course, they have the idea of, yeah, you have one interview a day and in [Home Country] you have normally two or three, you know. So yeah, what my colleagues think is that it's kind of a nice way to work.

Terpsichore (Pos. 14) offers a contrast, explaining that they are hoping for a new job in a different organisation, which would value the experience on Lesvos: "one of the aims I want, in future, is to go to the embassy and to be at the embassy you should have experience in one of the islands." Terpsichore, however, is an outlier and comments such as Sangarius' and Phorcys' are much more common.

For many participants, the largest cost of deploying is distance from family. A few officers are young and single, but most are married or in long-term relationships and about a third have children. There is a general consensus among these participants that deployments require significant tradeoffs: "of course we earn some money, but we keep away from the house, from the family" (Glaucus, Pos. 52). Thestis (Pos. 5), who was quite despondent during their deployment, says that "It's hard. I miss a lot my children, my [spouse], even my father, my mother. It's very difficult." Ares (Pos. 23) is likewise also strongly affected by distance from family, connecting a previous deployment to their divorce and arguing that this

is quite common: "I don't wanna say normal, but when you go abroad, when you meet other colleagues—half of us are divorced, you know."

All in all, deployments are costly, especially for officers with children or partners. The difficulty is mitigated by the extra pay, but there hardly seems to be a consistent career boost to suggest significant future financial rewards. This calculus is different for different officers and, on balance, officers would not deploy – especially not multiple times – if the costs were unmanageable. However, it seems clear that curiosity and enthusiasm to learn, as well as a certain professional motivation, are necessary to make the decision to deploy, especially multiple times.

5.2. Microprocess of Coherence to the Ideational Framework

Having established that, pecuniary rewards notwithstanding, SNEs appear to mostly deploy to Lesvos out of an openness to experience and professional motivation, it is worthwhile to consider the microprocesses of socialisation. The process of cohering novel socialisation claims to inductees' ideational frameworks can result in acceptance in the manner of either type I (performed and adhered to without regular incentives or sanctions) or type II (also performed and adhered to beyond the locally occasioned context of the deployment). It can also result in socialisation, rejection, avoidance or modification. For acceptance, the study looks for participant explanations of how a new belief regarding novel roles and norms fits in with their pre-existing beliefs. For rejection, the relevant explanation is of which pre-existing beliefs prevent the claim from cohering to the ideational framework. Modification is demonstrated when participants explain how the claim as it stands contradicts their prior beliefs, but a modified version does not. For avoidance, participants describe explicitly choosing not to discard a claim, but instead to not yet decide whether it can be cohered to their ideational frameworks. By focusing on these microprocesses, this section demonstrates the value of focusing on inductees' ideational frameworks directly, instead of on more easily categorizable demographic or other characteristics (see section 3.1).

Some socialisation claims fit in with participants' ideational frameworks neatly and others do not at all. In the former, participants simply accept or reject claims. For example, Ares (Pos. 104) explains that "back home

you don't know how to approach [migrants]." They (Pos. 106) explain that during deployments a different role must be played as an officer working with non-European: "Maybe [the applicant] really doesn't understand what is going on. So you have to take it slowly. A little bit differently. You have to be really sure, and you have to certify everything before you gonna do something and you have to make him understand." This novel role is easy to cohere to Ares' ideational framework: The notion is that some applicants are confused by the asylum process and that as a result they have to be dealt with in a particular manner. This instance of socialisation does not contradict important previously held beliefs; rather, this is new information that adds nuance to the participant's understanding of their role.

The increasing complexity of the ideational framework that results from experience also makes certain beliefs more difficult to cohere, especially overarching ones that lack nuance. For example, blanket claims about the applicants in Lesvos seem absurd to many officials, who have dealt with a broad cross-section of this population. Aides (Pos. 120), for example, describes such a claim about migrants that is common in her home country:

> I get the impression that the political, political parties on, on the right side, like I am specifically referring to [redacted], of course, that they try to convey the image or impression that most of the migrants are criminals, and that they just come to [Home Country] for, to have a better life, and they were not really persecuted in their own countries and stuff like that.

Although on its face this is a claim regarding factual matters, the belief that migrants are criminals or overwhelmingly undesirable contains normative implications, especially for the roles of asylum and police officers.

Aides explains that such a claim is harder to accept after deploying to Lesvos. Put in the language of this report, they say that such claims cannot be cohered to their ideational framework as a result of beliefs adopted during the deployment: "And then you come here and you see these people who were affected in so many different ways. And see — this, it just doesn't match this… Of course, there are people taking advantage of the

system, but it's not the majority, not at all" (Aides, 120). Aides' response shows how a focus on the interaction of new and previously held beliefs helps to understand the process of internalising novel roles and norms. Experience breeds nuance, which leads to a greater difficulty accepting simplistic claims. As the ideational framework becomes increasingly complex, especially in regard to a particular subject, claims ought to be appropriately nuanced in order to cohere.

Thestis has a somewhat mirror-image story of how experience on the island makes it more difficult to accept certain socialisation claims. They (Pos. 10) describe their views prior to deployment: "Before I arrive here I have another opinion. Before I come here, I thinking I must help him [the the applicants], I go there to help him, try to give him another life." However, as a result of experience, they (Pos. 10) could no longer quite accept that simple story:

> But now I'm seeing in different way. Because they pay a lot to be here to come to the country. So if they have money to pay, I imagine that the poor one will stay in their country. Only the guys who have money comes here. And when I talk to him, I saw that they don't have perspectives of working. If you ask him 'where do you wanna go?' 'I wanna go to Germany' 'why?' 'because it's a good life'. They don't say 'I wanna work'. They have heard that they have a nice living. The government pays it and they have a house. They don't do nothing. So they, of course they are running from war and stuff like that, but I think the main thing that they look for Europe is to have a better life but not to work.

This passage shows how the pre-existing belief that deserving applicants ought to be helped continues to hold. However, their particular experience with applicants has led Thestis to question how many of the applicants they encountered indeed fit that category.

Socialisation claims can also be modified. This nuance can be missed by less in-depth research methods. For example, a survey asking respondents to rate how much they agree with a given statement is an attempt to understand the degree to which they have internalised certain beliefs. Such an approach, however, does not account for the possibility of inductees reinterpreting socialisation claims in order to facilitate

coherence, especially when they encounter multiple claims that contradict one another.

Thalassa (Pos. 38), for instance, discusses how difficult it is to work with the applicants because of sympathetic feelings: "At the beginning, it's really hard, because you, you feel in their situation, you know. And sometimes I cannot turn off my mind. And I'm thinking yeah, it's a little bit sad." On the other hand, Thalassa (Pos. 39) is worried that uncontrolled border crossings are dangerous: "The uncountable or uncontrolled migration, it's very dangerous. We have to control them. Not we. The whole European Union has to control somehow the, this migration." Thalassa's line of thought offers a useful insight into how claims can interact in complex ways: the first one describes applicants as sympathetic, while the second describes them as threatening. While these claims do not necessarily contradict one another, they imply different roles and norms for SNEs. To manage the tension between the implications inherent in the beliefs that applicants are both sympathetic and threatening, Thalassa invokes her role as a professional. Her role as a Frontex officer on Lesvos requires adherence to the rules governing migration and asylum. Her role as a private citizen allows for sympathising with applicants. Therefore, during the workday they perform their ascribed role in order to manage the perceived threat posed by refugees, while in private conversation they voice sympathy and concern.

Ganimedes is similarly cross-pressured. On the one hand, they are strongly opposed to the conditions in which applicants live, but on the other they also see them as threatening to the European societies they are trying to reach. In order to manage the contradiction implied in the two claims, they similarly distinguish desirable from undesirable applicants, modifying the original claim into a more nuanced one. Ganimedes explains: "I want to take all of these poor Yazidis, but I don't think we should take some Moroccan thief" (Field Notes 1115, Pos. 6). Similarly, referring to families with ten children, they say, "They just have all these kids. They don't care if they live in garbage" (Field Notes 0339, Pos. 9). Although more blunt than many other officers, Ganimedes' implicit distinction between deserving and underserving migrants is very common and widely discussed in the Migration Studies literature

(Dhaliwal and Forkert, 2015; Goodman *et al.*, 2017; Hinger, 2020). Likewise, Thalassa's move to use her professional role to manage normative tensions is also very common, especially in studies of police officers (Bolger, 2015; Solis, 2004).

Participants also do not necessarily immediately respond to socialisation claims:

> Well, when you're at it, you want to help them first, but you don't kind of processes it because you just want to get the job done. Getting everybody to safety. In the end of the day, of course you think about it. You wouldn't be human, if you didn't think about that, you know? (Nerites, Pos. 33).

(Nerites, Pos. 33)

Avoidance of socialisation claims shows another wrinkle that can be missed through less in-depth methodological approaches: inductees do not only accept, reject or modify socialisation claims, but can also defer considering them at all.

Socialisation has its limits, but these are not to suggest that inductees stop internalising novel roles and norms as a function of age, as might be interpreted from the notion of primacy (section 3.1). Rather, ideational frameworks get complex and nuanced as a function of experience. Highly specific or technical claims that require previous knowledge might be easier to cohere to a more complex ideational framework, while broader socialisation claims might become more difficult. All of inductees' previous experiences create a framework of beliefs which the researcher ought to try and understand in order to know what the likely limits of socialisation among a given population might be.

5.3. Facilitating/Hindering Effects of Context

Existing literature suggests that, as discussed in section 3.4, extreme, affective and social contexts may be particularly important for socialisation. Lesvos is generally not an extreme in this sense because even though humanitarian conditions for applicants are poor, SNEs generally feel secure, notwithstanding concerns regarding riots and infectious disease. The conditions in the Moria refugee camp and the plight of

refugees more generally produce an affective context, which elicits strong emotional reactions from many participants. Lastly, the social context on the island is significant because inductees break with their social contexts (including professional communities) back home to a certain degree and form new ones. This section demonstrates how each of the three aspects of Lesvos affects SNEs' deployments.

5.3.1. Extreme Contexts

Conditions for applicants on the island are clearly extreme, but even though EASO and Frontex officials may work in Moria, most do not describe their experiences in terms that fit with extreme contexts of the kind defined in chapter 3. Nevertheless, some officers do describe fears of contagious disease and violent riots. Disease is an understandable concern given that many applicants are not medically screened and come from areas in which contagious diseases are endemic. Participants are vaccinated prior to deployment, but not for every disease and some diseases do not have corresponding vaccines. Participants display a general awareness of the threat, but do not express much worry. In a prototypical reply to a question about concern for health, safety and wellbeing, Ares (Pos. 100) replies: "No. If I had [concern] I would not be here. But some of the colleagues, they have this kind of — you never know what kind of disease are coming... But I don't think about it and, so far, I never had health problems." Along similar lines, Erinyes (Pos. 29-31) describes the sense of being "not not concerned:"

> E: Some people said that about 40% of the people in Moria are not yet medically screened. That can be a problem. Am I concerned? Not really. But—
> GT: Not not concerned?
> E: Exactly.

This level of general worry may contribute to anxiety among officials, especially regarding tuberculosis (Phorcys, Pos. 341), but is hardly constitutive of the socialisation-affecting sort of extreme contexts described in the literature about gangs, soldiers, genocidaires and others in truly extreme contexts mentioned in the theoretical chapter. As a result, it should not be expected that disease is a meaningful facilitator of or hindrance to socialisation, notwithstanding the literature in conversation

with Foucault (1965; 1977) about perceptions of migrants and disease (Mawani, 2007; Round and Kuznetsova, 2016, p. 1024-6; Simon, 1998).

Violence from applicants is similar to the threat of disease in that SNEs are aware of its possibility, especially given that small riots are common and that EU installations in Moria were overrun once (Damkjær, 2016). As with disease, however, officers mostly present a nonchalant air. Moreover, officials not working in the camp don't feel any concern (Phorcys, Pos. 341). Fear of riots and sporadic violence, however, does seem more serious than fear of disease for those working in the camp. The following statement is generally descriptive of how most officers describe feeling about safety in Moria:

> Before I came to here I was afraid because of the safety — for my safety, of the safety here at all. And to be honest, here in the camp is really a lot of criminality. Here is a lot of rape and some things, but it is all about the applicants — between them, the situation, but for me as a [redacted] here I really feel safe. Because I can see that every time when there is a bit danger for us or there would be a situation what could be dangerous – like riots – [in which applicants] would do anything to us, then the security tell us, 'stop your work and go behind.' So… I really feel safe, but I feel pity for the applicants.

> (Terpsichore, Pos. 22)

Participants understand that there is danger but seem to generally trust in the ability of private security contractor G4S and Greek police to keep them safe. Terpsichore (Pos. 22), for example, even walks through the camp alone at times on their way to work, which is not a long way, but contrary to security recommendations.

Nevertheless, trust in camp security is not complete. Kaliope (Pos. 58) offers a nuanced opinion, which is based on past experience at a different hotspot:

> So things have improved somehow to get the people protected. In [other hotspot] … an applicant jumped into the EASO management container with knife forward. And he was stabbing [in the direction of EASO officials] with a knife … and then he started scratching

himself … And only then they … they put a fence on the container. But only afterwards. And it was something like, we knew that something like this would happen with a high probability. And when it happened it came as no surprise. So sometimes things happen like that and there will be a lot of things where we think — we accept things happening with the applicants here in Moria… [But] can always come the next crisis and we are not prepared for it.

Similarly, Ares (Pos. 67) is concerned about the possibility of a riot because, unlike the EASO section, which has a drawbridge to the outside, there isn't as direct an escape route for Frontex officers: "There are also some security issues in the camp you know. We are in the middle [of the camp]. If riot happens, there are two ways to get out, but I don't know – 2000 people go mad – we're gonna [get] stuck in. It can happen."

It seems that past exposure to particular security incidents, such as those Kaliope describes, or to riots, make participants more worried. This is especially true for participants who recall the 2016 Moria riot, during which – according to them – the camp's private security staff mostly ran away instead of protecting the EASO and Greek Asylum Service officials. That event also led Denmark to withdraw its SNEs from Lesvos for a period (Damkjær, 2016).

5.3.2. Affective Contexts

The conditions in the Moria refugee camp were very poor while the research was carried out. Built for around 2000, it hosted between 5.000 and 7.000 and by the time it burned down, after the research was concluded, it hosted over 13.000 (BBC News, 2020). Many of these applicants for asylum live in an informal camp nearby known colloquially as 'the jungle,' while others live in apartments or other camps elsewhere on the island. Mostly, applicants live in tents and face severe difficulties. They may be bitten by rats and one participant describes ISIS-aligned asylum seekers raping African women (Nike in Field Notes 0339, Pos. 17). There is little access to showers, toilets and washing machines. Applicants sometimes don't have enough water, and when they do, they still do not drink enough because there are too few toilets. The smells of sewage and unwashed people are stifling (Phorcys, Pos. 317). All this is to say that

most every participant was strongly affected by the plight of the applicants, some even describe crying when they are alone (Thestis, Pos. 17).

Glaucus (Pos. 60) explains the emotional impact of witnessing conditions first-hand, rather than learning about them through press accounts: "So I don't know. We hear they are in the camp—okay it's in the camp. But we only understand the meaning of camp if we came here and we see with our eyes… I show you a picture, it's not the same. You have to came here to understand." Different aspects of the camp affect different officers. Most common are fears for the safety of the applicants. Participants voice concern about suicidal tendencies (Erinyes, Pos. 26; Kaliope, Pos. 54; Polyhymnia, Pos. 32), rape of homosexual refugees (Kaliope, Pos. 50), threats from ISIS (Kaliope, Pos. 50), Arab attacks on Kurds (Kolio, Pos. 43) and rape of black African women (Field Notes 0339, Nike, Pos. 17). Participants also relate concerns for children generally (Nerites, Pos. 32), noting specific concerns, such as that they are barefoot (Polyhymnia, Pos. 37), have had to travel alone (Thestis, Pos. 17) or are victims of domestic violence (Erinyes, Pos. 26). Others discuss more general facets, most notably smells (Polyhymnia, Pos. 37; Sangarius, Pos. 15; Phorcys, Pos. 317) in the camp or emotions of the applicants (Eumenides, Pos. 41; Thalassa, Pos. 36).

The greater affective impact of Moria in comparison to camps in participants' home countries is summed up poignantly by Terpsichore (Pos. 37-38):

> In [Home Country], I never thought about the situation of the applicants when I was at home. And when outside it was raining, I didn't think, 'Oh God, what about the applicants now?' … Since I'm in Greece, every time I close my windows when it's cold or when it's rainy or when it's windy, I think, 'Oh my god, what about the applicants in the camp Moria?' Now my thinking has changed and I feel in another way here. And that's every morning when it's cold or so, I think oh my God what about applicants. And in [Home Country] I had never been, never thought this way, because it was not necessary.

Put more bluntly: "It's intense. It's intense. You cannot say you don't, yeah. If you, if you're not, if you're not affected by this, you're not human. You have to be affected by that" (Nerites, 35). Nerites (Pos. 33) describes how the affectiveness of the context in Lesvos increases receptivity to socialisation claims:

> in the end, you think of it more deeply. You know? Because you have kids at home. And you think what, what makes, what makes a family putting these kids to this situation? If they were really being threatened by something, you know? So, well, it's a life-changing experience, you know. It is.

The shock and emotion may increase the plasticity of participants' ideational frameworks, facilitating the acceptance of difficult-to-cohere socialisation claims.

5.3.3. Social Contexts

During deployments, SNEs are far away from their family, colleagues and friends. Temporarily replacing those social networks, they create new ones on the island. Social networks play an important role in reinforcing or undermining socialisation claims. As mentioned in section 5.1, participants are comparatively open to experience and part of that leads to the quick establishment of new social networks. Almost universally, they enthusiastically describe their new friendships ("I made friends from all over Europe") and even describe this as a highlight of their deployments (Eumenides, Pos. 41).

Participants also frequently contrast their descriptions of the misery of the camp with the joy of being among new friends, seeing one as mitigating effects of the other:

> If it wasn't, if it wasn't like that, I don't know how we would react to what we do for work, you know? And it really helps to have that kind of relationship with people here. Because if it wasn't like that, because it's a way for us to get away from what you see, what you are, what you, you put you up, what they put you up to, you know?

> (Nerites, Pos. 41)

Nerites (Pos. 35) goes on to describe a formalised set of rules that helps mitigate the difficult affective experiences:

> So, and the, the group we have here, we're not only colleagues, we're like, we're friends, so it helps. And we have these small rules, like we should all have lunch together and dinner, nobody should be in the room all day, you know. We have like, even if you don't feel like having lunch, you have to go and sit there to, so we're all together.

These new communities on the island stand in contrast to the increasingly frayed relationship felt by participants towards the popular discourses in their home countries. For example, Ceto (Pos. 34) describes people back home as being naïve to the dangers posed by a subset of the applicants:

> Nobody in Europe understand what we are getting in… I don't say close everything. I don't say build a wall. No, no, I never saying that, but make the selection. Be careful what you're letting come. Because they will be my neighbour. They will hurt us because that's why they are coming. Many of them. The fighters who are coming back.[31] They will hurt us and they will be my neighbour and your neighbour.

The notion that the people back home fundamentally don't understand is very common. Moreover, even though there may have been interest in the question of asylum seekers during the refugee crisis, participants feels that even though the problem has not been solved, interest has been greatly diminished: "I think in the mind of a lot of people in [Home Country] it's not such a big deal anymore because they don't feel it" (Okeanus, Pos. 77-78). The experiential chasm between the people who make up their social networks back home and those who make them up at the hotspot reinforces the break between the two worlds, facilitating the acceptance of new socialisation claims.

Taken together, it is clear that extreme, affective and social contexts are all relevant for participants in this study. Affective contexts are very strong

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[31] ISIS on Lesvos was a common topic of discussion and reporting at the time of the interview. See Hilt (2018) for more on the subject.

as a result of viewing the plight of applicants on the island, most specifically in the refugee camp and upon landing on the shore. Social contexts are likewise strong because of the amount of time they spend together, whether at work or afterwards, and the distance from their home-country communities. This effect may be slightly less strong for Frontex sea patrol, however, who come in teams from a single country. Finally, extreme contexts matter too, but less than the others. It is possible that fears of disease and violence are greater than have been conveyed; however, the research methodology in this work takes words of participants both contextually and literally (see section 4.4) and tries not to interpret beyond what is conveyed in order to maintain validity.

5.4. Conclusion

By using an in-depth research design, it becomes possible to understand inductees' ideational frameworks and how novel roles and norms cohere to them. This process begins by understanding who selects into deployments on Lesvos. Looking at both EASO and Frontex SNEs, it is apparent that this population is open to experience and marked by professional motivation, at least more so than their peers back home who do not deploy. Even when considering possible financial or career benefits of deployments, it remains the case that these are hardly central motivating factors.

Once what makes participants' ideational frameworks distinct is established, the complexity of the coherence process is considered. It becomes clear that socialisation claims are not only accepted or rejected, but can be modified and avoided as well. This finding strengthens the case for the in-depth methodology of this report, given that such nuance may well be lost in more structured surveys and even interviews that are not complemented by participant observation and informal conversations.

Finally, context is analysed. Lesvos, as hypothesised in section 4.1, is a laboratory for an unusually fast-moving socialisation process in a difficult case. By highlighting the centrality of affective and social aspects of the context in particular, it becomes clear that indeed the island more effectively facilitates socialisation than would a deployment somewhere less intense.

This chapter can be thought of as a half-step between the theoretical and empirical parts of the report because it shows how theorised processes apply on the ground. The following two chapters apply findings in this chapter to understanding how this complex socialisation process results in the construction of professional and political European communities. Understanding SNEs as open to experience and professionally motivated helps explain why they are motivated to internalise novel roles and norms regarding everything from interview methods to the notion of a common 'we-ness' among Europeans.

Chapter 6

Socialisation into a European Professional Community: How inductees come to internalise workplace roles and norms

As national experts, SNEs have been steeped in a particular professional community in which they learned the norms and roles required for their work. When they arrive in Greece, some of these expectations are different. This chapter looks at particular roles and norms propagated by Frontex, EASO and Greek authorities, all of which have a say over how participants conduct their work. Analysing the microprocesses of type I and type II socialisation, it demonstrates that each type requires coherence to different pre-existing beliefs.

These work-related roles and norms are usually performed and adhered to without the need for regular incentives or sanctions, demonstrating type I socialisation. Interviews and participant observation suggest that this is because such locally occasioned compliance coheres well with pre-existing beliefs regarding legitimate authority. Specifically, participants believe that they ought to adhere to the standards of Frontex, EASO and Greek authorities because they are the legitimate sources of authority on Lesvos. These beliefs in legitimate authority allow for compliance even when guest officers do not believe that given roles and norms are conducive to high-quality work.

When novel roles and norms, however, do cohere to pre-existing beliefs about what constitutes high-quality work, type II socialisation becomes possible. That is, during their tenures as members of national professional

communities, participants have been inducted into various work-related roles and norms. Insofar as the new European roles and norms cohere to those into which SNEs were socialised in their home country professional communities, these SNEs may demonstrate type II socialisation, performing and adhering to them beyond the locally occasioned context of their deployments to Lesvos. Such taking for granted is evident in the cases of EASO's interview style and standards for credibility, as well as Frontex's claims about professionalism. However, where there is a conflict, officials only show type I socialisation. These limits are evident in EASO's approach to country-of-origin information (COI) and selected roles and norms of Greek authorities.

6.1. EASO Roles and Norms

EASO's interview methodology, credibility standard, and system for country-of-origin information (COI) find near-universal type I socialisation. The interview methodology and credibility standards also find strong evidence for type II socialisation; however, EASO's approach to COI does not. The EASO interview style coheres to pre-existing beliefs held by participants regarding effective interviewing but can contradict beliefs about the importance of conducting interviews quickly in order to manage a backlog of applications. The EASO credibility assessments cohere to pre-existing beliefs regarding effectiveness as well, in large part due to experience with first arrivals. Participants are resistant, however, to EASO's claim that caseworkers should also perform the role of researchers.

6.1.1. Interview Method

Participants are largely supportive of the manner in which eligibility interviews are conducted under EASO. Referred to as the "EASO way" or "EASO style," this approach envisions a different role for the interviewer than that which they have been socialised into as members of their national professional communities. Participants describe the interviews they conduct in their home countries as reminiscent of depositions, in which relevant facts are established and contradictions in an applicant's story are clarified through the use of targeted follow-up questions. The ideal national asylum officer is efficient and sceptical, looking for consistency and sussing out breaks in the logic of an applicant's story.

In the EASO style, on the other hand, much more time is allotted to interviews. Whereas, for example, an officer with the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) might conduct two or three daily interviews, while deployed to Lesvos they would conduct only one interview per day. Thanks to the additional time, "the manner in which we are doing that [in Lesvos] is much more exhaustive… The national authorities, they don't necessarily have the time to go so deeply into things" (Tyche, Pos. 19). As a result, applicants on Lesvos are less rushed and confronted, leading the asylum officer to understand applicants' whole stories better. This less-interrogative approach focuses on exploring the breadth and depth of each story instead of on reflecting back to applicants seemingly contradictory details.

Participants generally internalise socialisation claims by EASO regarding appropriate roles and norms for the asylum officers. They mostly accept that their role is less that of sceptical inquisitor and more focused on exploration. Likewise, the norm of getting the whole story tends to take precedence over norms regarding efficiency espoused by national professional communities. For instance, when asked whether officials "learn anything valuable that they bring back" to their organisations after deployment, Kolio (Pos. 48-9) emphatically answers: "Yes. I learned here really, the way how to, let's say, how to conduct the interview. Yeah. I say always, 'EASO style: how to explore more.'" Similarly, Polyhymnia (Pos. 54) explains that during her previous deployment they learned to "rely more on open questions [and] be more systematic in following up on what [applicants] say."

Some officers also describe type II socialisation. That is, they accept that the EASO approach is appropriate even outside of the EASO institutional context. Thaumas (Pos. 58), for example, explains:

> If there's something I will bring with me – not that I'm like rude during the interview – but in some levels you can get more confrontive. And here you are not confrontive during the interviews. You always have to pack it in [with] politeness—not ask direct questions, as an example.

Likewise, Aides responds strongly when asked, "has [the deployment] changed the way that you do interviews?" They reply: "Yeah. My

interviews are [now] longer in [Home Country] and I don't care if someone is, complains, because yeah of course, all the questions have to be relevant. But still my interviews are longer than most of my colleagues in [Home Country]" (Aides, Pos. 168-170). Kaliope (Pos. 48) makes a similar point about the quality-efficiency tradeoff: "In [Home Country] we got targets… if you want to have the numbers, get the numbers. But if you want to have the quality you can't have the numbers."

It should be noted that the EASO style is not completely new to caseworkers, who have had training from EASO prior to deployment and theoretically all member states should be following similar procedures. Nevertheless, officials are unanimous in saying that the practice of interviewing in as part of EASO is different from what they learned in their home countries. Moreover, although participants are generally complementary to the EASO style, pre-existing beliefs in roles and norms related to effectiveness of interviews can function as limits on cohering the EASO way into participants' ideational frameworks. This can lead them to internalise parts of it in the manner of type I and parts of it in the manner of type II socialisation.

Nereus, for example, accepts that interviews should be more open and use fewer leading questions, but sees limits to this approach where it does not cohere with their pre-existing beliefs about the need for effective interviews. They (Pos. 94) explain:

> The whole methodology, the interviewing methodology is more open. Less, like, yeah no leading questions, which is – when you say it like that – a good thing, but no direct questions. So sometimes also a bit too, too open I would say. Like, both for the applicant, because they don't know really know what you're asking about. But also just to be able to be a bit more confrontive, when things aren't really adding up.

As the passage makes clear, Nereus isn't wholly rejecting the EASO way, but adds nuance, arguing that it can undermine the larger normative standard of interviews needing to be effective. This division of the claim into parts and treating them separately shows the complexity of the process of cohering claims to an ideational framework discussed in section 5.2.

Overall, the EASO way demonstrates that the role of an interviewer, whether it be more interrogative or more exploratory, is not a deeply held role. Rather, it appears that there is a deeply held normative commitment to conducting interviews well. The new role promulgated by EASO can be readily internalised and taken for granted in the manner of type II socialisation because it does not undermine central pre-existing beliefs: asylum officers believe that they ought to conduct interviews well and the training at the hotspot teaches them a role that fits this pre-existing normative commitment, even if it contradicts pre-existing practices. As Aides (Pos. 168) explains: "it's just like the quality standards are much higher here, when we work for EASO, than in our home office." It is when participants reject the premise that this new role leads to higher quality interviews or when they argue that it conflicts with another normative standard such as efficient interviewing, that the claim is modified, accepted in parts or only in the manner of type I socialisation.

6.1.2. Credibility Standard

Whether or not an applicant's claim for asylum is recognized by an authority generally requires (1) membership of a particular social group,[32] (2) existence of a well-founded fear of persecution and (3) a nexus between this well-founded fear and membership in the specified social group (EASO, 2020a, p. 28–9). Sometimes, the three components can be established in a relatively straightforward manner. For example, Syrian "journalists who are seen as critical by the actor in control of the particular area, well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated" (*Ibid.*, 2020b, p. 79–80). In the case of journalists, membership can be easily demonstrated so long as location of their work can be shown and therefore the nexus is quite clear.

It is much more difficult, however, to demonstrate the nexus between being a member of a family involved in a blood feud in Afghanistan and a well-founded fear of persecution. See the EASO (2019, p. 72) guidance:

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[32] Examples of particular social groups include, but are not limited to, sexual orientation and gender identity, children, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons living with disabilities and illness and nexuses thereof.

> For men directly involved in a blood feud, in general, well-founded fear of persecution would be substantiated. For women, for children and for men who are farther removed from the feud, the individual assessment of whether or not there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: intensity of the blood feud, origin from areas where the rule of law is weak, etc.

In cases that are difficult to document, credibility of the applicant's story becomes central. Despite formal procedures, credibility assessments are less reliable and more reflective of interviewers' personal histories, trainings, biases and the like, especially in marginal cases (Granhag *et al.*, 2005; van Veldhuizen, 2017).

Asylum bureaucracies tend to have what academics call a 'culture of disbelief' (Jubany, 2017). Although there is variation among officers (*Ibid.*, 2011), the experience of working as an asylum officer makes officials generally sceptical:

> The thing is, you can [work as an asylum official] for a while, but then you also get, I think mental issues because you hear a lot of, let's say, this stories. And when you believe, and also this job makes you a little bit more suspicious. You start asking questions. Yeah. And also, sometimes get, is getting also annoying for your private life. Because you start asking questions. But we are trained like that, to get, let's say that, the truth out of it. Yeah.

> (Kolio, Pos. 35).

As Kolio explains, in agreement with the academic literature, asylum officials see their role as that of the suspicious sceptic and this role can be very deeply in grained.

Deployments, however, can change somewhat how these officials see their roles. Phorcys (Pos. 285) describes applicants for asylum on the island:

> So yeah but [the deployment] affected me in the way that I see things in different way. I see how the applicants live here… When

you see people coming in, the applicants, you can see that they are tired, and that they're not feeling well, and that they're depressed a bit, and they are more open, I think. They talk, because it's so recent memory that they have.

They (*Ibid*.) offer a contrast to applicants they see back home:

And when they [are] in [Home Country],[33] for example, they lived there for one year, they have a flat, they have an apartment, they have the regular, scheduled life and, you know, a kitchen and go to school. So when we have the interviews there, they're, first they're more prepared for the interviews. And secondly, they are more healthy mentally.

They (*Ibid*.) explain that due to the harsh conditions on the island and recency of the arrivals, the stories officers hear appear more credible:

And here you see a lot of people who are really tired or exhausted. And you can see it when they come in. Because they, I mean, here the, the camp is, yeah, it's not a, they don't have good living conditions there. And I, this affects people. And the answers that you get are more open, I think, and maybe also more honest, and more direct. Yeah, that's what I'd say. But I can see the differences because you hear different stories from the same nationalities differently here than I used to have in [Home Country].

Overall, the two principal changes to credibility are that the officers believe the deployment makes their credibility judgments more accurate, but at the same time they are more sympathetic to the applicants (Kolio, Pos. 57-8). The two appear contradictory but can also be conceived of as remedying shortcomings of general rules. That is, SNEs' ideational frameworks become more complex as a result of experience (see section 5.2).

For some participants, their experience on Lesvos leads to significant changes in how they assess credibility. Asked, "How do you think for you

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[33] [Home Country] refers to the participant's home country, not the applicant's. See Appendix B.

and other people the deployment affects how you establish credibility?" Tyche (Pos. 22-3) responds by explaining the impact of being in the field: "In very positive way. This is something you cannot learn in a training. You could learn it of course theoretically, but that's not to learn it in the field and to apply it practically—having the exercises of doing so."

Phorcys (Pos. 329) similarly explains that interviewing applicants who have not had much chance to talk, receive legal advice or speak to other applicants allows them to hear stories that may be more accurate, and they can use these stories as a benchmark against those they hear back home. Tyche goes further yet, demonstrating not just internalisation of the roles and norms of EASO in Lesvos, but a preference towards changing her home country's practice. Speaking of credibility determination in Lesvos, they (Pos. 23) say: "So that's something I'm trying to help with and apply also to my national authority."

Most commonly, however, participants say that their time in Lesvos has not significantly affected their approach to credibility determinations. For example, Polyhymnia (Pos. 60) explains that they understand applicants better as a result of their deployment, leading to a follow up question:

> GT: I still want to press you though, so you understand them better, so what happens as a result of your [newfound] understanding?
> P: Well, when you come to the core of their application it probably doesn't make a difference.

> (*Ibid.*, Pos. 61-2)

Even though the core of the determination is not affected, however, participants suggest that some changes may indeed occur at the margin. Polyhymnia (Pos. 63) continues:

> When it comes to their travel route descriptions, to have a little bit of feelings for the hardships they have gone through, I might be a little bit softer in my judgment on that. … During a conversation you need to never forget the situation that applicants find themselves in, to not overstate their capability to overstate herself and so on. A tiny little bit would maybe lower the threshold in terms of what I expect someone to deliver so to speak, but a tiny little bit.

This passage suggests that, according to Polyhymnia, their deployment has lowered the threshold of what they consider credible by "a tiny little bit." This is hardly suggestive that a significant number of opinions are written differently as a result of deployments. However, it does show a change for the participant regarding normative standards for credibility. These normative standards are changed as a result of new beliefs regarding the effects of hardship on applicants' abilities to communicate their stories. This change is not a wholesale rejection of previous beliefs; rather, it demonstrates socialisation into different but compatible roles and norms regarding how credibility ought to be established.

As with the EASO interviews, one sees a bit of a detachment from the sense that the role of the asylum officer is to be the arbiter objective truth. The officials understand that many of the stories are not true in a certain objective sense, but they also accept that people are in dire straits. They see their role as being to conduct an interview in accordance with the standards of their professional communities.

6.1.3. Country of Origin Information

Although there is strong evidence of type II socialisation into EASO's methods for interviewing and establishing credibility, SNEs are very sceptical of the organisation's claims regarding the appropriate role of asylum officers in establishing country-of-origin information (COI). They perform the role without requiring regular sanctions or incentives, demonstrating type I socialisation, but they reject it conceptually, making it clear that they would prefer not to perform this role once their deployment ends, demonstrating that type II socialisation does not occur.

Many participants feel that COI is handled better by their home country bureaucracies, wherein asylum officers are often assisted by a research team. However, in Lesvos they are mostly expected to perform the role of researcher themselves. Tyche (Pos. 9-13) explains in some detail:

> T: In [Home Country] we have a whole department making the COI, which is quite extensive. We also have part of a department who's doing the legal analysis on the basis of the outcome of that COI information. Here we're doing COI research using the internet. UN and Amnesty websites for example are good but some

> sources in my opinion are not very serious. What EASO has established is a so-called helpdesk, which helps a lot with establishing some information, but it doesn't give you a full guideline on certain countries. There is some COI info, but it's mostly general and not in the context of asylum. These aren't guidelines in the sense of asylum. This is in my personal opinion where the difference is.
>
> GT: So difference is: one, research you have and, two, translation of what that means specifically for asylum?
>
> T: Yes. Especially the second one.
>
> GT: Same claim in both places. What's the different outcome?
>
> T: The clear line on certain asylum constellations. Like, homosexuals from Iraq or the persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan. If I'm a national authority I have a clear guideline. Of course, there are also exceptions possible. But to diverge from that guideline you need justifications.

In a similar vein, Erinyes (Pos. 40) describes, "not having the same access or access to the same COI contributing information." They (*Ibid*.) explain the problem:

> The bigger freedom that you have here to do your own research and to reach your own conclusion, that leads to different results… Sometimes we read transcripts from where I think yeah this is not possible, but the person claims that nationality. I worry sometimes. I don't think there's enough expertise here.

The need for EASO officials to take on the role of researcher is not salient for all officials but is also clearly rejected by those for whom it is important. As far as type I socialisation, none of the officials refuse to internalise this role and perform it appropriately. However, it is unlikely that any would take it for granted as the correct way of doing things. The role of researcher takes time away from interviewing and writing opinions (decisions in their home country context) and, as a result, the role is contradictory to another, more deeply held one and cannot be taken for granted.

6.2. Frontex and a European Professional Community

Due to the broad range of jobs performed by Frontex officials, and how different they are from those they do in their home organisations, there is a greater diversity of particular socialisation claims with which they are confronted. For example, Glaucus (Pos. 62) highlights the question of what appropriate pay for a police officer is:

> We talk [about] the way that I am living in my country: what I have, how much is my salary, how much is the salary of the most of the people. And we [ex]change that kind of information. We talk about the places we like most. The places we don't like. And that kind of information, I think it's important because you start to know the people and you start to know the way of their living there. So it's important.

What Glaucus is saying is that it is important for SNEs to know how much each other is paid back home. Not only because of a general interest in one another, but because they want to compare the standards of their home countries' professional communities with those of other countries in order to understand what an appropriate salary is for someone who does their work. This example is an instance of how a European professional community emerges on Lesvos by performing and adhering to common roles and norms.

Beyond salaries, officers discuss common standards generally as well as specific ones, such as regarding the correct use of body cuffs (Graea, Pos. 16). The notion of common standards as normatively desirable suggests a belief in the importance of a European professional community. For instance, most Frontex officers work in the camp, screening or fingerprinting applicants. It is common, though not universal, for them not to have a background in these roles (see Frontex, 2020), a point that gets criticised:

> The [redacted] countries send guys that, they don't understand nothing of fingerprinters. Guys work in the traffic police, guys that work in the public order police, guys that don't understand nothing of fingerprints… If the Frontex need guys to make the border patrol with dogs, we send guys with dogs. If the Frontex

> need guys to make the sea patrol, we send guys especially for the sea patrol. So the fingerprints should be the same.

> (Glaucus, Pos. 50)

As Glaucus explains, more technical positions, such as returns or shore and sea patrols usually do require experience doing the same work in guest officers' home countries. As a result, socialisation claims regarding how SNEs should performs their role differently than they did in their home countries are less common for Frontex than EASO. Of course, practical skills are learned. For example, Ares (Pos. 104) talks about how deployments teach officers not to be scared of migrants: "back home you don't know how to approach [migrants]." They (Pos. 106) go on to explain that deployments teach Frontex officials the different roles they out to play: "Maybe [the applicant] really doesn't understand what is going on. So you have to take it slowly. A little bit differently. You have to be really sure, and you have to certify everything before you gonna do something and you have to make him understand."

Taken together, these particular standards reveal a broader sense in which Frontex demands a certain professionalisation that is not always true of participants' home organisations, especially small, rural police departments. These notions of professionalisation are quite popular with officers. The term can have varied meanings, but often in the context of SNEs on Lesvos, it refers to a larger sense that there are normative, European standards for the professional community. This can also be interpreted from academic findings that Frontex training of member state police officers, "has promoted the socialization and professionalization of border guards at the European level" (Horii, 2012, p. 160).

Thalassa (Pos. 42) voices an example of how Frontex deployments promote the construction of a European professional community:

> We have to work in a multicultural environment. And let's say we are, all the European countries are, taking – let's say under an umbrella of Frontex – they are organizing us to sharing information and share everything. Because when you work internationally, the cooperation is much more getting easier, I think. It's much professional.

Thalassa is explaining that SNEs learn about the importance of information sharing and accept that as an appropriate norm. In a later passage, they (Pos. 53) similarly describe how international cooperation drives them "to learn the English much more better… to learn technical skills, how is handling procedure and handling the emotions also." These new roles and norms they learn, whether information sharing, English language or handling of applicants, are all examples of the appeal of Frontex's socialisation claim that officers from across Europe should act according to professional European standards. As with EASO's successful socialisation claims, these cohere to participants' pre-existing beliefs in the importance of high-quality work. As a result, they are often not only internalised but become taken for granted and are performed and adhered to beyond the locally occasioned context of deployments to Lesvos, evidencing type II socialisation.

6.3. Greek Authorities' Roles and Norms

Seconded National Experts are deployed to Lesvos in support of Greek authorities, which means that although they are supervised by EASO or Frontex, the final authority on the island is Greek, whether that is the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Police, Greek Asylum Service (GAS) or the Greek judiciary. As chapter 5 and previous sections of the current chapter have demonstrated, type I socialisation, in which inductees adhere to roles and norms without incentives or sanctions, requires that socialisation claims cohere to beliefs about legitimate authority. Type I socialisation can occur even when the roles and norms in question do not cohere to beliefs regarding what constitutes high-quality work internalised as part of SNEs' membership in national professional communities. The socialisation claims promulgated by Greek authorities considered below are not performed and adhered to beyond the locally occasioned context of Lesvos because they do not cohere to what officers learned as national officials. However, both EASO and Frontex SNEs accept the legitimate authority of the Greek state and its institutions and so perform and adhere to norms without the need for regular incentives or sanctions. As a result, type I socialisation is clearly evident, but type II is not.

The legal structure putting Greeks authorities in charge on Lesvos is clear to SNEs. As Thaumas (Pos. 31) puts it, "I am deployed here to help the

PLATO Report 2

Greek authorities. To help EASO help the Greek authorities." Similarly, asking Thalia how come European cooperation works at all, they reply that, "things work because we all follow Greek law" (Field Notes 2107, Pos. 3). Moreover, participants understand that they are in a support function regardless of their views on Greek authorities. For example:

> In the end, it's the Greeks, it's all up to the Greeks because they make decisions, and they make the final decision whether an applicant is accepted or not. So it's not us, we are only writing the opinions, what we think how a case should be decided on, but in the end, they will decide. So I hope they don't see it as a big interference in their work.

> (Phorcys, Pos. 313)

Likewise, Polyhymnia (Pos. 71) shows that they have internalised the relationship between Greece and the EU, even though they may not like it:

> Yeah I mean you have this EU-Turkey statement, and it has its, you can justify it in a certain regard to things, but to implement it, it's supposed to be Greece. It's Greece on behalf of the whole European Union and of course certain member states with the political pressure to keep the arrivals slower than they have been. So yeah you shift the responsibility to a state and then you say okay when you do that we send you a couple of [inaudible]. It's a makeshift solution.

Overall, the relationship between the organisations is best summarised by Hebe, who was overheard saying, with a frustrated smile, that "we can't tell GAS how to do their job" (Field Notes 2107, Pos. 10).

The degree to which SNEs accept that Greece is in charge of the hotspots might be surprising to researchers, given that the popular and academic focuses on EU responsibility in Lesvos and, in particular, the salience of Frontex in the press. Academic books and articles about EASO and Frontex are myriad and well-cited, while articles about practices of the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Police, GAS and the Greek judiciary are fewer and farther between (for a few exceptions, see Franck, 2017; Pollozek and Passoth, 2019; Skleparis, 2017). Even applicants for asylum,

according to Ganymedes, are surprised that to learn that GAS, not EASO, makes the decisions in their cases (Field Notes 0339, Pos. 4). Indeed, high-profile breaks with Greek authorities have received international attention, such as a Danish Frontex crew refusing to push migrants back to Turkey (Reuters, 2020); however, the newsworthiness of these events highlights their curiosity.

6.3.1. Greek Vulnerability Threshold

The vulnerability threshold is a useful demonstration of the strength of norms regarding legitimate authority because it is abided by even though it is a source of significant frustration and even anger among EASO officials. The vulnerability threshold means that if certain criteria are met, the asylum interview is stopped, the applicant is given an open Ausweis[34] and protection from deportation and a later interview is scheduled.[35] Nereus (Pos. 54) explains that the threshold on Lesvos is lower than in her home country:

> Here the threshold for being vulnerable is really low... So yeah, the clear example is, are the witnessing of traumatic events, low threshold for physical violence as well and, like, some diseases like asthma. So that's in the Greek law as a serious disease so that also exempts you from the border procedure, which is just very different in [Home Country].

The sense that the vulnerability threshold is significantly lower in Lesvos than in SNEs' home countries or even than it was during many previous deployments to other hotspots is unanimous.

On the surface it would appear that this technical difference should not be a major source of frustration, but it is brought up by interviewees consistently and is a never-ending topic at EASO officials' social functions. Thaumas (Pos. 83) explains:

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[34] An open Ausweis is the term used in Lesvos colloquially for an identification card allowing travel throughout Greece.

[35] This procedure is no longer current, having changed since the fieldwork took place.

> Everybody here in Pagani doesn't understand the border procedure and everybody is very unsatisfied about this vulnerability element. And it's a common issue that we are discussing every day and there's some caseworkers that are more frustrated. Like, I am actually okay, but we have some caseworkers who is really angry about this and wants to write the higher EASO and make this a conflict… this is not what we're supposed to do here.

Officials offer many criticisms of the standard. For example, Proteus (Pos. 35) argues that "The people who are really vulnerable become indistinguishable from the other cases." That is, that harm is caused to applicants who would have also been considered vulnerable using a higher threshold. Phorcys (Pos. 170), who has not finished a single interview during the six weeks of her deployment, criticises the policy as cynical:

> they get the Ausweis where there's no restriction of mobility. And I can imagine that when they are free to move wherever they want to, they will just move on and go to other countries… as soon as someone absconded… yeah, we accept them in [Home Country].

Participants do not generally believe that the lowered threshold is the product of Greek authorities' concern for vulnerable applicants. In interviews and informal conversations, they express bewilderment, suggesting this is a Greek attempt to empty the island of applicants or even to incentivise them to leave the country by absconding into the Balkans. Others speculate that Greece fears that returns to Tukey would lead Erdogan to open the borders and increase the number of irregular crossings.

In their view, SNEs on Lesvos are asked to no longer perform their role as interviewers. Rather, their role instead is to provide legal cover for a cynical attempt to sidestep the problems associated with the refugee camps by pushing people with asylum claims into the shadows. This role is fundamentally contradictory to their role at home. Moreover, normatively, the notion that asylum interviews should regularly not be completed contradicts various norms, including about the right to asylum

and European solidarity. Most importantly, however, it clashes with their pre-existing belief in the importance of high-quality work.

The vulnerability threshold is an example of type I socialisation in which norms and roles are internalised and performed without the need for incentives or sanctions. But it is impossible for participants to take this for granted, in the sense of type II socialisation. Furthermore, some officials, although they perform their task as required during their deployment, plan not to return for future deployments because the contradiction is too great. Erinyes (Pos. 28) explains:

> I concluded myself that I'm part of an organisation that claims to be helpful while not helping. And I'm really ashamed of this. I don't want to take part of this... this thing is just hypocrisy. It's unfair. I'm coming here eight hours per day for nothing. Having a lot of work to do for not much results.

The ability to exit the organisation is related to self-selection (see section 3.1). Officials are in Lesvos by choice and even if they feel obligated to perform certain roles and hold up certain norms, they also have agency to just quit or not renew their deployment (note that about half of participants have previously deployed) (Hirschman, 1970).

6.3.2. Organisational Issues

Beyond the vulnerability standard, participants have difficulty with a variety of organisational issues. Ares (Pos. 44) explains that in order to have a successful deployment, "You have to have a lot of patience." Asked to illustrate the need for patience, they (Pos. 46) explain that other countries are more punctual: "Back home if you have something to do, let's do it. Do it now, you know. As quick as possible, as professional way, all these standards... Back home for me eight o'clock is eight o'clock. And [for Germans] eight o'clock [also means] eight o'clock." They go on to describe a lack of punctuality among the Hellenic police officers. This is a common complaint among Frontex participants generally: for example, when Ganymedes sees a sleeping dog, they remark that it's lazy because it's a Greek dog (Field Notes 0339, Pos. 19).

Ares (Pos. 46) demonstrates type I socialisation regarding the Hellenic Police punctuality norm, cohering it to her role in support of Greek authorities:

> When you deploy here you have to be aware that we support Hellenic police. We don't make the rules. We support them. They say, okay we gonna work and we're gonna work now. So you have to be aware. And I have no problems with this, but I know it's annoying sometimes waiting for nothing for one or two hours. But for the newcomers, who are [on their] first… mission, they're really stressed. But they make the rules. We just support them.

Ares clearly opposes the local norm that deprioritises punctuality, but they internalise it and learn to work with it. Their comment about newer inductees is helpful for showing that this norm is difficult for participants to cohere to their ideational frameworks. Nevertheless, they manage to accept it by invoking the belief that Greeks make the rules and SNEs just support them; that is, they defer to the higher norm of legitimate authority.

More generally, the lack of organisation is a common source of consternation, leading to harsh assessments, most extreme in Hebbe's use of the term, 'incompetent [expletive[36]]' to describe the Greek Asylum Service (Field Notes 0339, Pos. 28). EASO officials in Moria describe significant errors made regularly by GAS. Flow managers, for example, don't have full lists of which applicants have received which documents. This leads to a lack of accountability in case of errors. To remedy this issue, EASO officials keep handwritten personal lists so that when GAS officials say something never happened, they can point to the note and show them that the applicants in question received a given document (*Ibid.*, Pos. 7). This culminates in what some EASO officials call "the shit hour" (*Ibid.*, Pos. 3, Pos. 28), in which they work to reconcile errors. Nevertheless, they learn to work with this norm by adapting their behaviour to suit it (by

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[36] The expletive is redacted because it is a regional term that could undermine the pseudonymity of the participant.

keeping lists) and cohere it to their frameworks by emphasising the legitimate authority of the Greek Asylum Service.

EASO officials in Pagani also have complaints about Greek authorities. Thaumas (Pos. 31), for example, complains about being underused: "I have so many competences as a caseworker and I couldn't understand that they weren't fully taking advantage of my abilities and my competences as a caseworker." In a related vein, Frontex officials also have concerns about Greek management. Moirae (Pos. 25), for instance, bemoans the fact that Hellenic Police don't take time to train SNEs on Greek-language computer systems and that instead they have to train one another: "It would be much easier if English-speaking Greek taught [redacted] the [computer] system" (Moirae, Pos. 25). Both of these anecdotes reflect a broader feeling that Greek authorities do not use the deployed officials sent to support them as efficiently as possible.

6.3.3. Norms regarding treatment of migrants

The discussion of fundamental rights violations in Lesvos has been deep and comprehensive, with little need to recount here (see Carrera and Stefan, 2020; Dawson, 2017; Fink, 2020; Holy See, 2016). Beyond seeing humanitarian conditions as an affective context that affects socialisation (see section 3.4), these humanitarian conditions imply roles and norms in themselves. Having poor humanitarian conditions is a political choice of the Greek political system, not a necessary evil. Therefore, they can be treated as norms with associated prescriptive roles for participants in this study.

SNEs suggest that the different roles and norms regarding treatment of applicants are reflected in the behaviour of Greek officials. I, for instance, witnessed a Hellenic Police officer chase a young Afghan while waving a baton, clearly intending to beat him, only to be turned away once encircled by angry applicants. Even a local cleaner of the EASO premise took the dirty water and splashed it at applicants' feet with a mean-spirited smile (Field Notes 0339, Pos. 22). Similarly, private security guards, feeling sympathy for a dog in the double fence of the EASO enclosure, spoke of how letting it out would be dangerous, explaining that Arabs eat cats and dogs and that the dog is scared that the children will kill it (*Ibid.*, Pos. 24).

Graea (Pos. 16-8) describes about how Greeks are comparatively aggressive toward applicants, keeping them unnecessarily in Velcro ties, scaring them and at times beating them:

> In this country, no one takes a risk, we always use the Velcro. Even if he's cooperative. And I think it's because there's a lack of communication. We don't try to build trust here... I feel always that [applicants] are... intimidated by the Greek... If something goes wrong, if something goes in a different way than the Greek like, then it's immediately extremely shouting, in the Greek language, which the migrant doesn't understand. Or they use the hands. And for us it's very strange.

SNEs are also shocked by humanitarian conditions in Moria. Kolio (Pos. 43), for example, could not believe the level of interethnic violence in the camp prior to deployment, saying, "I've never believed that this can happen here on European ground." They account for these humanitarian failings by saying that the Greek police is "inefficient." When pressed to clarify, however, they said they wished to remain "diplomatic" (Kolio Pos. 74-9). This need to remain diplomatic, despite strong misgivings, is clarified later on: "what you, you start to realise also: don't push the Greeks, the Greeks. Don't force them to do something because they are very proud" (Kolio, Pos. 108).

Similarly, Phorcys (Pos. 353) is deeply concerned about humanitarian conditions, but is clear that it is not the role of SNEs to critique:

> But some people say, yeah, the camps are, the camps are built like this, to not make them stay and to not make them come. We can't do it. And also, we cannot explain this to the Greeks because the Greeks are also not in the best economic condition at the moment. And you can't, you know, have nice places for them, when, when other Greeks or the nationals can't afford a flat. Yeah, but this is political. I know it's a bit difficult.

These emblematic comments by Kolio and Phorcys can seem like professional courtesy, and to a degree they are indeed that. However, they are also reflections of the fact that the participants have internalised and taken for granted the notion that Greece is the legitimate authority on Lesvos. They could never take for granted that humanitarian conditions are acceptable, but they accept that this is the environment in which they ought to conduct their work.

6.4. Conclusion

Scholars focusing on type I European socialisation have long been interested in understanding how professionals from so many different national communities manage to work together effectively. This chapter shows that a belief in the legitimate authority of both European institutions and national governments goes a long way to explaining this. Even where SNEs strongly disagree with policies of EASO, Frontex or Greek authorities, their pre-existing beliefs in those institutions' legitimacy makes it so that they internalise roles and norms, at least in a locally occasioned manner, without the need for regular incentives or sanctions.

Scholars whose work focuses more on type II European socialisation have traditionally been more interested in explaining how working together leads professionals to see themselves as part of a European professional – or even political – community. This chapter shows that where roles and norms cohere to nationally formed pre-existing beliefs regarding what constitutes high-quality work, participants will perform and adhere to them beyond the locally occasioned context of their deployment. Taking European work-related socialisation claims for granted begins the process of national professionals identifying with the European professional community. The following chapter discusses this aspect further, looking at the depths of participants' identification with the European professional community and interpreting the degree to which this translates to identification with a European political community.

Chapter 7

Socialisation into a European Political Community: How inductees internalise roles and norms regarding Europe

Having shown how a European professional community is constructed on Lesvos, this chapter demonstrates how it can be used to undergird a European political community. Roles and norms related to Europe, whether meaning European solidarity or identity or something similar, are somewhat different from the work-related ones discussed in the previous chapter. The concepts at hand are much broader and more ambiguous, suggesting that there is much more room for inductees to interpret and modify socialisation claims.

Moreover, understanding type I socialisation is important for work-related roles and norms because it contributes to the longstanding scholarly debate about how professionals from so many different national communities manage to work together effectively. However, type II socialisation is more relevant for understanding whether and how working in a European context – governed by European roles and norms that facilitate self-identification with a European professional community – can lead to the emergence of a political community. Put simply, this chapter asks the question so common to the literature on European socialisation: does time spent in European institution makes inductees into Europeans?

Returning to this work's research question, this chapter contributes to understanding *how SNEs deployed to the Lesvos migration hotspots are*

socialised into European professional and political communities. The fieldwork carried out for this research demonstrates that participants hold a general belief that the mission is failing. Not that the particular work of SNEs is not being carried out according to requirements, as demonstrated by the strong findings of type I socialisation in the previous chapter, but that despite their efforts, a larger aim – that of managing the Union's asylum system and borders – is not achieved.

Participants, however, do not in turn reject the normative value of European cooperation and solidarity. Rather, they find culprits for the failure, blaming it on intangible, distant sources, such as politics, politicians or (political) higher-ups at EASO and Frontex. Having ascribed the blame for failure, they then work to reinterpret success, often suggesting that even though the larger mission might not be succeeding, the fact that a diverse group from all over Europe is working together effectively according to common, European, professional standards is a form of success in itself.

Participants see themselves and their emergent island community as a model, arguing that if those states, bureaucrats and politicians that govern an imagined Europe saw matters from SNEs' street-level perspective and shared the same spirit of solidarity and community, the larger issues with asylum and borders could be addressed. Ascribing failure to a lack of others' solidarity strengthens guest officers' belief in its importance, describing a spirit of European cooperation on Lesvos from which politicians could learn. For many participants, the notion of European solidarity coheres to their nationally formed ideational frameworks in the manner of type II socialisation and is performed and adhered to beyond the locally occasioned context of their deployments.

Finally, some officials take the sense of European solidarity that has been strengthened through working for Europe so far as to describe newfound feelings of being part of a European political community. There appears to be a difference between the EASO officials, for many of whom a pre-existing European identity is challenged by the practical failures of European governance, and Frontex officials who generally arrive on the island with less of a sense of themselves as Europeans, but who find this identity appealing. The reasons for these differences require speculation; however, more interestingly, participants generally internalise the sense

that their inchoate professional community – comparatively free, in their views, from politics and parochial interest – should serve as a blueprint for a European political community, which they either explicitly identify with or come to think of as a goal worth striving for.

7.1. Perceptions of Failure

EASO and Frontex put effort into being seen as effective. A cursory look at their websites or annual reports shows images of officers at work, practical guides, analytical reports and carefully designed maps and charts. Even as a researcher in the field, I was given by Frontex a packet of glossy materials, including a recent risk analysis report. Such efforts are intended to convey an aura of effectiveness and professionalism to an array of audiences, whether these are institutional stakeholders, civil society, the general public or the organisations' own staff and seconded experts.

As described in section 5.1, many participants in this study are professionally motivated. They see European institutions as the highest level in their professional field and believe that deploying with them could be an effective way to use their expertise to make a difference. Thalassa (Pos. 39) shows how deeply these impressions can run among national officials:

> For me, I heard about Frontex after, when I finished my law enforcement school. Let's say this European Coast Guard Agency is, is the head of the professionally, or how can I say, in the border guard's career is the, Frontex is the top, let's say, because it's not always possible for one country is responsible for all of Europe.

As chapter 6 has shown, participants view EASO and Frontex as legitimate authorities and often see these organisations' socialisation claims regarding various roles and norms as coherent with SNEs' pre-existing beliefs regarding what constitutes high-quality work. As demonstrated by their receptivity to EASO's interview method and Frontex's professionalism, SNEs are open to internalising socialisation claims and performing and adhering to them beyond the locally occasioned context of their deployments (i.e. type II socialisation).

Nevertheless, participants in this study also feel that some larger mission is failing. No matter how high-quality the European methods and management on the island might be, SNEs see that arrivals continue, the situation in Moria remains abysmal and Greece remains responsible for a disproportionate share of asylum seekers. None of the EASO participants feel that their missions are effectively addressing these larger issues, while most Frontex staff feel the same. Participants deploy principally as a result of their openness to experience and a professional motivation to apply their expertise in furtherance of some larger aim. They have every incentive to see success, but the notion is too outlandish for them to accept.

As a result, officers face a contradiction between the sense that they are doing their jobs well and that the larger mission is failing. They resolve it by ascribing blame for failure to people and entities who do not have the same street-level perspective that they do. In a prototypical statement, Ceto (Pos. 34) argues that, "Nobody in Europe understand what we are getting in. The selection [of applicants] has to be real here in hotspot." The sense of failure is difficult to accept because, as chapter 6 demonstrates, participants have a strong belief in what high-quality work ought to look like and a belief that they know how to carry it out. Blame shifting helps to resolve that tension by saying that SNEs are doing their job properly, but outside forces are causing the larger project to fail.

EASO officials in particular tend reconcile the larger failure with belief in their own personal competence by ascribing failure to what they call 'politics.' For example, Nereus (Pos. 58) uses the term 'politics and economy' to explain why so many applicants are rendered vulnerable:

> So right now, they're, like, way too many, maybe three times as many people as they should be in Moria. So you need to get people away from the island. So the way to do that is making them vulnerable. So I understand that. I understand the procedure. I guess it's not as it should be. And it's not a matter of law. It's a matter of circumstances and politics and economy.

In a similar vein, Erinyes (Pos. 23) voices her dissatisfaction: "I somehow felt really used by European politics. You know, someone high up above decided that we should do the job this way. And we did it. However, this does not help anyone." This blame shifting to so-called politics is done

explicitly by Aides (Pos. 200), Kaliope (Pos. 48), Kolio (Pos. 104), Okeanus (Pos. 110), Proteus (Pos. 40) and Terpsichore (Pos. 32, 59) as well.

Although referencing 'politics' and 'politicians' is more common among EASO officials, it is also implied by Frontex guest officers. For example, Eumenides (Pos. 33) suggests, "We are supposed to have one common regulation but even though, you can see some countries go their own way and that's because of the hierarchy. Maybe at its highest level. I don't know how to explain it actually." Similarly, Glaucus (Pos. 67) sees the core of the problem as at the European level: "I think [the European Union] have to change the way of they seeing this thing. The way they move here the migrants and all this situation. Hope so. It's my hope that they change something about that situation."

Participants describe the political level of the EU as "a big bureaucracy machine… like a tiger without teeth" (Ares, Pos. 88). Asked "do you see it differently here [as a result of deployment]?" Ares explains:

> The mission is clear. I understand. The migrants should be registered. Yeah, what we do, we register and we're trying to stop them. But nobody stop them because it's impossible to stop them on the sea. So whoever comes, he's in. so we register them. But is this gonna solve the problem? No.
>
> (Ares, Pos. 89, Pos. 92)

Ares demonstrates how SNEs can both believe that 'the problem' is not being solved while maintaining the belief that they are conducting high-quality work.

7.2 Finding Success

Although there is significant failure, SNEs (as described in section 5.1) are open to experience and professionally motivated. Without diminishing the size of the failure, they also look out for possible successes. One area that they point out, often in contradistinction to the broader failures, is the creation of a community on the island. The previous chapter showed the microprocesses of how a European professional community comes together, accepting and rejecting various roles and norms. SNEs are all members of their home country's professional communities, but as a

result of their deployments they are also members of a European professional community, constructed on the island of Lesvos.

In attempting to socialise their inductees, organisations try to further an esprit de corps, in part by making claims about the organisations' success (Juncos and Pomorska, 2014). Such claims are difficult to cohere to inductees' ideational frameworks, given the plain realities with which SNEs are confronted on Lesvos. As described in section 5.2, however, socialisation is not simply a binary choice between acceptance or rejection: inductees also modify or avoid socialisation claims or parts thereof. These microprocesses are evinced in SNEs' reinterpretation of what it means for hotspots to succeed or fail: they can set aside questions about irregular crossings or the asylum system and focus instead on whichever positive outcomes there may be of European efforts on Lesvos. Thaumas (Pos. 87), for instance, describes deployments as conducive to European integration, arguing that EASO is "the glue keeping the member states together. Like, in that way, they're doing something." Thaumas is frustrated that interviews are not being completed regularly and that Moria is overflowing with applicants living in bad conditions; however, by focusing on European cooperation, they can see success alongside failure.

Many participants see solidarity as the solution, arguing that the political level (whether described as the EU, politicians, or member states) should cooperate in order to address the issues of migration, borders and asylum. Beyond support for solidarity, SNEs also chastise states with a reputation for being unhelpful at the European level. Polyhymnia (Pos. 65), for example, criticises member states for being uncooperative in creating a functional Common European Asylum System (CEAS):

> The reason [for poor asylum governance] is because certain member states are just breaking it. Breaking the process. Slowing it down. And you get—I mean, we can only guess who those are, but we have certain ideas. Look, I'm not on their side, let's say.

Kaliope similarly opines on the lack of solidarity at the political level, setting in opposition the 'politics' of member states and 'doing our job' as practiced by professionals. 'Politics' is used as a term deriding member states that to not follow appropriate European roles and norms:

Um for example, with the Dublin scenario, how do you deal with them? It looks sometimes that member states are not egoistic and so 'oh we have to find a European solution' But then they are not [inaudible], you know? So playing the national card and saying 'oh we've done our everything' and then they try to start a bargaining process. 'Okay, I take so many of them, and then you give me that for that'. Tit-for-tat bargaining, like from game theory. We start bargaining. It's going on at the cost of the applicants and it's sometimes goes on the cost of those dealing with their applications… We deal with them, but we also know there's so many politics in there, which makes it a strange dynamic sometimes. So that sometimes leads to frustration, because we say, 'can't we do our job within the law?' (Kaliope, Pos. 48).

Kaliope's use of the term 'national card' demonstrates a belief that putting national interests above European ones is wrong. Also, they suggest that member states that are not showing solidarity are doing so out of egoism and that fundamentally 'tit-for-tat bargaining' – the hallmark of intergovernmental negotiation – is normatively inappropriate. Likewise, Polyhymnia (Pos. 69) critiques the lack of solidarity among member states, calling for "something truly European:"

Yeah here you see—you block off a real European solution compensating it with standing European experts and to a certain extent it is dependent on the commitment of individual member state... Actually it's very contradictory. So [instead] of making something contradictory, why don't you make something really European? And that is you know, you see that only when you work here. To give the answer to the question whether I came to that idea after having been to Greece.

Nereus (Pos. 226) goes farther still, arguing that "it's not working too well. Everybody knows" and that the deployments are mostly "symbolic" due to a lack of cooperation, "But then again, at least we're doing something, trying. And, yeah, it's a matter of the political environment in all the member states that are focusing internally, and not liking migration and stuff. So it's, it's just a hard case. For EU making reasonable things." As with Kaliope, Nereus holds that it is normatively correct is to cooperate in

furtherance of common interests, but member states are too focused on internal politics.

7.3. Solidarity

Participants put a lot of effort into finding a silver lining. This proclivity may be due to personal dispositions, an attempt to give a positive perspective to the researcher or a sense that personal success or failure is bound with that of the organisation. There is likely some truth in all of these explanations; however, there appears to be something more meaningful behind the attempt to salvage success or excuse failure. All participants appear to believe in the principle that Europeans should work together to manage common issues relating to borders and asylum. As Thalassa (Pos. 39) puts it: "The uncountable or uncontrolled migration, it's very dangerous. We have to control them. Not we, the whole European Union has to control somehow the, this migration." Moreover, this pre-existing belief in solidarity appears to be strengthened as a result of their deployments.

A belief in solidarity does not necessitate support for practical measures beyond coordinated policy and common standards; however, it implies a normative belief in a certain European 'we-ness,' which Ladon labels the "Europeanist mindset" (Field Notes 1258, Pos. 7). Solidarity implies that states and people ought to not only to work together or aid one another for mutual gain but also implies a common identification that undergirds this mutual obligation.

Conversations with participants rarely turn into technical policy discussion regarding which affairs should be managed at what level of governance. Instead, they describe a sense that in the face of mutual challenges, Europeans and European member states ought to help one another and that this both conveys material benefits and forges normatively desirable ties between people and countries. Phorcys, for instance, makes the case that supporting EASO is not just about trying to manage migration, but is also an important act of solidarity among states. They (Pos. 349) describe the problem:

> I wish there were, there would be more caseworkers from other countries. Because there are lots of caseworkers from Germany,

from Holland, some now from Norway, or Denmark, and so on.
But, and I think France, but they don't send so many people.

Phorcys (*Ibid.*) *goes* on to explain why it is important to even send symbolic support: "The only thing that I would wish, that also, some other countries would also send people to work here and to support it. And just to give a sign, just a symbolic caseworker to be on the island." They understand why not all countries send personnel, noting reservations about the EU-Turkey deal or dangers to flow managers, but feel that showing support is worthwhile due to the normative desirability of solidarity. Participants also mention practical benefits, arguing that caseworkers learn valuable lessons from seeing how the asylum procedure works in different countries.

7.4. Imagining a Community

The social context on Lesvos is in many ways ideal for making European identities salient. SNEs are detached from their home-country social networks and integrated into new, European ones.[37] Many participants feel "really tight bonds" (Aides, Pos. 100) with the other deployed personnel, creating a sense of a community of Europeans which in turn leads to explicit invocation of European identities that can buttress a European political community. Combined with the strong affective context (see section 5.3), the conditions for socialisation should be even more favourable.

Deployments are often compared by participants favourably to the Erasmus student exchange programme in the sense that transnational friendships are formed and new experiences are had (Aides, Pos. 40; Polyhymnia, Pos. 18; Proteus, Pos. 45; Terpsichore, Pos. 17). Studies of the Erasmus student exchange have – as with studies of secondments to European institutions – generally not found very strong evidence of emergent European identities (James, 2019; Mitchell, 2014; Sigalas, 2010). Lesvos, however, is a much more affective context than either

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[37] Frontex sea patrol are an exception because they work as national crews instead of mixed ones. Nevertheless, they share hotels and socialise with other nationalities while being away from their home country colleagues and families.

deployments to Brussels or student exchanges. Moreover, alongside general openness to experience, which likely motivates Erasmus students as well, SNEs are also motivated technocratically. They want to make a difference by applying their expertise in working for Europe. As a result, the ethnographic work shows that their induction into a European professional community strengthens beliefs in Europe as a normative project.

Many officials are motivated to deploy by openness to experience, which makes them excited about building transnational friendship networks. As Thestis (Pos. 12) puts it, "I want another perspective of the world, of Europe." Such statements raise the question of whether these friendship networks are understood by participants as European rather than generically international and whether these friendships lead to increased European self-identification.

As the previous section shows, socialisation into a European professional community can facilitate type II socialisation into the norm of European solidarity and a certain 'we-ness' among European officers. For example, Moirae (Pos. 32) describes a Frontex training which they found very effective: "On the first day – the Greek police officers, they had quite difficult to understand why we are here. They called us… police officers from other countries." But then, following the training, "they called us European colleagues" (*Ibid*.).

It is impossible to know from Moirae's narration whether those Greek officers really took for granted this emergent norm about the use of the term 'European' and felt that the guest officers were genuinely European colleagues beyond the locally occasioned context of the training exercise. However, the Greek officers' use of the term reinforced Moirae's sense that they were all Europeans:

> And I think that was a really good… So for us of course they are the European colleagues, but for them it was more like, 'What are you doing here? Why do you come here to work? What is so special with you guys from other countries?' And then in one week we were European colleagues.
>
> (Moirae, Pos. 32)

One can well imagine a counterfactual version of this training in which Greek officers did not agree to adhere to the norm of using such terminology. That would have likely undermined Moirae's ability to take for granted the notion that they are all European colleagues.

Thestis also offers a useful description of the microprocesses of how friendships they formed on Lesvos lead to personal identification with Europe; that is, a taken-for-grantedness of the normative sense that guest officers are all Europeans. Asked whether "you feel as a result of working here more connected to Europe and other Europeans?" (Thestis, Pos. 11), they explain how these interpersonal relationships build in her and her colleagues a sense that they are all Europeans:

> Yes. You see the map… nobody knows [Home Country]. You see, when I come here it's a way to meet other cultures, other ways of working, because we work with also police officers in our shift. It's good. I want—another perspective of the world, of Europe. I make also great contacts. I said that 'when I come to Italy, I will call you' I have contacts in every country now. It's great. And also 'if you come to [Home Country], you have a house, you can come to my house'. It's great for that also.
> GT: So I guess you're all part of Europe? Of the same?
> Yes. Yes. it's like that.

(Thestis, Pos. 12-4)

As this passage shows, there is a mixing of professional community identification among police officers as well as friendships, which leads to an affirmation of the sense that they are all a part of Europe. This is not to suggest that the notion of Europe is brand new to any of these officials as it may well be a motivation for deployment. Nevertheless, it appears that through adherence to common roles and norms as European officials, they strengthen their sense of a broader community of Europeans.

The subject of Europe is raised regularly when participants socialise. The EU as a political or administrative body is usually understood as dysfunctional and disconnected (see section 7.1), but there is also an awareness that these interactions form bonds between the deployed officials that are in some important sense European, rather than merely

international or cosmopolitan. When asked directly if there is a process of Europeanisation, participants are forthcoming and strongly agree, with Kaliope, for example, answering "Definitely yes," to nods from Ananke (Field Notes 0339, Pos. 8).

Participants are not blind to their differences: they discuss, for example, the many cultural dissimilarities between the deployed nationalities, noting especially distinctions between Northern, Southern and Eastern Europeans. However, their contact with applicants can create a sense that as different as Europeans may be from one another, they have more in common with each other than with the applicants. For example, Ares (Pos. 106) explains: "The EU citizen is aware about the law… But with those people, they're not aware. They don't know what is passport. They don't know what is visa. They don't know what is permission to stay, or driving license or what kind of regulation we have." Beyond such practical distinctions, some participants describe the non-European applicants as very different from Europeans in cultural ways too:

> People are coming and what is the problem where they are from? The culture is the problem. How to behave when you are not agree with each other. We learn to talk with each other and respect each other even if we are not agree. When these people are coming, we have to [teach] them here. That's the most important thing to do and I also hear other colleagues saying the same thing. You have to [teach]. They coming here and they are changing our ways in Europe. They have to learn how we are doing it and do it like that. Not that we change things.
>
> (Ceto, Pos. 35)

Ceto goes on to offer the example of the cross controversy,[38] which gripped the island around the time of our interview (Kitsikopoulos, 2019).

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[38] The short version of the story was that crosses began going up around Lesvos, both physical and painted ones. This was seen by one side as an affirmation of the Christian character of the island and by opponents as a message of hostility to refugees. Ceto was upset that it appeared refugees or their NGO supporters were responsible for destruction of a cross above a small beach in Mytilene and that this destruction

Glaucus similarly discusses the different worldviews of the non-Europeans they encountered on Lesvos, criticising,

> how we Europeans want to welcome all these people, but they don't respect 'the religion' and other values. [They] noted the ageing European population and said it was important to have more workers, but that these people didn't primarily want to work.

> (Field Notes 2329, Pos. 9)

The distinction between the norms of applicants and SNEs, when combined with the collegiality among European officials, serves to strengthen the sense of a European community that is more internally homogenous and more distinct from non-Europeans than many participants believed prior to their deployments.

Beyond the differences between participants and applicants, feeling that they are working together for Europe can lead to the explicit invocation of European identity. Nerites, for instance, explains how the deployment made her internalise the belief that they are European: "Because you have the same goal, right? Everybody's doing the same thing. But they carry different baggage, because they come from different places, although we're all Europeans, you know?" (Nerites, Pos. 5). Later in her interview, they (Pos. 23) return to this point, describing how European professional communities can create a unifying spirit:

> And this is like, the spirit of Frontex, you know, we are together with our differences… So this, this Frontex operation here is, it kind of sums what the, what they were trying to do when they started the European Union. Kind of, kind of sums a little bit of that.

Ceto (Pos. 37), previously sceptical of the financial burden of the European Union, also sees Frontex as creating Europeans:

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reflected a fundamental difference in norms adhered to by refugees and Europeans: "These people [Greeks] are orthodox. They are believers and, okay, they have their beliefs… Migrants know this is Christian island. [Greeks]—this is their way of living… They destroyed that cross. Who do you think did that? If they are not immigrants, they are NGOs" (Ceto, Pos. 35).

> But you see here what it means to be as Europe as one, to work together and don't look at the differences, but look what we have in common together. We are building a society together for all of us… the positive in the hotspot is when I see the people working, all of the Europeans – there is not difference. We are one. We are Frontex. We are—that's the meaning of being Europe.

Overall, these strong claims for feeling more European as a result of deploying are much more explicit among Frontex than EASO officials. This is likely since EASO participants have mostly completed an advanced degree while Frontex officers have usually completed only a technical policing education (see section 4.3) and European identity is a well-established correlate of educational attainment (Schilde, 2014, p. 651). As a result, EASO SNEs are more likely to already have internalised some type of European identity. The sample of participants studied in this work supports the notion that for EASO officials the deployment is more likely to be a disillusioning of their high opinion of the EU, while for Frontex the deployment functions as an introduction to the idea that they share a common identity. Nevertheless, this distinction is speculative given the limits of this report's research design.

7.5. An Emergent European Community

Nerites explains how a European political community can emerge from a professional one and sees this as a positive outcome. They (Pos. 30) consider people sceptical of European integration and suggest that through cooperation it becomes clear that Europeans need each other and are "nothing" by themselves:

> There are, nowadays, there are some European scepticals now. In some countries. I'm not going to say names. And this would be a good place for them to come and see the working atmosphere we have, working with each other, being members of the European Union. And I would want them to see it, because we need each other. We need each other. And this would be a nice, a nice example, like, showing these kinds of missions we preform here would be a nice thing to show to these sceptical people about the European Union. Because we need each other. We're nothing by ourselves. You know?

This passage makes explicit the participant's perception of the link between everyday cooperation and the adoption of roles and norms regarding Europe in a broader sense.

Thaumas (Pos. 87) makes a like argument about the emergence of a 'greater Europe' as a result of cooperation under EASO auspices:

> I mean the border in some level seems to vanish when you're talking about these elements and you feel a greater Europe. And we have the same problems and we have the same elements that we're struggling with in society. So yeah, it's, I feel more now that it's a common European problem we have. Where before I felt it more in a national level. But now I actually start to feel like no, this is a common European conflict or problem or element that we all have to solve by cooperating. And I think that if the member states actually cooperate much more than we are doing right now I think we will make remarkable results.

Thaumas shows how deployments teach that migration is "a common European problem we have," which member states can only "solve by cooperating" in spite of their diversity of preferences and interests. Although they are only referring to migration, one can elucidate from their description a sense that this could apply to European challenges more generally.

Similarly, Graea (Pos. 42) explains that "Greece of course has a serious huge migrant problem" and that therefore, "it's not only Greece but Europe has this problem." They (Ibid.) explain that although it is also in her country's best interest to support Greece, it is also obliged to do so because they are both European: "I see it as an obligation. We need to help each other. Greece is Europe. [Home Country] is Europe. Together we're Europe. We have outside borders. We are responsible for that also. So in that—of course we have to help them. We have to work together." The language of obligation shows how the sense of mutual challenges can breed a sense of membership in a political community; in Graea's words, "we're Europe."

Asking participants directly about their feelings of European solidarity is liable to reduce the validity of the research by intimating a false

impression of the subject's salience and confusion about terminology (Fujii, 2018, p. 64-7). This is a general problem with ethnographic research but is particularly difficult in this case because participants are told that this is an EU-funded research project (see Appendix C). To mitigate the misconception that certain answers are preferred, the questions on this issue are as open-ended as possible. For example, Kaliope (Pos. 45) is asked: "Have you – and you really don't have to answer yes to this question, I just want to see if it's important to you – have you, as a result of being in hotspots, had a change in how you thought about Europe, the EU, anything like that?"

This open phrasing communicates to Kaliope that they should not try to offer responses they think the interviewer might want to hear. They (Pos. 46) reply:

> I saw mistakes, which could be improved of course. Hotspots are not all about European values. That's the bad thing about it. But I also know that currently it's the best we can have. With the European Union… I see the positive things, which I can value more, and seeing the negative things, where I articulate myself and say, 'this and that needs to be changed, that it works better'. So [the deployment] helps me—it's not one-sided everything good or everything bad.

The nuance and criticism in this reply give confidence that Kaliope as trying to communicate her genuine views. Her principal critique, in the second sentence, is that "hotspots are not all about European values." More than any accolades they could offer, this critique reveals a commitment to some normative conception of Europe which ought to be reflected in the hotspots. By saying "it's the best we have," there's a sense of a European 'we' trying to solve a problem.

Nerites (Pos. 78) compares her time in Greece to previous international work outside Europe, drawing a clear distinction between within and without Europe:

> The difference here for me is, when you go to [Non-European Country 1], or you go to [Non-European Country 2], you're away from home, you have the same mindset to help. Right? But in here,

> I feel that I'm doing this for my country. You know?... Although it's so far away, and from the [Home City]... So I volunteered to come here, and I'm really, I hope that our job here helps in a positive way the, my country and the European Union.

The identification of national and European interests suggests that European socialisation is "more subtle and complex than zero-sum notions of loyalty and allegiance" (Lewis, 2005, p. 939). Rather, one can see one's home country and the larger European interest as one and the same. Nerites' comparison of the mindset abroad and at home suggests identification with a European political community that has been bolstered by repeated deployments. A similar claim comes from Ceto (Pos. 37), who explains one effect of her deployment:

> For me I understand better [due to the deployment] what we [Europeans] are talking about, why we want to be together. You learn that better because you are working together for the security of all of us. And it's not just because it's Frontex. We are working for security of my family and your family and everybody's family. It don't matter where you're living. In Lithuania, [Home Country], UK, or Denmark. Everybody is working together and we are making it safe for all of us.

Inductees do not universally accept these socialisation claims. For example, when Phorcys (Pos. 342) is asked if her views of the EU have changed as a result of her deployment, they clarify that "I don't think my views of changed." They (Pos. 349) explain that "EASO is a big organization like any other organization" and that "they still support countries, and they still help refugees and applicants and so on. But at the same time, of course, they have, like selfish reasons to do the work as well." Their (Pos. 353) criticism of the operation echoes Kaliope's claim about European values: "I don't want to say I'm doing, I'm on a mission here, and I'm doing, like something useful for my country and for Europe and so on. No. It's like a total political reason why the EU-Turkey statement was in place anyway." This description of EASO as an organisation with its own interests fits in with other participants' discussions of 'politics.'

Although not universal, it is clear that inductees generally understand that they ought to be working for Europe out of a sense of their common Europeanness. Some of the SNEs mentioned above describe a change to their worldview as a result of these deployments. They increasingly internalise the notion that they are part of a larger European political community and take this for granted beyond the locally occasioned context of their deployments, demonstrating type II socialisation.

7.6. Conclusion

This chapter shows how professional communities can form the basis for political ones. When confronted with apparent failure, inductees do not simply accept the claim. After all, they volunteered to deploy not just out of an openness to experience but out of a professional belief that their skills and talents can help address societal problems. And as a result they make so-called politics and politicians the culprits. Comparing themselves to those semi-mythical figures in national capitals and Brussels, they see a difference in the amount of on-the-ground experience and unselfish solidarity.

Having placed a lack of solidarity at the heart of the problems, many officers build it up further as a virtue and as a solution to Europe's problems. As they build their own European community on the island, they see in it a model for how Europeans can work together. The notion that Europeans can work together effectively can further personal European identification. This identification is different of every officer: for some, the concept never quite arises in conversation, while for others it becomes a genuine commitment. Others yet, arrived on the island, perhaps naively European and are shocked at the horrors of the camp and the general dysfunction. But even these disillusioned officers see the problem as a lack of solidarity, a selfishness of politicians, which would be ameliorated by Europe being more like the model professional-cum-political community SNEs have developed on Lesvos.

Chapter 8

Conclusion: Summary and Discussion

The literature on European socialisation, going back to the 1970s, asks two principal questions. One relates to how, despite their diverse countries of origin, inductees in European institutions manage to work together for a common, European purpose without the need for regular incentives or sanctions in what is known as type I socialisation. The second question goes further, asking whether these inductees become Europeans in some meaningful sense. The two questions together form literature which has come to be termed 'European socialisation' and it contains three principal lacunae (see section 2.4). First, studies tend to focus on the effects of easily categorizable inductee characteristics, rather than on the underlying beliefs these characteristics represent. Second, research has been overwhelmingly focused on socialisation in Brussels, making it unclear how much of findings can be ascribed to Europe's capital as opposed to the organisations themselves. Finally, previous work has tended towards surveys. Though often complemented by formal interviews, such an approach makes it difficult to know which issues are most salient to inductees and what the relevant underlying belief structures might be.

Stepping into the gap in the literature, this study uses an in-depth ethnographic approach to focus on inductees' belief structures in a European setting that is far-removed from Brussels—the Lesvos migration hotspot. The report asks, *How are SNEs deployed to the Lesvos migration hotspots socialised into European professional and political communities?* Through a mix of formal interviews, informal interactions and participant observations, it finds that type I socialisation requires

coherence to pre-existing beliefs regarding legitimate authority and that type II socialisation requires coherence to pre-existing beliefs regarding what constitutes high-quality work. This socialisation process is found to form a European professional community, which undergirds an inchoate political one.

8.1. Summary

The literature review (chapter 2) describes the two general strands of research into European socialisation and how the field developed over time. It reveals a paradigm change in the early 2000s, as a result of which questions about 'quality of contact' came to modify the well-established contact thesis. In general it shows a field that has become more developed and cohesive, using insights from psychology to explain what happens to inductees in European institutions. Overall, the literature shows clear findings regarding country and age effects, but few other predictors of socialisation are accounted for consistently across studies.

Chapter 3 constructs the theoretical framework for the investigation. It focuses in particular on the first two lacunae, striving to explain how pre-existing beliefs and context matter, leaving the methodological lacuna for chapter 4. The theoretical framework borrows from coherentist epistemology, which argues that the truth-value of beliefs lies in their coherence to one another. These interrelated beliefs are described as an ideational framework, to which any new beliefs must cohere in order to be accepted. As a result, by understanding inductees' webs of pre-existing beliefs, the researcher can understand why some socialisation claims can be cohered to the ideational framework while others cannot.

Taking a note from the sociology of professions, the chapter goes on to describe SNEs as members of national professional communities whose esoteric expertise – and hence their ideational frameworks – are discursively constructed (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). Participants in this study, after all, are inductees into EASO or Frontex, but they are not neophytes: whether only a few years or a few decades, they all have significant experience in the asylum, police or related organisations in their home countries. Participants have internalised beliefs about what constitutes high-quality work and legitimate authority during their induction into their national professional communities. These beliefs

become important in later empirical chapters, which study how they cohere to the novel roles and norms into which SNEs are inducted as members of European professional communities on Lesvos.

Finally, the chapter contends with literatures on socialisation in other settings, which demonstrate that context matters. In particular, extreme, affective and social contexts are found to be important. Definitions of each are offered, preparing the ground for chapter 5, which investigates which are most relevant for Lesvos and how. Even though it is intuitively clear that the Greek migration hotspot is very different from Brussels or national capitals, where most studies on European socialisation have taken place, this section provides the theoretical basis for explaining why this comparatively intense context should produce different socialisation outcomes.

Chapter 4 introduces the report's research question and hypothesises that type I and II socialisation require coherence to different pre-existing beliefs. Moreover, it hypothesises that the island sees the construction of a European professional community, which in turn undergirds the construction of a political one. This approach is based on a framework that views SNEs first and foremost as professionals, rather than as collections of demographic characteristics so common to studies discussed in chapter 2. They do their job as required, regardless of their personal views; however, where novel socialisation claims can be made to cohere to pre-existing beliefs they have internalised as members of national professional communities (a process facilitated by the comparatively extreme, affective and social context of Lesvos), inductees may take them for granted, performing and adhering to them even once their deployment has ended.

The rest of the chapter goes on to explain that Lesvos is an illustrative case that can be applied to more general questions of socialisation, especially regarding so-called adventurous European deployments. The case of Lesvos can be thought of as a laboratory for studying an unusually fast-moving socialisation process. Inductees are strongly pre-socialised by national organisations and leave the island quickly, but their deployment experience is very intense and conducive to socialisation. As a result, Lesvos is ideal for an in-depth but time-limited study of how novel roles are cohered to pre-existing ideational frameworks.

Chapter 5 explains that SNEs deployed to Lesvos are more open to experience and professionally motivated than their colleagues who choose not to deploy. The chapter also shows how inductees' ideational frameworks require that socialisation claims cohere to pre-existing beliefs. However, this is not a simple binary of acceptance or rejection. Rather, participants can modify claims, avoid them or consider them in part. These microprocesses of socialisation become crucial for later analysis, especially in chapter 7, and demonstrate the value of the in-depth fieldwork conducted for this research.

Chapter 6 shows how a European professional community is constructed. Inductees on Lesvos encounter novel roles and norms, which they internalise, performing and adhering to them without the need for regular incentives or sanctions. This finding of across-the-board type I socialisation is dependent on participants' perception of the legitimate authority of the institutions on the island. However, for SNEs to perform and adhere to roles and norms beyond the locally occasioned context of Lesvos – that is, in the manner of type II socialisation – novel claims have to cohere to pre-existing beliefs with which they've been inculcated as members of national professional communities. Taken together, this chapter shows how a European professional community is built on the basis of national ones.

Chapter 7 demonstrates how the emergent European professional community can metamorphose into a political one. Participants see more and more people streaming into and languishing in a horrid camp and know that this could not be an image of success. This failure, however, is held up in stark contrast to the fact that these national experts, now members of an emergent European professional community on the island, are doing their job well and together. To them, that's something. They see themselves as working in the common European interest and ascribe failure to a higher up, somewhat imaginary 'politics' that are only concerned with petty national interests. If only these politicians and high-level administrators in Brussels and national capitals had the same sense of professionalism and solidarity as the SNEs on Lesvos, the larger issues of irregular crossings and asylum could be managed sensibly. On this basis, it can be seen that a European identity can be constructed, at least for some officers.

8.2. Discussion

The findings in this work show the value of not seeing inductees as empty vessels. This is a longstanding critique, as shown by Smith's (1973) critique of Scheinman and Feld's (1972) work. Traditionally, however, scholars have attempted to remedy this by increasing diversity of samples and considering the intersections of these characteristics. Due, however, to the challenges of inductees selecting into organisations, organisations selecting inductees and the posited "double effect" of socialisation (Suvarierol, 2011, p. 195), consistent results are inherently challenging to isolate across studies, conceptualisations and operationalisations.

This report steps into the debate, suggesting that by studying inductees' ideational frameworks directly, the field could more successfully overcome selection issues and better understand who is most rapidly socialised and how. This study has been focused on the how, looking to the common beliefs of SNEs and members of national professional communities. However, there would be great benefit if future work would focus on the diversity of ideational frameworks and the explanatory power therein. This focus is already common for broader studies of popular views on European integration, especially those based on Eurobarometer findings (Nissen, 2014) and those based on more sociological or anthropological works (e.g. Macdonald 2020). By making beliefs central to the study of socialisation, the noise created by the focus on intervening variables (inductee characteristics) could be reduced and more fine-grained results might be attained.

This report could also be valuable to the literatures on EASO and Frontex, which tend to be focused on technical aspects of law and practice or are aimed at highlighting problems and advocating for reforms. This study, although interested in the everyday policymakers who act as the gatekeepers of Europe, is not curious about them *qua* street-level bureaucrats in the sense of Lipsky (1980). To the author, these are professionals, inducted into a national community and then into a European one. As a result, this work might appear to some readers to skirt the issues that matter, whether about state coercion, bordering, criminalisation or whatever else. And in a sense it very much does. This report sees participants in this study first and foremost as professionals with a shared, esoteric knowledge that gives them a particular sociological

function in society. The details of this function and its impact are beyond the scope of the investigation.

In practical terms, this report has shown how some SNEs adopt particular roles and norms, from enthusiastic acceptance of the EASO interview style in the manner of type II socialisation, to the hesitant acquiescence to questionable practices of Greek authorities in the manner of type I socialisation. Policymakers, trainers and members of civil society looking to reform these organisations and improve standards would do well to analyse socialisation as requiring coherence into pre-existing roles and norms. How to cohere Frontex's support function to its reporting duties in cases of rights violations? Moreover, can or should officers be made to understand that "the Greeks are in charge" except for when it comes to humanitarian law, in which case the Europeans are in charge? Satisfying answers to such questions are not easy to come by and the roles and norms they imply are even more difficult to induct officers into. However, only rigorous analysis will produce the type of in-depth understanding needed to make improvements.

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Appendix A: List of Participants in the Study

Below are pseudonyms of all participants in the study and their agencies. Major participants have sat for an audio-recorded interview, while minor ones have not. Note that pseudonyms are independent of participants' gender.

Major EASO Participants:	**Major Frontex Participants:**
Aides	Thestis
Erinyes	Brizo
Kaliope	Sangarius
Kolio	Nerites
Nereus	Eumenides
Okeanus	Ares
Phorcys	Moirae
Polyhymnia	Glaucus
Proteus	Leukothea
Terpsichore	Thalassa
Thaumas	Ceto
Tyche	Graeae

Minor EASO Participants:	**Minor Frontex Participants**:
Ananke	Eurybia
Erato	Euterpe
Ganymedes	Hesperides
Hebe	Ichnaea
Hermes	
Iris	
Ker	
Ladon	
Melpomene	
Momus	
Morpheus	
Nike	
Plutus	
Thalia	
Urania	

Appendix B: Definitions of replacement terms in transcript excerpts

[Foreign Country]: A country that is not the one from which the SNE is deployed

[Home Agency]: Agency employing SNE in their home country.

[Home Country]: Country from which participant is deployed

[Home Language]: Language of work at agency from which participant is deployed.

[Hotspot]: One of the other locations in which deployed officials work in Greece. These may formal hotspots (Chios, Kos, Leros or Samos) or one of the many other locations in Greece to which SNEs have been deployed.

[Italian Hotspot]: Referring to one of the hotspots in Italy

[Previous Deployment]: Previous deployment as part of EASO or Frontex

[Previous non-Frontex/EASO Deployment]: Previous deployment not as part of EASO or Frontex

#: When referring to more than one object, such as multiple other hotspots, each is given a number in the manner [Hotspot 1]. Numbering restarts for each transcript and is intentional not consistent across transcripts.

Appendix C: Positionality Statement

Ethnographic researchers often produce a positionality statement, which offers transparency to the reader and aids the researcher in overcoming biases inherent (though not limited to) qualitative research. In this work, I consider positionality questions suggested by Lacy (2017). Questions in italics below are copied from her article.

How do you understand the research process and knowledge? (paradigm)

Although this work is methodologically ethnographic, it is attempting to contribute to a literature in political science that is fundamentally positivist, in the loose sense of the term. As a result, this work avoids interpretative methodologies, but takes interpretivist and other post-positivist critiques and contributions seriously. Because this study is not looking at causation, but is instead offering a reorientation in perspective, the fundamental positivist-interpretivist tensions are not too problematic.

What are your beliefs about this topic?

I came into this work very sceptical about the role of identity and socialisation in the secondment process. As the literature review shows, there isn't much to be expected. As a result, I am setting a high bar for evidence, especially of type II socialisation.

Any history or personal interaction with this topic?

I have very little history with migration hotspots, border control and asylum officials. This makes me very much an 'outsider' in the field.

What are your understandings of systems of oppression and their influence on your research?

There clearly is an oppressive system at hand at the migration hotspots. However, my work does not look so much at dynamics relevant to those relationships. Instead, it's about relationships between national and European officialdom, which in the EU have a very unclear power relationship. The fact that my research is sponsored by the EU was made clear to participants (see section 7.3) and so I made it very clear that I am not looking for pro-European responses.

What is your connection to your participants? Do you share any commonalities, identities, or experiences with your participants?

I am not European, which means a certain outsider perspective. However, many officials have a migration background, which I found helpful in building connections. Two thirds of respondents are men, but I did not noticeably have closer relationships with them. There was some commonality with SNEs who studied social science, but that did not reliably translate into a particular kind of relationship. I also did not share much of an ideological background with most of the participants.

What do you think you will find in this study?

The expectation was that socialisation would be very related to how affective the context is. However, it is much more agent directed than expected, hence the agent-directed socialisation model that I develop in chapter 3.

What are your hopes for this study?

To understand that the nuances of how officials think about Europe and how their secondments affect this.

Anything else that is important for the reader to know about you?

Perhaps just that I have a very varied background: multiple citizenships, mixed ethnic and class background, lived in many cities and countries, and have worked in different professional contexts. I have an accent in English, but not one that clearly references my background. All in all, I have a lifelong history of fitting in with diverse groups in a variety of contexts.

Overall, my greatest positionality concern is that because I successfully built personal relationships with many of the participants, I am concerned that they tell me what I want to hear. Given the EU funding of the work and my academic background, I was worried they'd say pro-European things to please me. Instead, they tended to assume based on my background that I am naively pro-European and so worked hard to disabuse me of my presumed ignorance. Given that a lack of European socialisation was my baseline expectation, taken from the literature (see

chapter 2), I believe that if there is any bias in this research, it is in understating, rather than overstating the socialisation effect of SNE secondments to Lesvos.

Appendix D: Items received from Frontex

Appendix E: Interview Materials

Document 1: Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet – Practitioner Interview

Project title: Practitioner Identity in the Context of Core State Powers Integration

Invitation: You are invited to take part in a study on how working in migration hotspots affects your views and behaviours. The research will interview you and will also record observation of your interaction.

Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please contact the researcher for any questions or further information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

Purpose of the study: The academic literature has not reached a consensus on how working in migration hotspots affects the seconded member state officers. The purpose of this study – in part through this interview – is to better understand these effects.

If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked to sign the Consent Form on the last page of this document. You will be given a copy of both the Participant Information Sheet and the Consent Form to keep.

Why have I been chosen? This research is interested with national officers seconded by their member states to migration hotspots. You were chosen by the researcher with consent from you organization in a sampling strategy intended to include as many nationalities and job types in the research.

Do I have to take part? The participation in this study is voluntary. You don't have to give a reason if you don't want to take part. If you do want to take part now, but change your mind later, you can pull out of the study at any time without experiencing any disadvantage.

How and when will the data be collected? This set of interviews will be conducted between 24 September and 9 December, 2018 in the city of Mytilene and its environs, Greece. Participation should last about an hour. It will begin with legal forms, proceed to open-ended questions, then increasingly specific

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questions. A follow up interview may be conducted remotely in 6–12 months.

Recording, storage, and deletion of data: This interview will be recorded and notes will be taken. Recordings will be transcribed. Materials will only be made available in a manner that is pseudonymous, meaning that your comments will not be traceable back to you. Unlike anonymous data however, the researcher will be able to match data to individuals, but the broader public and research community will not be able to.

Confidentiality will be guaranteed by keeping all recordings stored securely behind two-factor authenticated servers. Data will be kept for scientific replicability, but will never be shared without guaranteeing the privacy and confidentiality of the research subject.

Data will remain controlled by the researcher and stored on Freie Universität Berlin's secure server system. Although the university will not be able to view the files, it will be able to delete the whole archive remotely.

What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part? The study's primary expected contributions are to the academic study of core state power integration and the sociological literature on 'street-level bureaucrats', which simply means public employees who interact with the public. This project may also help design future European cooperation projects, including hotspot systems. No specific discomforts, disadvantages, or risks are foreseen.

What are my rights? You have the right to appeal to the national data protection authority of Germany, where the research is based and will process and store the data. You have the right to withdraw your consent at any time. You have the right to request access to and rectification or erasure of information about yourself obtained via this study. You will not own any intellectual property that may arise from any future research.

Any complaints can be addressed to the researcher's supervisor, Prof. Dr. Markus Jachtenfuchs at jachtenfuchs@hertie-school.org.

What will happen to the results of the research project? As mentioned prior, results will be pseudonymised in accordance with definitions in GDPR Art. 4. Results will be published as a doctoral dissertation as well as related books, scholarly articles, and pieces in the popular press.

Who pays for the study? The data is collected as part of a PhD project of the international research project The Post-Crisis Legitimacy of the European Union (PLATO), which has received funding from the European Union's Framework Programme for Research and Innovation Horizon 2020, under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 722581 (2017-2020).

Who do I contact for more information or concerns?

Lead investigator:	Gil Thompson PhD Researcher, Marie Curie Fellow Berlin Graduate School for Transnational Studies, Freie Universität Berlin Germany
Contact:	gil.thompson@fu-berlin.de +49(0)159.01236171
Data Protection Officer:	Name: PENDING Title: PENDING
Contact:	Email: PENDING

Informed Consent Form

Please mark to indicate you consent to the following:

I have read and understand the Participant Information Sheet	Yes	No
I have been given sufficient time to consider whether or not to participate in this study	Yes	No
I have had the opportunity to ask questions and understand the study	Yes	No
I am satisfied with the answers I have been given regarding the study and I have a copy of this consent form and information sheet	Yes	No
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the study at any time	Yes	No
I consent to the research staff collecting and processing the statements I make/information I give during interviews	Yes	No
If I decide to withdraw from the study, I agree that the information collected about me up to the point when I withdraw may continue to be processed	Yes	No
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and that no material, which could identify me personally, will be used in any reports on this study	Yes	No
I know who to contact if I have any questions about the study in general	Yes	No
I wish to receive a summary of the results from the study	Yes	No

Declaration by Participant:

I hereby consent to take part in this study.

Participant's Name: **Email:**

_____   _____

Signature: **Date:**

_____   _____

Document 2: Prof. Dr. Jachtenfuchs Endorsement Form

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of Governance

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Tel. +49 (0)30 – 259.219.315
Jachtenfuchs@hertie-school.org

24 September 2018

To whom it may concern

This letter is to express my support for Gil Thompson's research project *Practitioner Identity in the Context of Core State Powers*. As Gil's doctoral advisor I can ensure that this project is ethical, relevant, and in the public interest. I hope that you assist him with granting interviews and allowing him to observe your organization.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have further questions.

Sincerely,

Markus Jachtenfuchs
Professor of European and Global Governance
Director, Jacques Delors Institute Berlin

Appendix F: Codebook

List of all the codes used in MAXQDA and their frequency.

Code System		Frequency
Code System		727
Red	Anger	2
Red	Frustration	7
Red	Excitement	1
Red	Stress	4
Red	Emotional distance from work	2
Red	Value of first-hand experience	21
Red	Individual is not making a difference as part of deployment	8
Red	Deployment is Emotionally Intense	12
Red	Individual is making a positive difference re migrants	2
Cyan	Appreciation for Greek Locals	6
Cyan	Sympathy for Greek Locals	2
Cyan	Friendship with Greek Colleagues	3
Cyan	Negative opinion of Greek colleagues	4
Cyan	Appreciation for Greek Colleagues	7
Cyan	Successes interacting with Greek colleagues	7
Cyan	Problems interacting with Greek Colleagues	7
Cyan	Greek Sovereignty	11

Cyan	Opinion about Greek governance (positive)	1
Cyan	Opinion about Greek governance (negative)	25
Cyan	Better understanding of Greek Colleagues	1
Violet	Deployment helps understand other cultures	15
Violet	Deployment leads to learning other countries' procedures	14
Violet	Deployment is a meaningful personal experience	12
Violet	Deployment helps understand migration	14
Violet	Emotional difficulty of Work - Lesvos	19
Violet	Emotional difficulty of Work - Generally	2
Violet	Ethical Questions about the work	2
Violet	Job performace deteriorated due to deployment	0
Violet	Job performace improved due to deployment	20
Violet	Job performace will deteriorate due to deployment	0
Violet	Job performace will improve due to deployment	15
Violet	Deployment will not affect job performance	3
Violet	Deployment will worsen attitude toward job	5
Violet	Deployment improves attitude toward job	6
Violet	Deployment Creates personal/professional opportunities	6

Violet	People who are not part of deployment don't understand	9
Green	Deployment leads to increased sympathy for migrants	5
Green	Sympathy for migrants	29
Green	Concern about migration	9
Green	Fear of Migrants/Camp	9
Green	Emotional Reaction to Migrants' Conditions	23
Green	Acknowledgement of Migrants' Conditions	28
Green	Difference Between first Arrivals and migrants in home country	15
Green	EU in Lesvos supports European Project	8
Blue	Support for increased European solidarity	23
Blue	Positive view of European Governance	8
Blue	Negative view of European governance	21
Blue	Deployment teaches EU standards	4
Blue	Friendships with EU colleagues continue after deployment	15
Blue	Appreciation of European Colleagues	16
Blue	Negative opinion re EU colleages	4
Blue	Friendships with European colleagues	15
Blue	Deployment leads to frustration at lack of European solidarity	8
Blue	Feeling European	6

Blue	Deployment leads to feeling more European	10
Blue	EU efforts in Lesvos are not genuine	9
Blue	EU efforts in Lesvos are effective	5
Blue	Negative opinion re EU efforts in Lesvos	37
Blue	Positive opinion of Frontex/EASO	16
Yellow	Technical EASO	26
Yellow	Technical Frontex	8
Yellow	Vulnerability Threshold	31
Yellow	Applicant Credibility	27
Yellow	Economic Migrants	2
Yellow	Non-EU Cooperation	3
Yellow	Non-Hotspot Frontex Cooperation	1
Yellow	Non-Frontex EU Cooperation	6
Yellow	Informant self-selection	20
Yellow	Deployment Length	4

Appendix G: Maps

Map of Camp Moria
Sourced from UNHCR (2016)

Map of Lesvos Island
Sourced from Athens Magazine (2016)